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Abstract 
 
Author: Rostam Abdulazeez Hakeem 
Title: Trace and history: an investigation of Kurdish banner-making through contemporary 
art practice. 
This practice-led research project considers the culture of banner-making in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
The research is trans-disciplinary in character, combining artistic, historical, and sociological 
research. The calligraphers’ workshops of the city of Sulaymaniyah in Kurdish Iraq are a focal 
point. Here the backing-boards to banner-making have absorbed traces of slogans written 
on banners for many different purposes over extended periods of time. The permitted 
appropriation of these backing-board palimpsests provides material for the development of 
an innovative genre of abstract painting, deploying calligraphy to embody a coded chronicle 
of communal life in Kurdistan. Concurrently, interviews with the calligraphers of 
Sulaymaniyah are undertaken, and these, in conjunction with conventional historical 
research into Kurdish banner-making, provide important context to the practice. Many first-
hand stories of the calligraphers contain powerful socio-political insights, especially 
regarding the status of martyrdom in the region, and evidence of corruption in martyrdom 
designation. These insights lead to an invitation to a normally inaccessible archive, research 
into which prompts a significant shift in theoretical and artistic mode, away from personal 
expression through the globalised field of abstract painting, toward a socially engaged 
methodology deployed through an installation in the Archaeological Museum of 
Sulaymaniyah, in which the creative role is envisaged as means to provide the calligraphers 
of the city with a collective voice in response to a potent concern. 
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Contributions to knowledge are made through: the appropriation of distinctive material to 
develop a specific genre of abstraction; new insights gained through interviews with 
calligraphers; historical research from photographic archives, and martyrdom archives; 
through the culminating exhibition, the selection of key stories of calligraphers, combined in 
radical and provocative form to directly address their own community, with relevance also 
to the wider region of Kurdistan. Further artistic research interrogating these themes is 
presented as an exhibition in the UK. 
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Glossary 
Ba’ath: The Iraqi party founded in 1951, as the Arab Socialist Party (the word Ba'ath means 
Renaissance in Arabic) 
ICP:      Iraqi Communist Party 
IKF:      Iraqi Kurdistan Front 
IMK: Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (Iraq) 
ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (also IS Islamic State) 
Jash: Kurdish militias who supported by Iraq's governments against the Kurdish political 
movement. (Kurds called them Jash, meaning ‘little donkey’, but the Iraqi 
governments had called them 'Fursan' Knights) 
KRG: Kurdistan Regional Government  
PUK: Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
PDK:  Kurdistan Democratic Party 
PKK:  Kurdistan Workers' Party  
PMC: People's Mobilization Committee 
KF:  Kurdistan Front 
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Preface  
As a Kurdish child, the backdrop to my upbringing was the Iraq-Iran war, and later the war 
fought by Iraq against the Peshmerga, the military forces of Kurdistan. As a family, we had 
little or no stable life routine, often moving between conflict areas, which forced me to 
leave school for a year. Sometimes we survived by good fortune. In 1987, having just moved 
to the village of Surdash, which was under Peshmerga control, the Iraqi army launched a 
large operation, over the entire day and night of July 18th, to take the village, during which 
four Peshmerga were killed, two of them a few metres from us. Many Iraqi soldiers were 
also killed. The Iraqi army then burned the village, and we were forced to escape to the next 
village and later the city. This was my first direct encounter with Peshmerga corpses that 
were later declared as martyrs. 
Whilst at school in the 1980s, our activities were devoted to Ba'athist party activities, events 
and celebrations, especially celebrating Saddam as leader, the Ba'ath party itself, and the 
call for war. As students, we were forced to participate in such events, and special banners 
were made for us to carry. We felt shame at this, because we suffered from Ba'athist 
violence towards Kurds, so tried to avoid raising Ba'athist banners as much as we could. 
After 1991, the political situation changed, and Kurdish parties took control of Kurdish 
majority areas. During the uprising that led to the change, the bodies of Ba’athist security 
and intelligence officers were put on the streets, and I witnessed how they had been 
beheaded. I began to go to political activities taking place near our home, and for the first 
time witnessed the activities of the communists (Shuara) who flew red banners on which 
their slogans were written in white. 
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Most families possessed weapons that gathered from when the region was a battlefield, 
and as a young man I began to draw such subjects, prohibited during the Ba’ath period. I 
began to study art at the Institute of Fine Arts in Sulaymaniyah, and based my paintings on 
personal and family memories from the time of the Ba'athist regime and the war. 
During elections to the Kurdistan Parliament, taking place for the first time in the modern 
history of Iraqi Kurds, there was an intensive competition between parties in the election 
campaign. This campaign became called Shara Paro, meaning ‘fighting cloth’ due to the 
large quantity of banners, flags, and cloths used in the campaign. 
The political situation deteriorated again due to internal battles between Kurdish parties, 
resulting in the killing of hundreds of Peshmerga. One of my relatives was killed by the KDP 
while he was a prisoner, and the party my family supported, the PUK, made black banners 
for his funeral ceremony, which were placed on his grave outside his family home. They 
were also placed on the PUK headquarters in Sulaymaniyah, and on the wall of the mosque 
where the funeral was held. From then onwards, as I went to work, I noticed black banners 
written for PUK martyrs, and became interested in calligraphy shops where they were 
made. I was fascinated by the colours that leaked from those banners onto the backing 
boards used by the calligraphers, especially the white colour that always seemed to 
dominate the surface. 
I became absorbed by the daily accumulation that occurs on the backing boards and how 
these layers related to successive events in this area. As an artist, I was aware of the 
aesthetic qualities these marks held, and their potential for use in a language of abstraction, 
imagining at this point an abstraction vaguely suggestive of the social and political 
discourses embodied there.  
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This research project emerged from that dilemma. Eventually I would have to set aside my 
desire to become a contemporary painter in order to recognise the importance of the 
layered narratives of the banner-making process, and their messages for my culture, and my 
sense of identity. Although it was important not to forget their relevance to my own 
experiences, I also needed to go back into history in order to find out how banners were 
used in different epochs, and how changes in the socio-political situation affected their 
appearance.  
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Introduction 
Modern Kurdistan has a complex history which continues to unfold, and a territory which 
continues to alter, at considerable pace. Kurdistan is broadly defined as those areas with a 
significant majority of Kurds, and encompasses South East Turkey, Northern Syria, North 
West Iran, and Northern Iraq, to a total of around 190,000 square kilometres. 
The Kurdish peoples continue to dream of an independent state with international 
recognition, but the division of their territory between the four contiguous nations has had 
the effect of weakening individual and collective rights. Over the past century they have also 
endured regular discrimination and oppression, most conspicuously in Iraq in the late 
twentieth century, when they faced genocide under Saddam Hussein. In Turkey and Iran, 
Kurdish identity has continually been frustrated by the forbidding of cultural practices and 
study in the Kurdish mother tongue. When Kurds in Syria finally liberated their area from 
the more recent threat of ISIS, and ran their region, the Syrian government still did not 
recognise their authority. 
In light of such persecution, and the persistent denial of a national identity, it is hard to 
compare Kurdish culture with that of nation-states, where documentation and preservation 
of artefacts, histories and linguistic diversity is habitual. Kurds have few archives of their 
own, and each of the surrounding states have written Kurdish history and culture according 
to their own bias, with few Kurdish intellectual and philosophical materials to counter this 
appropriation.  
A more accurate Kurdish history and culture is therefore dependent on more objective 
Western accounts and archives, whilst the use in this research of Western philosophy as 
primary reference permits an overarching global perspective to be applied to Kurdish 
contexts without the interference patterns produced by local Middle Eastern rivalries. 
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The research is concentrated on the part of Kurdistan in Northern Iraq, which gained 
autonomous status in 1970, and which was reconfirmed within the Iraqi Republic in 2005 (A 
more detailed history is contained in Chapter 3). 
The practice of calligraphy has been important throughout Kurdistan from ancient times 
until the present day, both in private correspondence and in public display. The profession 
of calligrapher is an ancient one, and calligraphers’ workshops are established in every town 
and city, fulfilling the important role of the accurate and elegant writing-up of public 
announcements of political events, special occasions, ceremonies and obituaries, as well as 
commercial announcements.  
Although the growing use of computer technologies has begun to reduce this practice, 
banners made in these workshops remain part of everyday life in urban areas of Kurdistan. 
Produced on the spot and handmade, they have an immediacy and urgency of production.  
Each calligrapher paints his banners upright, and hence they are first attached to a backing-
board (in wood or plastic) mounted on the wall. The colours of the cloth, usually cotton, and 
of the paint (now usually acrylic) are chosen according to a particular code of meaning, for 
example, white writing on black as symbolic of sadness or death. The material used for the 
banner is thin, often of loose weave, so that when the calligraphic stroke is applied, the 
colour leaks through the cloth onto the backing board, so that the board accumulates a 
residue of multiple slogans. These overlapping and intermingling layers of coloured text 
charting everyday life in the city are partly visible, partly obscured, as successive layers 
accumulate. Over the course of years, before the board needs to be replaced for a new one, 
long sequences of events, good and bad, catastrophes and celebrations, ideologies and 
beliefs, goods and services, leave their traces in a colour-dense palimpsest. 
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Kurdish or Arabic texts (and very occasionally English), in specific and culturally-coded 
colours, (e.g. one for an announcement of a death, another for a political affiliation) overlay 
one another on the supporting boards in new combinations and compositions.  
This research project centres on the recognition that, whilst precise interpretation is 
impossible, these complex combinations of text and colour, a form of encryption, contain a 
rich aggregation of Kurdish social history, and offer the artist-archaeologist a glimpse into 
his own identity, and the greater identity of Kurdish culture, and of a troubled nation.  
Chapter 1 describes the methodologies of the research project. Certain methodologies were 
used from the outset, whilst others developed during the research, from both theoretical 
and practical insights. A key methodology was the interviewing of the calligraphers, as this 
supplied much of the material for all stages of the practical research. 
Chapter 2 begins with a discussion of my personal history and my early experiences that led 
to my interest in banner-making and its residues, and how such experience, combined with 
a growing interest in fine art painting, developed into this research project, and its first 
expression in a series of paintings, based first upon appropriation, and later on simulation. 
Chapter 3 contains extracts from the calligraphers’ interviews, written as a composite 
history of first-hand knowledge of events received through commissions for banner-making. 
Whilst this is inevitably subjective, and therefore has, for the purposes of accuracy, been 
underpinned and contextualised by substantial historical research, it is in fact the highly 
personal, subjective nature of these records that lies at the heart of the final outcomes in 
practice. 
Chapter 4 records and discusses the installation in Sulaymaniyah Archaeological Museum 
that demonstrates the significant shift in my practice that occurs as a consequence of the 
interviews with calligraphers. The exhibition articulates the transition from an art practice 
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that prioritises a personal vision influenced by personal history, to a collective vision formed 
in collaboration with the calligraphers themselves. 
Chapter 5: covers the presentation of the Shaheed exhibition, and considers critical 
reception, audience feedback, and personal reflection. It discusses new knowledge 
produced during the project, in both practice and theory, and in their interrelation. 
Proposals for future projects provoked by reflection on the exhibition are also discussed. 
 
 
A Note on Language Complexity 
 
Martin Heidegger maintained that “language is the house of being”, and in such a personal 
research project, conducted in a second language, usually via translators and proof-readers, 
linguistic tensions inevitably arose. As the project progressed, my English improved to the 
point where I realised that many concepts that can be expressed in English do not readily 
translate into Kurdish, as that language is not sophisticated enough to capture the 
philosophical concepts required to underpin my methodological and analytical approaches. 
This feature of Kurdish was an important consideration for siting the project within a 
western philosophical context, but adopting that context also allowed me to become 
familiar with a universal language of research and analysis used in universities across the 
world. Importantly, it also gave me a new perspective on the various claims and counter-
claims made on Kurdish history by the four nation-hosts. 
Nevertheless, when researching in Kurdistan, especially when conducting the interviews, I 
was naturally thinking in Kurdish, whilst also applying theory gained from researching in the 
UK. This conflict of thought-modes was intensified by the realisation that I would want the 
research eventually to be published in Kurdistan, and that therefore I would need to 
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prevent the theoretical contextualisation from become too locked into untranslatable 
English modes of explanation. Sections of the history chapter are occasionally affected by 
this concern. Later on, recognising that such a standpoint would likely compromise the 
quality of thinking portrayed in the text, I decided that if the work is to be published in 
Kurdistan, it would need to be in Arabic.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
Chapter 1: Methodology  
Outline 
In order to understand whether a painting practice based on traces of Kurdish banner-
making can reveal aspects of a socio-political context, I arrived at a methodology involving a 
combined approach through the following: the collection of physical materials (residues); 
the collection of related qualitative data in the form of narrative content; reflection upon 
these sources through both theoretical and historical lenses, and through artistic research, 
mainly a studio-based painting practice. The activities associated with each method initially 
occurred in sequence and then became a back-and-forth iterative process. 
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1: Collection of Materials 
 
The first approach was the task of collecting materials - the residue of the banner making 
process in my hometown of Sulaymaniyah, in the Kurdish region of Iraq (see Figure 1). At 
intervals, and over a period of time I collected from calligraphers’ workshops their backing-
boards, on which the daily act of calligraphy on fabric banners is supported and enacted. I 
also collected leftover pieces of fabric. I observed the making of the banners on repeated 
daily visits to the calligraphers’ workshops, to ground my project in observation and 
reflective consideration of calligraphic residues. Without rushing to interpret the results, but 
instead making process observations, I aimed to open other pathways to understanding the 
residues, such as: what information might they reveal about the social and political fabric of 
Kurdistan? The collected residues are key to my artistic process, and a primary source for 
both developing and addressing my research questions.  
I became fascinated by the calligraphers’ boards, which I noticed in their workshops, in 
2013. The similarity of the surfaces - the residue of the banner making practice - to 
modernist paintings, was striking. I started to collect and store them as a form of ready-
made art material. This moment could be a considered as the beginning of my research 
project.  
The collected residues are various; the backing boards, cloth and canvases. These materials 
were utilised by calligraphers over different lengths of time before coming into my 
possession, and are a consequence of writing hundreds of banners. These overlapping 
layers of paint, containing the everyday history of the city and its citizens, remain partly 
visible and partly coated as the paint seeps through day after day, infiltrating the layers 
from days gone by. They comprise diverse and specific culturally-coded colours which differ  
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according to purpose, an aspect that I explore in detail in Chapter 3 as part of my historical 
research method. 
On the supporting boards texts and colours merge to create new forms. Each stage brings 
new combinations and compositions. When initially looking at the backing boards it is not 
possible to read the Kurdish text exactly, but the colours make reading of the encrypted 
data of the events almost possible. In other words, one might say that these residues are 
effects of some causes: at first one is only able to see the effects, whilst the causes are 
largely absent.  
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2: Semi-Structured Interviews  
Observation and material-collecting and informal conversations with the calligraphers 
(research participants) motivated me to enquire further about these banners and to gain an 
insight into the causes of the residues.  I needed to find a strategy to gain greater insights 
into the calligraphic process and its causal effects, and about the function of the banners in 
Kurdish society. Hence, I utilised the method of semi-structured interviews: 
 “Semi-structured interviews are often preceded by observation, informal and unstructured 
interviewing in order to allow the researchers to develop a keen understanding of the topic 
of interest necessary for developing relevant and meaningful semi-structured questions. 
The inclusion of open-ended questions and training of interviewers to follow relevant topics 
that may stray from the interview guide does, however, still provide the opportunity for 
identifying new ways of seeing and understanding the topic at hand”. (Cohen D. and 
Crabtree B. 2006, as cited in Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 2008). 
I needed to devise interview questions that would give insights into how the banners are 
used by people from different strata of society. Some of the questions originated from my 
own background as someone who had observed the banner-making process for several 
years and my personal participation in various events that the banners represented since 
Saddam's era to after the 1991 uprising.  Some of the other questions were informed by the 
frequent debates and discussions I had with the calligraphers, mainly about the process of 
making the banners. Work in the studio, theoretical readings and tutorials with my 
supervisors prompted further related questions. While I thought I might anticipate the 
responses to some of the questions, the value of the semi-structured interview technique is 
that it was dynamic and fluid, leading to unexpected information. 
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Banners are a phenomenon used by Kurdish society for different purposes, for example the 
uses vary between ordinary civilian events, and events organised by political parties or non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). I interviewed the calligraphers in order to know who 
commissioned banners and for what occasions. They might have been commissioned to: 
announce a family death; attend a demonstration or protest; to mark an historical or 
religious event; or to celebrate a martyr. These differences became more evident during 
interviewing the research participants.  The responses of the calligraphers to the initial 
questions in the interviews opened further avenues of enquiry, creating sub-questions as 
the interviews progressed. The interviews with the calligraphers led to a second set of semi-
structured interviews with a new group of research participants – the people who ordered 
the banners. 
Sometimes the interview opportunities happened by coincidence. For example, when I was 
in a calligrapher’s workshop, a group of people came to the shop to place an order for a 
banner, and I was then and there able to arrange to interview them. I was able through 
these interviews to obtain data directly from the main banner users at the time of the 
events for which the banners were needed. In some instances, I interviewed both the 
calligrapher and end user of the same banner.  Various data was drawn from societal 
occurrences, such as political, social and religious events, and the interviews produced a 
considerable quantity of material.   
In the academic field using people for data collection requires ethical procedure and 
approval, and understanding the grounds and contexts of the Ethical Approval form 
submitted to the University was a key research training process.  
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When I returned to my home city of Sulaymaniyah, I began the interviews systematically, 
meeting prospective interviewees one day in order to introduce myself and my project and 
ask for permission to interview the following day.  On the day of the interview itself, I used 
an audio recording device for data recording the interviews, and afterwards I began 
transcribing the data in Kurdish, and then translated, or had translated, some of them into 
English. Original Kurdish transcripts of the interviews appear in the Appendix, and will 
remain in that form for the Arabic version of the document. 
I noticed that the most insightful responses to the interviews were ones that took a 
narrative structure, with references made to the event that the banners had been ordered 
for. These stories were reflections of both personal experiences of the individual and more 
broadly of social and political events, revealing the rich layers of Kurdish society. The 
narratives informed my historical research and were also used as a source for my artistic 
practice, to scope out a new genre of painting.   
One problematic issue revealed through the interviews was the case of the Shaheed or 
martyr, in Iraqi society in general and in Kurdish society in particular. When the interviews 
were transcribed and translated, I realised there was a problem with the definition of the 
term martyr, because as well as the term meaning both ‘martyr’ and martyrdom’, those 
martyrs killed as patriots and those killed as traitors are both registered as a martyr in the 
KRG’s records. This latter version contradicts the common idea of a martyr within the 
Kurdish struggle for their rights. This issue arose as a new subject to explore with the 
calligraphers and subsequently became a focal for my exhibition in which calligraphers 
produced banners drawing on examples of previous banners that had referred to Shaheed, 
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and which became the substance of the installation in Sulaymaniyah museum. The 
exhibition questioned the word Shaheed within its historical context (see Chapter 4). 
The potentiality of the interview as a research method is significant because the interview 
material became a crucial source for both the practice and the historical understanding. The 
narratives gathered though the interviews are the main subject of the studio practice - 
transformed into colours and forms to produce new genre of artworks based on language 
and calligraphy. In parallel, the content obtained from the interviews brought to light the 
undocumented history of banner-making in Kurdistan, and significantly, was the means to 
reveal socio-political issues - providing a new perspective for me as an artist to consider 
Kurdish identity through the residues of banner-making. Thus, one returns to the society 
through these residues, and search by asking questions and by observing.  
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Method 3: Philosophical, Artistic and Historical Lenses 
Selected philosophical ideas provide a lens for the artistic research, while the work of other 
artists provides contextualisation. The concept of the palimpsest, developed when 
considering the backing-boards, provided a useful metaphor for the theoretical 
investigation. Meaning is not only framed on the surface but is embodied in the material 
layers and released through contextual understanding.  
In the calligraphers’ workshops, each layer imposes a further a trace on the others, giving so 
the object an aspect of Julia Kristeva’s intertextuality. (The Chicago School of Media Theory, 
2003). Derrida's notion of shifting meaning between temporal and spatial contexts (Derrida, 
J. 1981) is also relevant to an understanding of how meaning may become embodied on the 
backing-board surfaces. The viewer also plays a key role, in that glimpses of information or 
significance, accessed through the recognition of certain words in conjunction with certain 
colours, also has potential to generate new meaning, and in this sense, the project aligns 
with Umberto Eco's philosophical text The Open Work (1989). 
The works of several artists were useful reference throughout the project. Certain works of 
American artist Cy Twombly provided an initial inspiration for paintings incorporating text.  
Research into the work of Glenn Ligon and Fiona Banner were also useful regarding the 
generation and deployment of texts on a two-dimensional surface. Although their works 
vary technically, both use language within the painting process to highlight socio-political 
issues, and hence are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2; Mona Hatoum was instructive 
both in terms of her use of text, but more importantly her installation strategies, which are 
considered in Chapter 4 in relation to the Shaheed exhibition. Jeremy Deller proved a potent 
example when it came to the use of banners in contemporary art.  
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Ligon was especially influential, for, as Alex Farquharson says of his work, 
Ligon treats language as not purely literary, but he seeks to discover a new strategy 
to show his artistic imagination. For this purpose, Ligon relies on borrowing phrases 
from literature and other external sources in order to construct layers of linguistic 
structure. Language is the most important element for most of his artworks. He 
changes the text structure through the process of accumulation and repetition the 
text and demolishing the original text and he builds the new relationships between 
the words and the sentences. This kind of linguistic act on his painting surfaces, 
certainly leads to a series of interrogations and paradoxes aimed at changing the 
original material first, and secondly, he is attempts to show his artistic vision 
concerning social and political issues as well as reality. In his practice, Ligon 
appropriates from an assortment of sources series of words that he transcribes some 
of the time verbatim and at different times in a rehashed arrangement.  
(Ligon, G., Farquharson, A. and Manacorda, F., 2015: 16). 
In Ligon’s process the texts sometimes reoccur and become layers upon each other so that 
the audience are not able to read them, or sometimes a sentence is repeated several times. 
According to Manacorda, the Ligon method relates to literature and is based on selection 
from a variety of different sources. The language itself as a communication tool is 
transformed into a technical configuration through which more meaning is extracted, a 
method is derived from the process of selecting the appropriate colour and surface. His 
method also relies on the process of repetition in the writing of texts and words in order to 
convert the text into one with into multiple meanings, and containing a strong sense of 
intertextuality.  
For Ligon’s, language and residues of language become the main characters in producing an 
abstract painting, an approach which helped me formulate the method in which participants 
in my interviews have a role in producing my artworks. 
Another artist reference for whom text is a major element is Fiona Banner. In an interview 
in Banner illuminates the use of texts as a method: 
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I wasn’t articulate about this stuff and I spent much more time writing and 
trying to circumnavigate some of the problems of the image that way than 
usually making any work; it was writing as a way of seeing, really. I suppose 
I was trying to see a way around these things. It wasn’t a formal kind of 
writing and it wasn’t public. Then I began making notes on how I could 
make pictures… notes on what things looked like. Those notes in turn 
became the pictures. To begin with, I used writing as a way of un-making’, 
getting distance, and then I began building up images and scenarios by 
using language. Essentially, I began making and un-making with language 
and then making and un-making language itself (Banner, F. cited in The 
Power Plant, 2007: 3). 
 
According to Banner, writing is a part of instruction and destruction. The words are a 
method to illustrate violence as she explains: Language is an important element in some of 
her works, especially the verbal language of war films. She tries to change the image using 
language as visual form to approach with historical issues and navigate them. Through this 
kind of methodology, she tries to show her voice and imagination and transforms the 
existing elements that consist of duration - colour, light into visual language. 
Fundamentally I feel I can make a more legitimate picture thusly. 
Frequently the words get packed to the end of the page when I'm reaching 
the end of the drawings, mirroring a directness to get the thing completed 
before the model falls or loses the stance, or the light goes, or on the 
grounds that… yet formally, words mirror a duration (Banner, F. cited in 
The Power Plant, 2007: 5). 
 
Meaning is not fixed or static in her works, they are always dynamic and changeable, and 
the artist considers herself a researcher and investigator, as she explains within the 
interview: 
Various works talk to each other, some deliberately challenge others. The 
work is in flux, I do not think the meaning settles, I do not think it is 
conclusive, and I do not think it should be. It is investigative and 
explorative. That is what I mean when I said earlier “you can’t fix 
meaning,”-meaning changes according to all sorts of factors, historical, 
momentary, ever changing personal references etc. So, this conversation 
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has been good, because we have been, verbally, in motion (Banner, F. cited 
in The Power Plant, 2007: 21).   
 
According to Cay Sophie Rabinowitz, Banner transcribed war films, and her interpretation of 
visual action is made into drawings of the letters of the alphabet. Some of her works include 
letters in neon alongside neon accentuation marks. She transcribed 'Don’t look back' in 
1999 - the narrative about Bob Dylan - three times from memory, which she charachterises 
in a dialogue with Joanna Pocock as "a more personal project … about my love of Dylan and 
how impossible it is to be a fan" (Joanna Pocock, 'From Arsewoman to Unstable: A 
discussion with Fiona,' (www.interviewstream.zkm.de, 2004). Their talk prompts a reference 
to THE NAM, (1997), Banner's distribution of unedited records of six Vietnam movies. 
Banner qualifies the large volume as "a tracing rather than a re-presentation". (The Power 
Plant, 2007:32).  
Transcription is used by both Ligon and Banner as an essential tool in the artistic process, 
producing different forms of abstract paintings. Each employ taking texts from diverse 
sources to reveal new perspectives on racism, war and gender violence. Similarly, 
transcription plays a part in my artistic research through collecting and transcribing data 
sourced in the interviews. The narrations expose themes, including social and political 
issues, which can be transcribed for use in the painting process. 
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Historical 
Considering the historical context became one of the key approaches within this research 
project, because through analyzing data from interviews and undertaking a literature 
review, new knowledge began to emerge that had a strong influence on the trajectory of my 
research, and on my activity as an artist. The new knowledge in Chapter 3 does not present 
the fact of history solely, but agrees with Foucault’s definition: "archaeology does not seek 
to reconstitute the ‘truth’ of history, but show how any period is made up of a series of 
discourses: it is not a return to the innermost secret of the origin; it is the systematic 
description of a discourse-object" (cited in Felluga, D. 2011: 140). In this sense, writing 
about the history of the banner-making is not just the recording of historical information 
but it is an attempt to understand how the banners played their role in any period of the 
Kurdish socio-political history.  
Writing the history of banner-making is an important act for the Kurdish people because the 
Kurds, as a nation, have no independent status to build institutions for writing and archiving 
their history.  An historical approach is necessary to find overlooked aspects of Kurdish 
identity, and this is illuminated by the phenomenon of banners. Through exploring the 
history of banner-making through the testimonies of the calligraphers themselves, a 
different view of history becomes possible. The calligraphers’ stories are discourses from 
different periods, combining as a form of collective voice reflecting on key socio-political 
issues. 
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Method 4: Artistic Research 
 
This was the central research method for the project, identifying appropriate subjects, 
provoking new modes of inquiry, and expanding the domain of research. It is also the 
method through which the relevance of the project as a whole is made manifest. 
My artistic research methodology involved constant reflection on the intentions behind the 
production of artworks, and their likely consequences, including issues of appropriation and 
originality, and of audience reception. Detailed application of the methodology will be 
discussed in Chapter 4 when I record and discuss the culminating Shaheed (Martyrdom) 
exhibition, and in the next chapter when I provide a commentary on my painting practice. 
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Chapter 2: Painting as Appropriation. Painting as Archaeology. 
“My good Adso,” my master said, “during our whole journey I have been teaching you 
to recognise the evidence through which the world speaks to us like a great book.” 
                                                           Umberto Eco, The Name of the Rose, Bompiani, 1980 
 
In this chapter I outline the initial methodology adopted for my studio painting practice, and 
the progress of the paintings from appropriation mode to mimicry mode, following further 
research in the calligraphers’ workshops in Sulaymaniyah. At this stage I was reading widely, 
and multiple theories and questionings were beginning to affect my approaches. For this 
reason, I have sought to preserve a broadly linear, chronological structure in this chapter 
rather than over-formalise the interrelationship of theory and practice. 
 
As I partly recounted in the Preface, my childhood in Sulaymaniyah city, living close to 
calligraphers’ workshops, meant I had daily eye-contact with the banners produced in their 
workshops, and I recognised these banners as important to social interaction. However, as a 
Kurd, I had complex feelings toward the use of banners.  During the Iraq-Iran war, and the 
first Gulf War, the Ba’athist regime forced schools to protest against Iran and the US, and 
school administrators were provided with banners to this effect, making students wave 
banners in protests and marches. When I was in high school, Ali Hassan al-Majid, also known 
as Chemical Ali, visited Sulaymaniyah to open an art project, and our school (Rojhalat) made 
banners for that occasion, and forced students to take them to the art project site. That 
same year, 1988, Chemical Ali used chemical bombs in Halabja to kill thousands of Kurds in 
the operation known as Anfal, and thus I was deeply ashamed to have been a part of 
Ba’athist events.   
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After 1991 banners became an important medium for party propaganda, and consequently 
huge numbers of banners, in various colours and sizes, were displayed in public places. 
During the civil war between Kurdish parties (1994-1998) black banners were made almost 
every day for martyrs who died for their political beliefs, and on my way to work I 
encountered these every day. This memory continues to have an important influence on my 
artistic outlook. 
 
At the time, I was interested to understand the role banners play in the sharing of news and 
propaganda within Kurdish society, and how their colours symbolically divided Kurdish 
society into groups. I also noticed how the text of each banner left its traces, like a 
palimpsest, on the calligraphers’ backing-boards, and how this palimpsest offered itself as a 
metaphor for collective memory. The similarity of such surfaces to modernist paintings was 
striking. The decision to collect these complex surfaces, whilst also observing the methods 
and skills of the calligraphers, became a key strategy in my developing research. 
 
The process of painting in the Plymouth studio began at the time I was reading the news 
about Sulaymaniyah on Kurdish websites reporting on recently begun battles between ISIS 
and Peshmergo forces, and the accidental slaying and kidnapping of the Yazidis. I began 
transcribing extracts of such news onto banners, using, as closely as I could, the same 
method and style of banner script as the calligraphers themselves use, and simulating their 
materials. I used one piece of cloth to write on, using thin fabric so that the colour easily 
soaked through allowing the script traces to accumulate on the MDF board I had installed 
behind it.  
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Figure 1: Backing boards collected from various calligraphers’ workshops. 2011, Sabunkaran, 
Sulaymaniyah (Photograph Sheelan Hakeem).  
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An initial question was whether to allow theoretical research to lead, and have the painting 
respond to this, or to begin painting and allow that to become the dynamo for the 
production of written reflection and theoretical inquiry.  After consulting Sullivan’s thoughts 
on artistic research, I decided that the painting process should lead1.  As the layering 
process gained traction, a clear connection with the concept of palimpsest developed. The 
term ‘palimpsest’ was used by the Greeks, to describe animal skin (that would later be 
called ‘vellum’) on which writings are made and later erased (often by the act of scraping) in 
order to prepare the surface for new writing. Because the erasure cannot be total, an 
intersection or interference of various layers of writing accumulates.  
The idea of palimpsest was used as a metaphor in the field of psychology by Sigmund Freud. 
In his A Note upon the Mystic Writing Pad of 1925 he develops this metaphor by imagining a 
piece of paper placed on a waxed area for children to write on. When the writing is made 
onto the paper it is visible, but when the paper is removed, the writing disappears, leaving 
mere traces on the waxed area. Freud relates this process to the human psyche, and he 
 
1 “By the latter half of the 20th century, the process of making and understanding visual images had taken a linguistic turn. 
Influenced by postmodern theories of interpretation, artworks were seen as texts whose meaning was shaped in part by 
their contexts and genres, as the prior knowledge the viewer brought to the artistic encounter”. (Sullivan, G. 2010: 18). 
According to Sullivan, Donald Schön’s idea, “Knowing-in action”, “reflection-in action” and “reflection-on-art practice,” tells 
us that “effective practitioners have the capacity to bring implicit and tactic understandings to a problem at hand and these 
intuitive capacities interact with existing systems of knowledge to yield critical new insights”. (Sullivan, G. 2010: 67). 
 “The artist is the key figure in the creation of new insights and awareness that has the potential to change the way we see 
and think. The studio experience is a form of intellectual and imaginative inquiry, and the studio is a site where research can 
be undertaken that is sufficiently robust to yield knowledge and understanding that is individually situated and socially and 
culturally relevant”. (Sullivan, G. 2010: 70).  
“First, practice-based research needs access to experience in all its variety… Second, the role of practice-based research in 
the wider artistic and scientific community demands that it, in a self-reflective and self-critical way, is aware of its own 
grounds and possibilities… Furthermore, practice-based research has to take into account the possibility that has a wider 
than academic effects, even when theoretical, practice-based research in the arts has an effect on future artistic experience, 
be it individual or collective… that experience is hermeneutical through and through raises not only questions of validity for 
the interpretation, but also for recognizing that interpretation are not final, that experience has no end or ground and that, 
therefore, constant criticism is the only way to go forward”. (Hannula, M., Suoranta J. and Vadén, T. 2005: 42-44).  
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views the waxed area as a metaphor for the human unconscious. Through the process of my 
paintings, I considered Freud’s idea of this remnant collective memory, and extended it 
through the ideas of Jung to explore notions of the collective unconscious. This latter 
extension was eventually rejected as being too speculative, but the boards collected from 
the calligraphy workshops, bearing the thoughts and emotions of a range of people, 
accumulated daily on top of one other, might withstand scrutiny as an oblique form of 
collective memory. 
This research led me to Julia Kristeva’s ideas on intertextuality (Orr, M. 2003), as I 
considered that this type of meaning may be available within the text remnants, as each 
layer is ‘in contact’ with the previous one. The incidents resemble a chain in which one link 
joins to another, and thus an incident of today is associated with one from yesterday, or 
from the previous month and so on. Intertextuality applies more directly to literary fields, 
but due to the nature of my subject matter – the everyday ‘performance’ of text - it was 
clear this relevance could apply to certain specialist types of visual art. Readings of 
semiology allowed interpretations of the text remnants as forms of symbol, and the 
‘indexical’ definition of Charles Peirce in which the indexical sign is defined as the direct 
contact of two objects in a cause and effect relation in which the cause would disappear to 
leave the effect (Nöth, W. 1990). 
  
39 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The beginning of studio experiments. 2014-2015 (Photograph Ala Uzire). 
 
Figure 3: Making banners from layers of texts. 2015 (Photograph Martin Brooks). 
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At this stage, abstract painters including Cy Twombly, and Raymond Hens were useful 
examples, as both artists deploy text within the process of painting. Hens collects disposed 
textual material such as outdated posters, to be re-used in painting, whilst Twombly uses 
writings from ancient civilisations, especially Greek mythology, as a formative part of his 
paintings. In parallel, a more practical goal at this juncture was to discover the notational 
significance of the various colours I was using. 
During this painting phase, I returned briefly to Kurdistan to collect data, hold a series of 
interviews, collect more banner remnants, and further document the process of banner-
making by the calligraphers. I started my interviews with people from a wide range of 
classes of the community, including politicians, religious persons, wage earners, the middle 
class, and representatives of women’s organisations - selecting representative individuals 
for my interviews, and of course asking them if they would agree to take part in my 
research. The questions were devised according to the individual’s circumstances, the 
common points being the writing of banners for various occasions, and the colours used by 
each group.  
As the interviews progressed I realised that the calligraphers were a type of medium for all 
these different classes, and I began to question them more closely. My questions for the 
calligraphers were specifically: how they became calligraphers; about their clients; the 
differences between banners made during recent compared to historical periods; and 
memories from working as calligraphers. Using a semi-structured interview technique new 
questions would naturally arise from their answers.  
I visited calligraphers on a daily basis to become familiar with their working style, and the 
type of commissions they were receiving, whilst compiling photographic records. I walked in 
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all areas of the city - not simply areas familiar to me - in order to understand variations in 
style and methods used.  
Each calligrapher paints his banners upright, and hence they are first attached to a backing-
board of wood or plastic, mounted on the wall. The colours of the cloth, usually cotton, and 
of the paint (nowadays acrylic is most widely used) are chosen according to a strict code, for 
example, white writing on black as symbolic of sadness or death. The material used for the 
banner is thin, often of loose weave, so that when the calligraphic stroke is applied, the 
colour leaks through the cloth onto the backing board, so that the board increasingly 
accumulates residues of multiple slogans. Over the course of years, the sequence of events, 
good and bad, catastrophes and celebrations, ideologies and beliefs, goods and services, 
leave their traces in this colour-dense palimpsest. 
My research project centres on the recognition that, whilst precise interpretation is 
impossible, these complex combinations of text and colour, are a form of encryption and 
contain a rich aggregation of Kurdish social history, offering this artist-archaeologist a 
glimpse into his own identity, and the greater identity of his culture, and of his troubled 
nation. The residues of banner-making were integral to the process of producing new 
paintings.  Although the causes of these residues were obscured, or absent, the interviews I 
had conducted with the original makers could be characterised as a search for the causes - 
as an excavation of meaning.  
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Figure 4: Sample interview. 2015 
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Figure 5: Omer Salim’s calligraphy workshop. 2015 (Photograph Halo Lano). 
Figure 6: Appropriating calligraphers’ methods of making the banners and gathering traces. 2016. 
(Photograph Martin Brooks). 
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The first texts I used in the paintings were purely experimental and without significance, but 
following the interviews, the texts employed in these processes of mimicry became 
increasingly loaded, both with information and with emotional engagement. To retain 
faithfulness of process, it was important that sufficient stories overlaid each other so that 
the full intention of any one banner could not be fully or, in some cases, even partially 
deciphered, but instead stories mixed with other stories, all of different colours depending 
upon purpose and allegiance, in a form of palimpsest. 
Rather than a true attempt at analysis and evaluation, this enabled me to find new 
meanings to harness in my process. Whilst transcribing the interviews, questions of how I 
might transfer these stories into paintings arose.  I realised I could take quotes from the 
stories and place them as texts into the paintings. To achieve this, I simulated the 
calligrapher’s method, transposing their stories with paint onto new cloth, and repeating 
this process until a disappearance and demolition of language occurred.  
Language plays a significant role on the banners as an initially legible text which 
accumulates until it becomes illegible trace on the backing boards. The language contained 
in the stories from the interviews is relatively straightforward. Selecting colours for 
transcribing the stories is, as with the original commissioned transcription, based on content 
of the stories, using the colours with the relevant symbolic connotation.  
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Figure 7: Sampling a different scale of painting with a different background. 2016-2017 (Photograph 
Rostam Hakeem).  
 
Figure 8: photograph showing the two different works produced from a single process: the banner itself, 
and its trace that has leached through the fabric onto the backing board. 2016-2017 (Photograph 
Rostam Hakeem). 
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Derrida proposed that meanings are not firmly established, but are different and deferred 
(i.e. elsewhere, at a given time). He illustrates this with the idea that if we check the 
dictionary for a word, we establish definition by means of another word, which needs 
defining, and so on, in a relational dance. 
Having encountered Umberto Eco through Derrida, and read Eco’s Open Work (Eco, U. 
1989) I also read his novel, The Name of the Rose (2004) and was absorbed by his treatment 
of remnants as clues for analysing past incidents and unveiling political and social problems.    
Although I recognised that the act of borrowing was integral to my process of painting, the 
texts I chose to use were very different from the subject-matter of the calligraphers, who 
simply transcribe texts from their clients (e.g. news of those who have died; demonstration 
slogans; propaganda of political parties; commercial advertisements…) In contrast, realising 
that their recollections are an important element for forming new perspectives on the 
cultural discourse of Kurdistan in different epochs, I obtained stories from the calligraphers 
themselves. Rewriting these stories in the form of layers borrowed from the calligrapher’s 
subject matter and technique as a form of selective re-creation, producing complex new 
forms and meanings.  
To assist in these decisions, I looked closely at Glenn Ligon and British artist Fiona Banner, 
(The Bastard Word, The Power Plant, (The Power Plant (2007), especially Banner’s 
transcription of scripts from films about the Vietnam War, made at different scales onto 
canvas, so that an abstract product develops from a loaded political source. The process of 
painting at this point took time to develop and perfect, as the amount of colour leaching 
through the cloth was insufficient. It took much repeated writing of texts in order to get 
enough of a trace of colour on the backing boards.  
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The colour of the text selected depended upon the theme of the stories because in 
Kurdistan the calligraphers’ colours symbolise political parties. Out of the same painting 
process, two distinct sorts of paintings arise: the accumulated traces of the stories on the 
backing boards, which I began to understand as a highly specific genre of abstraction; and 
the accumulated stories on the fabric of banners themselves, which I realised might become 
an artwork of a different nature. 
The works on the backing boards, made from accumulated residues of coloured texts, 
similar to a palimpsest, were largely illegible. The texts on the fabric banners had some 
words able to be read, but as the successive stories are superimposed with previous stories 
any particular story is hard to decipher and thus appropriation remained a key method for 
the production of the paintings. 
In the Middle East, especially in Iraq, it is interesting to note that legal issues such as 
intellectual property rights in the cultural field are non-existent, whereas in the West there 
needs to be an awareness of copyright and intellectual property rights when using the 
materials of others in academia. Any of my own initial concerns regarding the ethics of 
appropriation were assuaged once I realised such a strategy is now a common methodology 
in contemporary art, nevertheless, I followed ethical procedure for my use of both the 
residues obtained from the calligraphers, and the stories from the interviews. Such a 
procedure is I believe, a necessary moral obligation in academic research2.    
 
2 Artists have occasionally been called out for infringing intellectual property rights, a good  
example being Damien Hirst’s show of 24 spot paintings in Los Angeles 2017, when he was accused of plagiarising the 
Australian aboriginal tradition of dot painting, handed down for many generations, and especially that of Emily 
Kngwarreye. Hirst denied having reproduced the style of the Kngwarreye’s paintings, but Barbara Weir, an Australian 
desert artist, insisted when interviewed by ABC that Hirst had appropriated the painting style, without even understanding 
the culture behind it (Schwartz, O. 2008). 
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Figure 9: A calligraphy workshop in Nawadar, Sulaymaniyah, 2015, showing the backing board with 
the accumulated traces from bannermaking. These are ordinarily discarded by the calligrapher when 
they are deemed too thickly layered with paint to work on top of. (Photograph Halo Lano). 
 
Figure 10: Photograph showing appropriated traces to begin making a new painting. 2016 (Photograph 
Rostam Hakeem). 
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Such considerations are vital for researchers intending to use the materials of others, and 
for this research project, two different ethical permissions were sought: the first to 
interview the participants, and to use their eye-witness accounts; the second, a consent 
letter from the calligraphers enabling me to repurpose their used backing-boards for the 
making of my own artistic works - I had come to know the calligraphers well, and would not 
have wished any of them to feel they were being exploited.  
A consent letter was provided and signed by the calligraphers to confirm that they 
understood that these materials were not going to be exploited for commercial purposes. 
This moment of artistic appropriation tallied with the positive Marxist definition of 
appropriation: producing new understanding through appropriating materials that have not 
been produced for consumption. To cite Evans:  
while for Marx appropriation was simply the form in which exploitation took place, 
because capital appropriated alienated labour, and dispossessing the workers from 
their own appropriation of the product of their labour, artistic 
appropriation…became a legitimate and necessary method: a kind of self-defence. 
That which Marx believed should be abolished, in order to achieve ‘real 
appropriation’, was now one of the inevitable preconditions that could at least be 
artistically appropriated (Evans, D. 2009: 215-216). 
 
In the studio, I began with the actual sections of backing-boards from the calligraphers’ 
workshops in Sulaymaniyah, obtained, as previously noted, by explaining the subject and 
purpose of my research and requesting the use of their old backing-boards. It is also 
important to state that these boards I obtained from the calligraphers’ workshops had no 
commercial value, and as they inevitably become too thick with paint accumulation to be 
workable, they are normally thrown away. In this sense certainly, exploitation was avoided, 
but I also hoped the calligraphers might gain insights into the importance of their role as 
banner-makers. (In the end, as Chapter 4 will make clear, I decided to address this and give 
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the calligraphers an authentic voice through my practice). 
Appropriation strategies are now common in contemporary art, where appropriation is 
viewed as “the intentional act of the artist in which they make use of pre-existing objects 
and methods of others in order to produce new works of art with new meanings”(Schwartz, 
O. 2008). In the academic field however, it is essential to be aware of stricter ethical 
principles, including respect for privacy and autonomy, attribution, and respect for 
intellectual property (2008). This strategy dates back to the early 20th century. 
Cubism was among the first artist movements to involve appropriated materials in painting, 
as can be seen in the work of Juan Gris and Georges Braque. Images were collaged from 
magazines and newspapers and having been removed from their original context 
contributed to new meanings. A more radical appropriation strategy was introduced by 
Marcel Duchamp’s landmark ready-made work Urinal, which shocked audiences not so 
much for its subject matter, but because it was a pre-existing object taken out of its original 
context, placed in a gallery setting, and signed as an artwork (though even this did not 
belong to the artist).  
Duchamp's intention, to liberate art from the traditions of the handcrafted artefact 
towards thought phenomena, has had a remarkable effect on our perception of art 
today; contemporary art tends to be interested in revealing cultural and political 
issues such that art is not only aesthetic, but rather, it raises issues (Meireles, C. 
1970. Insertions in Ideological Circuits, as cited in Evans, D. 2009: 51). 
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Figure 11: Building up layers of text to obtain traces. 2017 (Photograph Ala Uzire). 
Figure 12: Stories over stories - using diverse colours and fonts resulting in fragments of traces. 2017 
(Photograph Rostam Hakeem). 
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Half a century later, appropriation was extensively employed by the Pop Art movement. 
Everyday images were taken from popular culture and re-used in reproduction, 
juxtaposition, and repetition, the ultimate exponent being Andy Warhol. Another American 
artist Robert Rauschenberg, would take non-traditional materials, specifically photographic 
imagery and objects, and attach them to his paintings to generate a new dialogue around 
appropriation and painting. As Douglas Crimp in his essay On the Museum’s Ruins put it:  
 
I suggested that Robert Rauschenberg’s works of the early 1960s threatened the 
museum’s order of discourse. The vast array of objects that the museum had always 
attempted to systematise now reinvaded the institution as pure heterogeneity. 
What struck me as crucial was these works’ destruction of the guarded autonomy of 
modernist painting through the introduction of photography onto the surface of the 
canvas. This move was important not only because it spelled the extinction of the 
production mode but also because it questioned all the claims to authenticity 
according to which the museum determined its body of objects and its field of 
knowledge (2009:134). 
 
Evans usefully applies Duchamp’s innovation to the realm of politics: 
If Duchamp’s intervention was in terms of art (the logic of the phenomenon), it’s 
correct to say that it applied to aesthetics. If it thus announced the freeing of the 
habitual from the handmade, it’s also correct to say that any intervention in this 
sphere today would necessarily be a political one (Duchamp’s collocations having the 
merit of shifting our perception of art away from artistic objects towards the 
phenomena of thought; given that the art works being made today tend to be 
concerned with culture in general rather than art alone). For aesthetics is the basis 
of art, polities of culture (Evans, D. 2009 P.51). 
 
Authenticity of an artwork became an increasingly complex issue giving rise to myriad 
debates with the advent of Postmodernism, in which appropriation was a central strategy. 
Hayley Rowe notes that appropriation denied the notion of “originality” and so freed up the 
viewer to renegotiate the meaning.  
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Art theorists have often latched the issue of appropriation onto Roland Barthes’ concept of 
‘the birth of the reader’, for as meaning is deconstructed by postmodernist approaches, 
readers or viewers become producer rather than merely consumer. 
Barthes concluded that “the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the 
author” (1977, as cited in Irvin, S. 2005). This has had a great influence on linguists and 
critical theory. The way became clear to deconstruct and reassemble text, and readers are 
now free to generate their own interpretations. It can therefore be said that literary work is 
created in two parts: one by the author as an hypothesis structure; and the second by the 
sensibility of the reader. 
With the author out of the way, the reader, or appropriation-artist, finds they have the 
freedom to discover new interpretations. It is the reader who determines the meaning 
through his personal interpretation, and that meaning can change from day to day and from 
reader to reader. As Foucault said: “what difference does it make who is speaking?” (as 
cited in Irvin, S. 2005). 
Barthes’ recognition has broader significance for this research project, as my attempts to 
generate a distinctive abstract voice, evolved into a concern to express multiple voices.                                      
An integral characteristic of my methodology is its trans-disciplinary nature, which benefits 
from other fields of knowledge. Such an approach common in contemporary art, as Chris 
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Figure 13: Using stencils of political figures superimposed with political slogans. 2018 (Photograph Ala 
Uzire). 
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Dercon, former director of Tate Modern Gallery, suggests:   
“Contemporary art is representing a cultural space where many different disciplines 
feel suddenly at home. Whether they be imitated, taken seriously or not, 
contemporary art is welcoming pseudo-sociology, pseudo-urbanism, pseudo-
research and pseudo-activism.”  
(Dercon, C. as cited in Art Basel 2015). 
 
There was a pronounced historical and even archaeological aspect to the methodology, 
because the subjects and objects I researched had the characteristic feature of obliquely 
storing a history of the events. Interviewing a variety of people about the past, combined 
with recovering the memory of the calligraphers who had written the past (albeit in an 
unpreserved form), was a key strategy to this methodology. 
The French philosopher Michel Foucault offers a distinctive opinion about history and 
history-recording - differentiating himself from other historians. Foucault as sociologist, 
philosopher and archaeologist probes and searches, perusing the past to form new 
understandings. 
Archaeology is also a significant term for the analyses of Sigmund Freud despite working 
predominantly in the field of psychoanalysis. In some form, Freud depends upon the past 
for understanding and treating psychological ‘disease’, using an archaeological metaphor of 
mind.  
A useful reference in this respect was the project The Way of the Shovel (Roelstraete, D. 
2009 e-flux.com) curated by Dieter Roelstraete, in which he considers the contemporary 
artist as archaeologist, scanning the pages of past methods of the other knowledge-fields 
for producing an artistic work. 
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Figure 14: Building up layers of text to obtain a body of traces. 2018 (Photograph Rostam Hakeem). 
Figure 15: Building up layers of text to obtain a body of traces. 2018 (Photograph Ala Uzire). 
 
57 
 
The theory behind the readymade was explained in an anonymous editorial published 
in the May 1917 issue of avant-garde magazine The Blind Man run by Duchamp and 
two friends: “Whether Mr. Mutt with his own hands made the fountain or not has no 
importance. He CHOSE it. He took an ordinary article of life, and placed it so that its 
useful significance disappeared under the new title and point of view – created a new 
thought for that object” (Tate. Org, Art Term: Readymade 2019).  
The process of writing banners neatly fits Peirce’s definition of ‘indexical sign’ as in 
opposition to symbols and icons as a category comprising not only natural, but also many 
conventional signs. A sign vehicle is an index if it is “really affected” (Peirce, C. 2.248 as cited 
in Nöth, W. 1990: 113) by it as referential object. “The index is physically connected with its 
object; they make an organic pair, but the interpreting mind has nothing to do with this 
connection, except remarking it, after it is established” (§ 2.299 as cited in Nöth, W. 1990: 
113).  
What I gleaned from Eco’s The Name of the Rose is how the writer, artist, or author, may 
work by means of a special method. My role of a detective in this project (like William in the 
novel) allowed me to reach a position that I could not have previously imagined. The events 
I address are in the margins of history, with few ways to lead us back to them. Here the 
function of the research project is to lead to invisible areas, and re-show them in a new 
light, in order to provide new insight. 
Re-enactment is but one strategy considered by Roelstraete, D. (2009) in his reflection 
on artists who investigate historical events via archives and other available historical 
materials. Roelstraete suggests an artistic research methodology which helps bring 
past events back to life, as a kind of reconstruction and mending of memory, and in 
particular to prevent forgetfulness: 
Our culture’s quasi-pathological systemic infatuation with both the New and the Now 
‘youth’ has effectively made forgetting and forgetfulness into one of the central 
features of our contemporary condition, and the teaching of history in schools around 
the globalised world has suffered accordingly (Roelstraete, D. 2009). 
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In an analysis of Foucault’s archaeology, Barry Smart (2002) found that: 
the object of archaeological analysis is then: a description of the archive, literally 
what may be spoken of in discourse; what statements survive, disappear, get re-
used, repressed or censured; which terms are recognised as valid, questionable, 
invalid; what relations exist between ‘the system of present statements’ and those 
of the past, or between the discourses of ‘native’ and foreign cultures; and what 
individuals, groups, or classes have access to particular kinds of discourse [2]  
(Foucault as cited in Smart, B. 2002: 48).  
Foucault also found that:  
The archive of a society, a culture, or a civilisation cannot be described exhaustively: 
or even, no doubt, the archive of a whole period. On the other hand, it is not 
possible for us to describe our own archive, since it is from within these rules that 
we speak, since it is that which gives to what we can say-and to itself, the object of 
our discourse-its modes of appearance, its forms of existence and coexistence its 
system of accumulation, historicity, and disappearance. The archive cannot be 
described in its totality; and in its presence, it is unavoidable. It emerges in 
fragments, regions, levels… (Foucault, M. Archaeology of Knowledge:130 as cited in 
Enwezor, O. 2008: 16).  
 
In the article “Michel Foucault and Archaeology” (Willette, J. 2014), provides us with a 
number of important aspects of Foucault’s archaeological method which he used as a new 
way of historical approach. In other words, the archaeologist studies not so much the object 
itself, but how the object was constructed out of discourse. The mechanics of discursive 
formation, as it were, and how the discourse was created had to be studied without being 
concerned about what “truth” content the discourse might or might not contain. This was 
an intellectual move that re-directed the way in which historians treat documents, meaning 
that if what was analysed was the mechanisms of creating a discursive object, then the 
intellectual would be “disengaged” and critique would be re-located to mechanics and away 
from effects (Foucault as cited in Willette, J. 2014). 
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Figure 16: A original backing board salvaged from a calligrapher’s workshop. 2011 (Photograph Sherko Aziz). 
Figure 17: A calligrapher’s order book showing dates and details for commissions. Jwankar, Sulaymaniyah 
calligraphy workshop. 2015 (Photograph Sdiq Abdula). 
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Foucault remained important throughout to my project, because as philosopher he 
continually returns to history. Historian Roy Porter points out: 
By digging through history, engaging in what he called archaeology of knowledge, 
Foucault questions fundamental assumptions about modern experiences; 
assumptions that form the basis of the distinction between good and bad, sanity and 
madness, normality and sexual deviancy (Porter, R. as cited in Open Culture, 2013). 
Foucault rejects the idea that returning to history is nostalgia, he maintains that through 
investigating history he can analyse the phenomenon of the modern world. History for him 
is a store of unused ideas.  
Porter again: 
Foucault is the great explorer of the perverse, Foucault takes the traditional victims 
of history - the mad, the perverse, the bad, the sinful, the criminal, etc. he doesn’t 
romanticise that - he avoids doing that - but actually shows that within them there is 
a mirror image of society (Roy, P. as cited in Open Culture 2013). 
Similarly, my interrogation of the history of banner-making was intended as an excavation 
of the past. Research questions, which fed into the interviews, would out of necessity, 
involve other disciplines and fields of knowledge, including politics, economics, culture and 
religion. Interviews would often proceed in the way Freud worked on his patients; I 
attempted through conversation to gain an understanding about the traces on the banners 
through uncovering the discourses that lay behind them.  
I used the semi-structured interview form to be able to visit hidden corners of past and dig 
in profound places. The interviews proceeded mainly as a questioning of an individual’s 
memories, to refresh their minds - especially in relation to the writing of banners.  As 
writing banners is used in all aspects of Kurdish life, the interviews would gradually move 
outward to explore wider issues. In most of the interviews with calligraphers, I asked how 
61 
 
and when they learned calligraphy, which took them back to the teaching system at school, 
and to specific political and economic circumstances. So these are all linked together.  
What is important here is that such dealings with personalised history is not only about 
exploring or documenting them but also how to transform that history to an understanding 
of our present. Foucault describes this in his Archaeology of Knowledge: 
 Let us say that history, in its traditional form, undertook to ’memorise' the 
monuments of the past, transform them into documents, and lend speech to those 
traces which, in themselves, are often not verbal, or which say in silence something 
other than what they actually say; in our time, history is that which transforms 
documents into monuments. In that area where, in the past, history deciphered the 
traces left by men, it now deploys a mass of elements that have to be grouped, made 
relevant, placed in relation to one another to form totalities. There was a time when 
archaeology, as a discipline devoted to silent monuments, inert traces, objects 
without context, and things left by the past, aspired to the condition of history, and 
attained meaning only through the restitution of a historical discourse; it might be 
said, to play on words a little, that in our time history aspires to the condition of 
archaeology, to the intrinsic description of the monument (Foucault, M. 1972:7 -8). 
Through an active digging, Foucault comes to view the past as a crime to be solved and 
related to the present. An additional relevance of Foucault’s vision for my project is his idea 
that history should be converted into monument. 
Finally (and most importantly, perhaps), art and archeology also share a profound  
understanding—and one might say that they are on account of this almost 
“naturally” inclined to a Marxist epistemology—of the primacy of the material in all 
culture, the overwhelming importance of mere “matter” and “stuff” in any attempt 
to grasp and truly read the cluttered fabric of the world. The archaeologist’s 
commitment is to earth and dirt, hoping that it will one day yield the truth of 
historical time; the artist’s commitment is to the crude facts of his or her working 
material (no matter how “virtual” or, indeed, immaterial this may be), which is 
equally resistant to one-dimensional signification and making-sense, equally prone 
to entropy—yet likewise implicated in a logic of truth-production. 
 
Furthermore, there can also be no archaeology without display - the modern culture 
of museum display (if not of the museum itself) is as much “produced” by the 
archaeologist’s desire to exhibit his or her findings as it is by the artist’s confused 
desire to communicate his or hers” (Roelstraete, D. 2009). 
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Figure 19: Detail of the painting. 2018 (Photograph Baz Ahmed). 
Figure 18: Large scale painting made from traces, using a variety of socio-political stories as source 
material. 2018 (Photograph Baz Ahmed). 
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Reflection 
This chapter charted how my initial research into the workshops of Sulaymaniyah 
calligraphers led firstly to an appropriation strategy in which the traces of banner-making, 
imprinted and overlaid onto backing-boards, were removed from their original context and 
taken to my studio. Some of these boards were cut up and reassembled, others worked 
over, and others preserved as ‘found’ or ‘ready-made’ artworks. By changing the spatial 
context and usage of the material extracted from the calligraphers’ workshops to the studio, 
the materials were converted into an artwork through what Evans (2009) calls ‘re-coding’:  
The general understanding of appropriation art is still influenced by this critical-
subversive emphasis today; this even goes as far as the current lexical definition that 
describes ‘re-coding’ or a ‘shift in meaning’ which… takes place purely due to the fact 
that an original image has been appropriated” (214).  
 
The next phase was to turn the calligrapher's method, by way of mimicry, into a new means 
of generating paintings. Part of the mimicry was to first construct a studio version of the  
backing-board, which had the effect of producing both new banners and new traces for me 
to consider in a studio context. Both the pieces of cloth and the backing-boards would 
generate new artworks. 
This process of mimicry was further informed by ongoing interviews with the calligraphers, 
whose stories became the reference material for the new ‘banners’ (the pieces of cloth I 
used). The repeated writing of these banners, in order to overlay the backing-boards many 
times (to reproduce the palimpsest) offered me a radical new means of image-creation 
within the realm of contemporary abstraction.  
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As an unexpected effect, these repeated transcriptions caused me to recognize the inherent 
importance of the stories themselves. Through ethical procedures and conversations with 
calligraphers, I had understood and accepted that appropriation of the backing-boards was 
a valid artistic strategy, one that did not exploit the calligraphers, however, when it came to 
using their stories, I was not prepared for the feeling of responsibility that accompanied the 
layering of these often-disturbing accounts that caused their meanings to become illegible. 
This realization would in part prompt the shift in methodology documented in the next 
chapter. 
In the products of these processes, I recognised overlaps with the Islamic calligraphic 
tradition, in which portions of text are, through large-scale calligraphy, transformed into 
linguistic designs for display in mosques and other sacred situations. I knew this reference 
would appear stronger to Western eyes, as they would be unable to detect the secular 
nature of the information I was transcribing, but felt that the obliteration of the text would 
distinguish it from that reference point. For a Kurdish, Arabic, or Middle-Eastern viewer I 
made use of the passing similarity, in it allowed me to subvert conventional expectations, 
and provoke interest and curiosity. 
I also appreciated that an artist such as Cy Twombly, to whom I looked in the early phases of 
my studio research, used handwritten (though not calligraphic) text as a component in his 
layered, gestural paintings, and that artists such as Fiona Banner have made work based 
upon large amounts of transcribed text.  
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My practice is intended to provide new understandings about painting in relation to 
embedded socio-political issues, and the manner in which gradual accumulations of loaded 
meaning might pass via a form of palimpsest into illegibility, and thereby abstraction. For a 
Western audience, this illegibility retains a rhythm and colour palette particular to a Kurdish 
or Arabic context, and hence provokes a culturally-specific curiosity that distinguishes it in 
intent and visual surface from abstract painting in the Western canon, whilst to a Kurdish 
eye (or to one who understands Arabic) the abstraction will emit glimpses of potential 
meaning leaking through the visual suppression.  
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Chapter 3: Banner-Making in The Modern History of The Kurdish People in Kurdistan. 
Introduction: 
In this chapter I consider the development of banner-making in Kurdistan, particularly 
southern Kurdistan, using the city of Sulaymaniyah as a key example. In order to understand 
the reasons behind the emergence of banners as a cultural product in Kurdish society, it was 
necessary to consider them within the context of modern Kurdish history, and to appreciate 
the role banners played as medium for the transmission of socio-political messages during 
these historical events. 
As a consequence of being colonised and not having an independent state, Kurds have not 
been able to extensively record their own national history. They also have had no 
institutions to archive their cultural products. As a result, no definitive history of  
banner-making in Kurdistan exists, and it was therefore necessary to refer to alternative 
sources to conceptualise the history of banner-making. 
This chapter therefore, uses information gathered from on-site interviews conducted with 
calligraphers in their workshops, supported by photographic evidence uncovered in 
research at the British Museum. This chapter also uses information gathered from books, 
documents, and other archives in order to understand the historical context of banner-
making in Kurdistan. Throughout the chapter, the development of banner-making is set 
against key historical moments (captured largely as footnotes) as each political, religious, 
economic or social shift impacted upon their development, particularly in the significance of 
attributes of the banners themselves. At the conclusion of the chapter I record my own 
contribution, through practice, to the debate.  
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Banner-making is a common phenomenon in Kurdistan, especially in the city of 
Sulaymaniyah. Banners are written for diverse reasons, for example, for demonstrations, 
political party events, national celebrations, memorials, as well as for seminars and cultural 
activities. One of the most common uses of banners are for burial ceremonies, and when 
someone dies, the time and place of their funeral and burial is written onto banners and 
displayed publicly. Black is a symbol of eulogy and condolence. 
Banners are mostly written as a way of disseminating news and displayed in public areas so 
that the largest possible number of people can read them. The banners are in different 
colours and sizes depending upon the requirements of those who commission them. The font 
size and colours are also designated according to subject, because within Kurdish society the 
colours are divided among the political parties - each colour symbolizing a particular party. 
Black is a symbol of eulogy and condolence. The text fonts are considered as well, thus 
calligraphers do not write banners spontaneously. 
In order to understand the reasons behind the emergence of banners in Kurdish society as a 
cultural product, it is important to consider them within the context of modern Kurdish 
history, in particular its political and historical events. Moreover, it is important to know 
how the banners played their role as a medium for the transmission of socio-political 
messages within historical events. 
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Sulaymaniyah as centre of Kurdish political demonstrations 
 
During an interview (3rd of August 2015), historian Sediq Salih stated that banners that 
appeared in the later era of the Ottoman Empire were used in political events. Photographs 
showing banners of that time have been published in books. At the end of the 19th century, 
when the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP)   ىتيعمج ىقرت و داحتإwas established, the 
new party demanded reform of constitutional and parliamentary rule in order to determine 
the authority of the caliphate of the Ottoman Empire.  
Kurds thereafter participated in political movements within the CUP party, established by 
intellectuals and other learned people of the city. Two Kurdish members among the leaders 
of the CUP Party, Abdullah Cevdet and İshak Sükuti Diyarbakıri, were educated, forward 
thinkers, spoke foreign languages, and were familiar with the European lifestyle.  
Based on personal notes of the late Izzat Kaka, Salih understands that demonstrations took 
place at Sarai Square in Sulaymaniyah when the Unionists took power. He believes that, 
although there is no written evidence or photographs to prove that banners were used in 
those events, banners had indeed been raised. In the same interview, Salih stated that during 
the 20s and 30s, political activities began to take place in the cities of Southern Kurdistan - in 
particular Sulaymaniyah - which became the centre of Kurdish political demonstrations, 
especially by intellectuals, including writers and poets.  
There is a photograph from the 1930s (Figure 2) showing such a Sulaymaniyah protest. This is 
a significant document because banners are clearly visible in it. The image shows a series of 
demonstrations in which banners are being used to express demands.  
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In order to understand the reason for banner-making in the 1930s, particularly within 
Sulaymaniyah demonstrations, we must first consider the demonstration itself and refer back 
to prior events and significant incidents.  
The geopolitical changes after the First World War started when, Mosul Vilayet in southern 
Kurdistan, was invaded by the British Army when still under the power of the Ottoman 
State3. 
 
3 On the 7th of November 1918, Britain and France made an agreement, in which a new map was drawn up for the Middle 
East (Sachar, H. 1969, as cited in Corum, J. 2001:18). According to that agreement, independent states were to be established 
for the Arabs and also for the Kurds, however, in establishing Iraq, the Kurds were ignored (McDowall, D, 1996, as cited in 
Corum, J. 2001:18).  A Sunni was assigned King of Iraq, but neither Shiites nor Kurds were taken into account despite them 
forming the majority (Sachar, H. 1969, as cited in Corum, J. 2001:18). One of the high-ranking officials of Britain in Baghdad, 
Sir Arnold Wilson, wrote a letter to London, describing the situation as follows: “The Kurds wish neither to continue under 
the Turkish government, nor to be placed under the control of the Iraqi government.”  Wilson continued: “In southern 
Kurdistan, 4 out of 5 people support Sheikh Mahmoud’s plan to set up an independent Kurdistan”. He added that Kurdistan 
was anxious to break ties with Turkey (A. Wilson 1931, as cited in Chaliand, G. 1992:161).  
In 1920, revolts against the British invasion broke out again throughout Iraq. The situation became so critical that the British 
officer Sir Aylmer L Haldane requested the use of poisonous gas to suppress the revolt. Churchill agreed with the use of 
poisonous gas against those “uneducated tribal people” - mostly referring to the Kurds (Glancey, J. 2003 the Guardian).When 
the three vilayets, or districts, of Basrah, Mosul and Baghdad were unified, British authorities brought in a king from Hejaz, 
but the Iraqi component was not taken into account. The Shia did not want to be ruled by Baghdad, while the Kurds wanted 
their own independent state. By establishing Iraq, Britain sowed the seed of instability for the future (Hopwood, D. 2014, 
BBC). In 1920 Britain and Turkey signed The Treaty of Sevres. According to the agreement both Kurdish and Armenian nations 
were granted their own independent state. This formally introduced the Kurds as a nation; however, this was not carried out 
and remained on paper only. During that period, Kurds strived for their own rights but were suppressed by the Turks and the 
British (Simons, G. 1994: 263-264). On the 23rd of August 1921, a referendum was organized to assign King Faisal for Iraq, 
but Sulaymaniyah boycotted it (Lukitz, L. 1995: 34). Between 1920 and 1923 the British discussed establishing a free state 
for the Kurds by merging the southern and northern part of Kurdistan, but this did not happen. 
Sheikh Mahmoud who had declared a revolution, was able to control Sulaymaniyah, and in October 1922, announced himself 
Governor of Kurdistan. After a few days he formed a government cabinet of eight ministers, these consisted of tribal people, 
capitalists, and educated figures of Sulaymaniyah. They published a newspaper called Kurdistan Day. In 1923 Britain decided 
to end the power of Sheikh Mahmoud, justifying it by saying that Sheikh Mahmoud had a relationship with the Shi’a of Najaf 
and Karbala and the Kamalists, who considered the state of Mosul part of their own (Gorgas, J. 2008: 540).In May 1923, in 
order to suppress the revolution of Sheikh Mahmoud, Britain attacked Sulaymaniyah with a large army of 6000 soldiers and 
raided with IRF air forces (Napier, M. 2018: 43-44). 
The air force which was established in 1922 in Iraq was the strongest division, armed with newly developed technical 
weapons (Tucker, E. 2012: 181). Sheikh Mahmoud fled to Iran. The next year in May he reappeared in Sulaymaniyah and 
announced a Jihad against the British. The IRF raided Sulaymaniyah again on the 27th and 28th of May 1924 (Napier, M. 
2018: 43-44). The leaving of Sheikh Mahmoud opened the door for a new politics; the new administration of Sulaymaniyah 
was supported by tradesmen (Gorgas, J. 2008: 540).On the 24th of July 1923, The Lausanne Treaty was signed to replace The 
Sevres Treaty and The Republic of Turkey was formally recognized. There were some articles in the agreement that stated 
that non-Turkish nations have the right to speak in their mother tongue, but this was ignored, pushing the Kurds into a 
deeper plight (Chaliand, G. 1992: 161-162). After the Lausanne agreement, the League of Nations sent a committee to the 
State of Mosul to hear the requests of its people and to make a case study about the region, with the aim of formulating the 
best solution (Bulloch, J., Morris, H. and Bullock, J. 1992: 88-89). 
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Figure 1: Map showing the main border area under the control of the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of World 
War I. 1914 (NZ history). 
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Banners in the new Iraqi state: from Monarchy to Republic: 
When Iraq was established as a new state, the political situation in Kurdistan entered a state 
of conflict, and there were military clashes between the British and the Kurds. Although in 
the mid-1920s the League of Nations attempted to find a solution to the Kurdish issue in 
Iraq, it did not achieve any agreement on Kurdish rights4. 
 
4 After the Lausanne agreement, the League of Nations sent a committee to the State of Mosul to hear the requests of its 
people and to make a case study about the region, with the aim of formulating the best solution (Bulloch, J., Morris, H. and 
Bullock, J 1992: 88-89). The committee prepared and filed its reports from January till March 1925 and submitted them to 
the League of Nations.  The reports refer to the majority population of Mosul as Aryan-speaking Kurds, who were neither 
Arabs nor Turks. Some Arabs lived there, but relationships were not good and the following suggestions were offered: On 
the basis of an ethnic argument, one would have to conclude that the best solution would be to set up an independent 
Kurdist state - seeing as the Kurds account for five-eighths of the population - in which case, one would be justified in 
augmenting this figure to include the Yezidis, who are Zoroastrian Kurds, and the Turks, who would be easily assimilated into 
the Kurdish population. According to this estimate, Kurds would represent seven-eighths of the vilayt’s population. However, 
in order to ensure Iraq’s economic survival, the commission finally suggested that the vilayet be tacked onto the Iraqi state, 
“given satisfaction of the following preconditions: 
1) The country will remain under the League of Nations mandate for a period of about 25 years. 
2) The desire of the Kurds is that the administrations, magistrates and teachers in their country be drawn from their 
own ranks and adopt Kurdish as the official language in all their activities.”  
The Iraqi government decided to recognise Kurdish language and to allow it to be studied in schools - but only in primary 
schools. Some publishing of books in Kurdish was allowed and some ministerial posts were given to Kurds (Chaliand, G. 1992: 
161-162).  In the spring of 1926 Kurdistan School was established, with the aim of improving education, but later they sought 
autonomy and to make improvements to the economy. This motivating factor was behind the demonstrations of September 
6th. The political movement that gathered around the Kurdistan school came about for the following reasons: the agreement 
between Iraq and Britain; for Iraq’s independence; it bore no reference to the rights of Kurds; and because of the imbalance 
of power among Sulaymaniyah figures - especially the firing of Tofique Wahbibey as the Governor of Sulaymaniyah. 
In 1929 Iraq was progressing towards becoming an independent country, the Kurdish representatives in the parliament of 
Iraq submitted a letter to the Iraqi prime minister requesting the fulfilment of the promises of 1926, but the government did 
not take them into consideration. The Concordance of Anglo-Iraq Treaty4 was signed the year after, in which rights for Kurds 
were included (Gorgas, J. 2008: 541-542). In 1930, Britain wrote a letter to the League of Nations forsaking the promises 
made previously to the Kurds concerning the establishment of a Kurdish state; it mentioned that no security and stability 
would be gained unless that promise was revoked.  They mentioned that Kurds were incapable of self-rule, and spoke 
negatively of them, for example:  
On political grounds… Although they admittedly possess many sterling qualities, the Kurds of Iraq are entirely lacking in the 
characteristics necessary for political cohesion and self-government. Their organization and outlook are essentially tribal. 
They are without the tradition of self-government or self-governing institutions. Their mode of life is primitive, and for the 
most part they are illiterate and untutored, resentful of authority and lacking in sense of discipline or responsibility (Bulloch, 
J. 1992: 95). According to that memorandum, Iraqi officials asked for the negative points to be rescinded, adding that they 
could in fact work with the Kurds to rule the country - the  Kurds having many famous figures who held high positions during 
the Ottoman era, but the British responded by returning the report without any changes whatsoever (Chaliand, G. 1992: 
159). 
In 1930 Britain removed the mandate and thus Iraq became an independent country, but the Iraqi airspace was still under 
the control of the British forces and for the training of the Iraqi army (Short, M. and McDermott, A. 1975: 10). Between 1929 
and 1930 many memoranda were submitted to the League of Nations and British authorities by various people and 
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In the summer of 1930, further demonstrations broke out in Sulaymaniyah. On the 16th of 
July 1930 - the same day that King Ghazi visited the city, the first big demonstration took 
place in Sulaymaniyah because the 1929 agreement did not guarantee any rights for the 
Kurds. 
On the 10th of August 1930, the Iraqi prime minister planned to visit Sulaymaniyah, and this 
news spread fast among the opponents. The day before, Ahmed Fayaq Bey, who worked on 
the staff of the Real Estate Registration Directorate and was a member of the Sulaymaniyah 
court, arrived from Kirkuk. He presented a statement in lieu of the government stating that 
he would become Governor of Sulaymaniyah in place of Tofiq Wahbi Bey. Angry students 
attacked him, and he ran to a police station, from where he was later sent back to Kirkuk. 
Later, when the Iraqi prime minister, together with British officials, visited Sulaymaniyah, a 
demonstration was organised by the teacher Rafiq Helmi and Mohammad Salih Qaftan. The 
demonstrators consisted of about fifty science students from the Kurdistan evening school. 
According to British reports, some of Sheikh Qadir’s fighters participated in the 
demonstration.  
Both political parties of autonomous and federal Iraq held a meeting in the Saray building in 
Sulaymaniyah, in which The National Party submitted a memorandum for establishing a 
Kurdish state under the supervision of either the League of Nations or the British authority. 
 
committees about the rights of the Kurds within Iraq, and although British advisors and the Iraqi government made promises 
to observe the Kurdish language as a formal language, these were not honoured. 
After the articles of the Anglo-Iraq concordance were advertised on the 1st of July 1930, a committee was formed by 11 well-
known people, who sent a letter to Geneva requesting to establish a state for the Kurds under the supervision of the United 
States. They were also planning to boycott the Iraqi elections, which were to be held that same year. The British wanted the 
election to be held and be successful, so the new government - which included the British Administrational Inspector Captain 
Alban - had to work for the agreement so that the elections were not hindered (Gorgas, J. 2008: 542-543). 
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After the meeting the nationalist spokesman Ramzi Fattah came out to describe the meeting’s 
details, whereupon the fans carried him on their shoulders in triumph (Gorgas, J. 2008: 543). 
British authorities were continually urging the Sulaymaniyah officials, via their advisors, to be 
patient to achieve the autonomy they sought, in order to keep Sulaymaniyah calm.  At the 
end of August 1930, Tofiq Wahbi Bey was fired from his position as governor of Sulaymaniyah, 
the reason given was that he was inciting division. Later, the nationalist party arranged a 
demonstration opposing that decision, and when Ahmed Fayaq Bey was duly assigned 
Governor of Sulaymaniyah, the people were angered all the more (Gorgas, J. 2008: 544). In 
early August, Captain Alban commanded Sulaymaniyah officials to take part in the election, 
despite their not wanting to (Gorgas, J. 2008: 545). On the 6th September 1930 – regarded as 
a solemn day in Sulaymaniyah - a demonstration was organized (Figure 2). This was reported 
by some as ‘rioting’, referring to the demonstrators as ‘rioters’, whereas poets such as Fayaq 
Beakas, Peramerd, and Sheikh Salam Azzabani, who had taken part and influenced the 
demonstration, described the demonstration in more positive terms (Gorgas, J. 2008: 545). 
British Administrational Inspector, Captain Alban, reported that “on the 6th of September 
1930, thirty areas of Sulaymaniyah were invited to approach Saray for election, during which 
fifty students, angry guys, pugnacious, marched downtown, gathering in the shopping centre 
of Saray. Tensions rose among the people. Some held rods, sticks and stones in their hands 
and began to attack the police with them and also with coffee shop chairs causing injury. 
Military reinforcements arrived. The situation worsened and shooting was heard. An Iraqi 
policeman was shot dead. The sound of pistol shooting was heard, and two other soldiers got 
injured, the soldiers then began to shoot in the air to disperse the crowd. In the end, 13 people 
were shot dead and 23 injured, all were of the poor classes. It was reported that people 
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wanted to boycott the election, but that foreign hands were behind the incident” (Gorgas, J. 
2008: 545-546). 
Another report, written by P. S. Mumford, a civilian employee, claimed that people wishing 
to stop the elections gathered gradually, and that the angry crowd began to pelt stones at the 
policemen. After half an hour, Iraqi armed forces reached the area and started shooting at 
the crowd. According to the report no shooting was detected from the people’s side. As a 
result, 16 were shot dead (10 of which were young), and 50 were injured. 4 soldiers were 
slightly injured, and one was killed by friendly fire. In the afternoon that same day, hundreds 
of people were arrested, including leaders of the National Party (Gorgas, J. 2008: 546). 
Salih stated that such protests were organised by a group of educated Kurdish figures, and 
because no party was at that time established, they called themselves The National 
Organization. 
 In my interview (July 2015) with Ahmed Hamid, he said that after the First World War into 
the mid-twentieth century, there were many Iraqis who had studied abroad, returning with 
new ideas and political ideologies, and organising a new political platform so that they could 
ultimately form a political party.  A group of such men managed to turn their organization 
into a party, initially called The Association Against Imperialism, which later became known 
as Kifah Al-Shab (The Struggle of the People). A year later, on March 31st, 1934, the name 
changed to the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP).  
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Figure 2:  A demonstration on September 06, 1930, showing banners in use at Sara square, Sulaymaniyah (Zheen Centre, 
2015).
 
Figure 3:  A protest in Baghdad 1948, showing a banner which reads: “The Kurdish people demand the release of 
Barzani, and demand food and shelter for their families” (Zheen Centre, 2015). 
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Hamid stated that the ICP leaders were sent to the Soviet Union to study at the KUTV (The 
Communist University of the Toilers of the East) in Moscow. Marxist ideology in Iraq can be 
traced back to the ICP, specifically to their leaders educated in Soviet universities. They 
wanted to liberate Iraq from imperialism, to establish a democratic government, and to 
reform agriculture, build national factories, and give rights to labourers, peasants and 
intellectuals. Hamid maintains that the colour red, used for the Communist Party banners, 
derives from that used by the Communists in the Soviet Union. Iraqi Communists 
appropriated this colour, in the way that red tends to be adopted by most leftist parties in 
the world. 
Hamid states in the interview that during the fourth ICP congress, they decided to establish 
two branches: one for Kurdish society, and another for Armenian society, but this idea did 
not last long because the Iraqi government accused the Armenians of being British 
collaborators.  Consequently, while King Ghazi was in power, the Iraqi authority turned 
against the Armenians, arresting, imprisoning, and killing many of them, although a few 
managed to flee. Hamid mentioned “I remember when I was young, opposite our house 
there was an Armenian neighbour, but one day the man came back and took the children 
and left. People asked him why they had to leave in such a manner, and the man shouted: 
‘All Armenians are under threat’”. 
In the 1940s, new Kurdish political parties were established, some of which ended briefly, 
while others still exist.5 According to Salih, S. (2015) the use of banners directly related to 
the political situation in Iraq, because people used banners to demand their rights. 
 
5 In 1941, The Hiwa Party, or Hope, was established, led by urban intellectuals who embraced a broad political spectrum 
from left to right.  It was a nationalist party, and an attempt was made to distance the Kurdish political movements from 
the tribal identity. They sent memoranda to western powers to obtain international support to oppose the government in 
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In an interview conducted in June 2019, Bahadin Nuri 6 said that in 1946, several protests 
happened in Baghdad that they were aware of from newspaper reports, but “I did not hear 
of any protests that happened in Sulaymaniyah. I remember the first protest that I took part 
in happened in May 1946. The protest was organised by the Iraqi Communist Party to 
support the Palestinian issue against Zionism. The Iraqi Communist Party had many diverse 
members within the Iraqi society, including some from among the Jewish community. One 
of the participants, who was a member of the Iraqi Communist Party, Shaul Tawiq, was of 
Jewish origin. He was murdered during the protest by police and martyred because of it”. 
According to Salih, S. (2015), after the uprising of the 6th of September 1930, urban 
mobilisation decreased and there were therefore no protests or boycotts until 19487.  Iraqi 
 
Baghdad, meanwhile encouraging people to support Kurdish nationalist demands (Gunter, M. 1992: 66). Hiwa was 
influenced by the ICP, being one of the largest and most powerful organisations in the whole of Iraq. Support came from 
the working class, employees, students, and peasants (Hamid, A. 2015). 
In 1946, The Democratic Party of Kurdistan, or the PDK was established, and Mustafa Barzani became leader of the party. 
Their political agenda was for autonomy for the Kurds, independence, and democracy for Iraq. Along with the Iranian KDP 
they had the same dream of Kurdish rights. They claimed that the party existed to build a system where everyone in 
Kurdistan could live equally, having adopted Marxist and Leninism ideology - their program was close to that of the ICP. In 
contrast, the KDP defined itself as a tribal, conservative, and aristocratic party, dominated by the Barzani’s family 
(Chaliand, G. 1992: 165). 
The first congress of the KDP was held in Baghdad while Barzani was in Mihabad. The KDP wanted to convince all the 
Kurdish parties to join KDP such as Shorsh (Revolutionary Party), Rizgari (Liberty Party) and the K.J. Although most of them 
accepted, Ibrahim Ahmed who was one of the first congress members, preferred to be out of the KDP.  When the Mihabad 
republic collapsed in 1947, Qazi Muhamad was executed, and Barzani and his followers fled to the Soviet Union as Barzani 
had failed to convince the Iraqi government to allow him to stay. Barzani took refuge in Soviet Azerbaijan, where he 
remained until he could return to Iraq after that military coup in 1958 (Mustafa, N. 1996: 52-54).  
6 Bahadin Nuri was born in February 1927 and he was a general secretary of Iraqi Communist Party from 1949-1953. 
(Interview 2019). 
7 The Portsmouth Treaty was signed on the 15th of January 1948.  Students immediately reacted angrily to the new treaty. 
The police responded violently, killing 4 and injuring many. The government tried to calm the situation but masses of 
people - coming from all social classes - organized large protests on the 27th of January 1948, which they called the Al-
Wathba Uprising. It was one of the greatest urban mobilizations in Iraq showing the power of the opposition and how they 
could mobilize masses of people from all cities. It took everything the authorities had to quell the protesters, nevertheless, 
hundreds were injured, and 77 protesters were killed. Consequently, the prime minister was forced to resign, and a new 
government was formed (Marr, P. and Al-Marashi, I. 2017: 51-52). 
Despite the ICP leaders being in prison, they played a powerful role and Fahid was able to bring many different factions 
together for the Al-Wathbah.  He organized the Lijnat al-Taawn al-Watani, or The Committee for National Cooperation, to 
lead the revolt - this included The National Unity Party, The Progressive Members of the National Democratic Party, and 
the underground Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq. Kamil Qazanchi became a committee leader despite being left-wing and 
not a member of the ICP (Ismael, T. 2008: 39). 
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popular opinion, mainly led by the ICP, was all for ending the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, which was 
initially set up to provide a ‘close alliance’ between the two countries, for when it was to 
become a member of the League of Nations, and thus an independent state, but this turned 
out to be an empty promise.  Iraq politically, economically and militarily, remained under 
the control of Britain. In 1948, the Iraqi authorities negotiated a new treaty with Britain, 
because there was opposition to the existing treaty, and claimed the new one to be 
different to the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. This served to conciliate the opposition, but overall, 
Britain remained in control of Iraqi foreign affairs (Hamid, A. 2015). 
Nuri, B. (2019) pointed out that one of the slogans of Al-Wathba was against the 
parliamentary election system. Elections were conducted in two phases using an electoral 
system brought over from India, a British colony, that were easily manipulated by the British 
administrators. One slogan says: “End two-stage elections - we want direct parliamentary 
elections”, a slogan that continued to be used until the uprising of 1952, when the 
government announced a decree to cancel the two-phase elections, replacing it with a 
direct election model. 
Nuri, B. (2019) noted that, after the Al-Wathba uprising in 1948, people enjoyed a kind of 
freedom until May 15th 1948, when several demonstrations took place in Sulaymaniyah:  
“One day, we held a demonstration in front of the British Culture Centre which was 
close to the Grand Mosque. The centre was burned by the demonstrators. 
Meanwhile, someone called Ali Haj Mullah Sharif, a national traitor, had his 
motorcycle destroyed. A remnant was raised up by protestors, comprising around 
300 to 400 youths, shouting: ‘Strike it. It is a broken drum’.” 
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Salih, S. (2015) said there are photographs that show Kurdish protesters holding banners with 
slogans. Importantly, text in Kurdish cities was written in Kurdish, whereas in other areas, 
such as Baghdad, it was in Arabic (Figure 3). 
Nuri states that after the victory of the Al-Wathbah uprising of 1948, the Iraqi Communist  
Party organized several protests in Sulaymaniyah. The main slogans in those protests were 
against British colonialism, and for Iraqi independence - the focus was not on Kurdish 
national issues. All parties, even feudalists, were against British colonialism. 
According to Hamid, A. (2015) the ICP in the 40s was one of the most powerful opposition 
parties in Iraq, owing to having supporters from all social classes. When Iraq joined the Arab 
allies against Israel in May 1948, Iraqi authorities used the war as an excuse to convert civil 
rule to military rule, and eventually the Iraqi authorities campaigned against ICP’s members. 
Consequently, ICP leaders were executed and many were arrested, and others had to flee 
abroad.  
According to Nuri, B. (2019) the Al-Wathba uprising involved all parties. Although the Iraqi 
Communist Party was one of the most influential parties of the time, Al-Wathba was not 
only a success for them. Other parties included: The People's Party, led by Aziz al-Shan; a 
leftist party known as ‘The Bourgeois Junk Party’; the National Union Party, led by Abdel 
Fattah Ibrahim; The National Democratic Party (NDP), - one of the traditional bourgeois 
parties under the leadership of Kamel al-Jadrji; the Istiqlal Party - a right-wing nationalist 
party. The KDP had no influence in Baghdad, however, they did participate in some of the 
demonstrations in Sulaymaniyah. 
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Nuri, B. (2019) observes that a number of changes occurred in the leadership of the 
Communist Party while Fahad was in prison.  “Before the execution of Fahad, Sasson Dalal 
and Rafiq Chalak elected to lead the party.  Sasson Dalal made a statement to all branches 
of the ICP Party organizations throughout Iraqi provinces including Sulaymaniyah. The 
statement was addressed to ‘Our great partner in danger’. During that period, Hamid 
Othman was head of the Sulaymaniyah branch and I was a member of the organization.  
They selected me to lead the demonstration in solidarity with Fahad and his colleagues. I 
organized three demonstrations in Sulaymaniyah. One of the demonstrations happened to 
commemorate Al-Wathba and the other two took place in February. We told the party 
members to attend the demonstration at a designated place and time. One of the 
demonstrations started in front of the mosque near the Hawza Wishkaka. I led the protest, 
for which we had brought a coffin covered with a black cloth to feign a funeral, and we 
attempted to go into the cemetery. We had two banners, one of them was protesting 
against colonialism, and we wrote on it: ‘Glory to the Martyrs’, and on the other we 
demanded the immediate release of Fahad and his colleagues. The text was written in black 
onto white cloth. The demonstrators numbered only about 200, as there was decline in 
political support due to the increase in military rule during this period, creating fear. Soon 
the police arrived, along with security and intelligence forces, numbering more than the 
demonstrators. When we arrived at the Mizgate dw Darga mosque, we decided to end our 
protest, realising that the situation was serious”. 
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Although the Iraqi authorities managed to suppress the opposition, in 1952 the ICP led 
other large-scale protests in cities such as Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. In their message, they 
demanded 50 percent of oil revenue should go to the Iraqi people, the country revert back 
to civil rule, the government release all prisoners, and civil organizations gain permission to 
work.  In response, the government killed 8 protesters, one a Kurd from Sulaymaniyah. They 
also suspended a number of newspapers and banned all political parties (Hamid, A. 2015).   
 
Nuri, B. (2019) stated that the slogans of those demonstrations in Sulaymaniyah were 
generally against colonialism and its agents, meaning also the monarchy and its 
government. One read: ‘Restore the people, or, victory to the people’ illustrating how the 
main focus was on national goals and independence, rather than democracy, which was not 
considered an important topic at that time. Most slogans were ordered by the Communist 
Party, and banners made for those slogans were then distributed to party members.   
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Banner-making and its usage in the era of the Republic of Iraq 
In 1958, the political system in Iraq changed from monarchy to republic8.  Eventually, the 
overthrow of the monarchy was welcomed by the Kurdish people; it became a time of great 
hope and optimism.  The new constitution was written on the 27th July 1958, recognising 
Kurdish national rights: “Iraqi society is based on complete co-operation between all its 
citizens, in respect of their rights and liberties, Arabs and Kurds are associates in this nation; 
the constitution guarantees their national rights within the whole of Iraq” (Article 3) 
(Chaliand, G. 1992): 165). Kurds from cities and towns went to Baghdad with their banners 
to celebrate the new government (Figure 4 & 5). 
 
Pero, M. (interview, July 2019) states that Saeed Muhsen and Jamal Bakhtyar were working 
as calligraphers in the middle of the last century, and that he learned from them. "One day, 
Saeed Muhsen attended our school to make some banners for the celebration of Nawroz, 
forbidden during the monarchy. Mr. Muhsen began to outline the text on the banners and 
told me to fill in the gaps. That was my first attempt at writing on banners. In that era, the 
government defined Nawroz as a tree or spring celebration, not as a Kurdish national day, 
but still a time to show Kurdish ambitions. The photographs show people dressed in Kurdish 
costume and displaying banners. The banners were in strong support of Qasim’s revolution 
and saw the KDP as symbolic for their struggle” (Figure 6). 
 
8 On the 14th July 1958, The Free Officers led by General Abdul al-Karim Qasim, organised a violent coup d’état to end the 
monarchical system in Iraq and thereby making it a republic state. While Barzani, the KDP leader, was on holiday in Prague, 
he got a telegraph about the coup, saying he should return to Iraq. By the 6th of October, Barzani arrived in Baghdad where 
he was welcomed by Kurdish and Iraqi crowds. Meanwhile, the KDP was officially recognized as a political party and, 
importantly, several Kurdish newspapers gained publication rights, including the KDP’s organ Khebat (Struggle), and 
Kurdistan’s Azadi (Liberty) owned by a section of the Kurdish ICP, as well as Hetaw (Sun), and Zhin (Life) (Gunter, M. 1992: 
11). 
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Figure 5:  At the same celebration as above, this central banner declares: “The delegations of Kurdistan salute the 
revolution ... the delegation of Rawandouz” (Zheen Centre, 2015). 
 
Figure 4: Kurds travel from outlying towns and villages to congregate in Baghdad to celebrate the new 
government. Banners can be seen to read: “The delegations of the districts of Sheikhan, Zakho, Halabja, 
Shaqlawa, and Kalar, etc. salute the revolution” (Zheen Centre, 2015). 
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Figure 6: The 21st of March 1959 celebration in Nawroz, Sulaymaniyah. The text on the banner reads: “The 
Kurdistan Democratic Party is the greatest leadership of the Kurdish people”. (Archive of Fatah Saeed Shaly, 
Zheen Centre, 2015).   
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Figure 7: A gathering showing an image of Abdul al-Karim Qasim above the door, along with three banners. Kurdistan, 
1959 (Zheen Centre, 2015). 
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A few years after the establishment of the new regime, political relations between the Kurds 
and the central government in Baghdad deteriorated9. In the 1960s there were also 
divisions among Kurdish politicians themselves, especially among the leaders of the KDP, 
which had an impact on allegiances within the Kurdish community10.  
Pero was a student and a member of the Kurdistan Student Union during the Kurdish 
revolution of the early 1960s: “We were working in secret in the cities, and the Peshmerga 
were fighting in the mountains. Banners were requested for a Student Union event, which 
took place in Kirje, in the Surdash area, in 1962. I met Taha Baban and Jamal Abdul who also 
worked for the student union. I and Jamal Abdul made the banners, and Nushirwan  
Mustafa, leader of the student union, sent someone to collect them. We wrote nearly sixty 
banners and slogans for the Kurdish revolution and at the end of each slogan we wrote ‘Up 
with the leadership of Barzani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party’". 
According to Pero, this event happened again a year later, but the slogans were changed 
and the name of Barzani was not written on the banners: “I spoke to Taha Baban and said 
 
9 The situation in Iraq deteriorated due to Qasim’s decision to rule Iraq through military power with which he brutally 
suppressed both the right- and left-wing including the ICP. Freedom of expression was restricted. Ibarahim Ahmed who 
was a KDP general secretary was arrested because of an article in which he criticised Article 2 of the Iraqi constitution. He 
wrote that the Kurds of Iraq were part of the Kurdish nation, that Iraqi Arabs were part of the Arab nation, and that not all 
Iraqi people are part of the Arab nation. Ultimately, a rebellion broke out between the Kurds and the Iraqi government, 
who exploited certain tribes, arming them to fight Barzni - taking advantage of the internal division among Kurdish tribes 
(Chaliand, G. 1992: 165).  Conflict flared up again between the Kurds and central government, and Barzani found himself 
leader of a full-scale armed movement against Baghdad. Although his position was strategically strong, the Iraqi army was 
bombing villages and causing casualties among civilians - notably women, children and old people (Gunter, M. 1992: 13). 
10 In addition, in November 1963, when Barzani negotiated with General Arif for Kurdish autonomy, the KDP’s political 
bureau, led by Jalal Talabani and Ibrahim Ahmed criticized Barzani’s deals because they believed it was not clear exactly 
what Barzani was proposing and blamed Barzani for not informing them about the negotiation. After a KDP congress in July 
1964, Barzani dominated because he was supported by tribes and had 15,000 supporters among the Peshmerga. In 
contrast, the political bureau came from an urban background. As a result, Barzani successfully expelled Talabani, Ahmad, 
and other key members from the party, and they fled to Iran (Ghaliand, G. 1994: 59).  
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that I realised that the situation was about to change according to the specified content of 
the slogans. I was right, because before long the KDP broke up”.  
He refers to the splitting of the KDP into two parts: Jalali, and Malay. Talabani opened his 
office in Bakrajo, Sulaymaniyah, and at the end of 1962 and the beginning of 1963, banners 
were collected and displayed in Sarai Square. Jalal Talabani came to Sarai and delivered a 
speech on the top of the Nuri Ali Palace. Talabani said in his speech that they agreed with 
Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr on the decentralisation of Iraq, and autonomy for Kurdistan (Pero, M. 
2019 interview). 
In the 1960s, changes in the administration of the Iraqi government occurred through 
coups11 12and the Kurds suffered from the oppression of these governments13. On June 9th 
1963, authorities declared a curfew in Sulaymaniyah, but people from the countryside did 
 
11 On the 8th February 1963 in very bloody coup, the Ba’ath Party’s military commanders secured power by assassinating 
Qasim. For a while, President Abdel Salam Arif and Mustafa Barzani agreed to end military hostility.  Arif exploited 
ceasefire to reorganize the Iraqi military and prepared a full-scale armed campaign against the Kurds. According to Mustafa 
(1996), the Iraqi military sent its barbarous military intelligence force called Lywa al-eshrin to Sulaymaniyah, killing and 
arresting many people and destroying villages, while around the city people closed their shops and managed to escape. If 
someone asked what happened, people said that the Earth had cracked.  
12 On the 17th of July 1968, the Ba'ath Party was able to gain power via a military coup. The pan-Arabism was a 
fundamental ideology of Ba'athism, associated with radical Arab nationalism. Although Socialism was another part of 
Ba'ath’s ideology, in the 1980's, it accommodated capitalism (Kafala, T. 2003, BBC News). As Kaplan, R. (2018) stated: 
“That deeper force is the legacy of Ba'athism. A toxic mix of secular Arab nationalism and Eastern Bloc-style socialism that 
dominated Syria and Iraq for decades since the 1960s, it made the regimes of the Al-Assad family in Syria and Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq completely unique in the Arab world… As a rule, the more abstract and totalizing the ideology, the more 
blood that follows in its wake. That’s because once a leader is toppled or challenged, such ideologies provide for no 
intermediary layers of civil society — between the regime at the top and the tribe and extended family at the bottom — to 
hold a country together”. 
13 From the 1960s to 1970’s, war and negotiations between Kurds and central government in Iraq happened several times. 
The casualties of conflict during that time were many on both sides (Simons, G. 1994: 267), and there was no progress for 
the Kurdish dilemma because of Iraqi political instability. Iraq could not achieve anything through its military campaigns 
against the Kurds. Eventually the Iraqi government, led by The Ba’ath Party, proposed autonomy through negotiations with 
Barzani. The Iraqi president Ahmed Hassan Al Baker and Saddam Hussain’s vice president, selected Aziz Sharif to negotiate 
with Barzani who had a left-wing background. Meanwhile, Michel Afleq, one of the Ba’ath Party board members and 
leaders, believed that Kurds should enjoy autonomy and supported a new resolution for the Kurdish problem. (Gunter, M. 
1992: 14).   
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not hear this, and went as usual to the city centre for their commerce. As a result, many 
were killed. State forces buried the victims in mass graves (Mustafa, N. 1996: 74-75).  
When the curfew was ended, people opened up the mass graves in order to move the 
victims to the city’s graveyard, where they made a grave for each individual. 280 corpses 
were found (Figures 10 & 11) (Chaliand, G. 1992: 167). As the photographs show, white 
banners were erected over the new graves, with texts on them. 
According to Pero, Ali Omer, Omer Hamdi and Hama Faraj (Xala Hama) worked as 
calligraphers in the 1960s. They used red and orange cloth for banner-making and the texts 
were written in Ruqaa font. Another calligrapher named Khalid Zamdar appeared. At the 
beginning of his career, Zamdar had a workshop in the Iskan neighbourhood then later 
moved to Sabunkaran street. According to Aziz, S. (interview June 2015) because 
Sulaymaniyah was far from cities such as Baghdad and Mosul (where, for instance, Yussif 
Zanun, one of the most famous calligraphers in Iraq lived), and there was nowhere for 
people to go to learn calligraphy, those who were interested in the profession had to rely on 
copying.  
The next political phase between the Kurds and Baghdad began with the 11th of March 1970 
agreement14. According to Hamid, A. (2015), as the agreement was declared, people warmly 
welcomed it, celebrating throughout Baghdad and Kurdish cities (Figure 14). Although the 
 
14 The Ba’athist-ruled Iraqi government signed the autonomy agreement with the Kurds on the 11th March 1970. This was 
considered a significant achievement for the Kurds because it included most of the Kurdish people (Al-Khalil, S. 1989:  
pxxiii). The agreement included 15 articles to be implemented within four years. It recognised the Kurds as an equal ethnic 
group along with the Arabs in Iraq. It also gave the Kurds representation in the government system. Meanwhile, Kurds 
could be self-governing in majority Kurdish areas and it devised cultural and language rights (The Kurds, minority rights 
group report). The agreement was welcomed by both sides, while Ahmed Hassan Bakir the president of Iraq gave a speech 
on Iraqi TV declaring that “Our people, Kurds and Arabs, have regained their unity. Our fraternal relations are henceforth 
firmly based and will not be undermined.” Meanwhile, Barzani was interviewed on the same day and he described the 
agreement as the idea of Ba’ath party (Chaliand, G. 1992: 170-171).   
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KDP signed the agreement with Ba’ath party, the ICP supported it and participated in those 
celebrations organised for the occasion. In Sulaymaniyah, a crowd of people attending the 
meeting in Sara square included Shukri Sabri Hadithi, the city governor(Figure 15). The KDP 
representative gave a speech, but the governor did not allow Dr. Frais, who represented the 
ICP, to read his statement. 
Salih, S. (2015) stated that on the day of the declaration agreement many people attended 
with banners, and both wings of the KDP participated. Banners in Kurdish areas, such as 
Sulaymaniyah, were written in Kurdish, whilst the banners in Baghdad were in Arabic.  
People celebrated every year on the 11th March, and they made many banners, writing on 
them: ‘Long Live the Anniversary of the Holy March Agreement’ (Figure 16). Moreover, 
according to the agreement, Nawroz was recognised as the Kurdish National Day (Gunter, 
M. 1992: 16).   The March agreement appeared to be an opportunity to resolve the Kurdish 
issue in Iraq15, but when it failed16 it led to a new armed conflict between Kurdish political 
forces and the central state in Baghdad17. 
 
15 The March Agreement was a significant step for the Kurdish cause - if carried out - but peace talks had reached an 
impasse because of a lack of certainty on both sides.  The Iraqi authority held the advantage in negotiations as they could 
easily muster their army into battle. Ebrahim Ahmed the previous general secretary of the KDP said of autonomy: “depend 
on our strength and that of our enemy.” (Gunter, M. 1992: 14). 
16 The March agreement collapsed for a number of reasons, but particularly for Kirkuk being rich in oil. The Kurds 
demanded that the disputed areas be a part of the autonomous region, but the Iraqi authorities dismissed these demands, 
altering the demographics through the process of Arabization - forcibly displacing the Kurdish population from Kirkuk and 
the other disputed regions. The Iraqi authorities conducted raids on Faili Kurd properties and in September 1971, nearly 
40,000 Faili Kurds were deported to Iran, and forbidden to take any of their belongings with them. Meanwhile, the Iraqi 
Ba’ath regime failed on two attempts to assassinate both Barzani and his son Edris Barzani (Gunter, M. 1992: 17).    
 
17 In January 1974, negotiations started again between the KDP and the Ba’ath regime about implementing autonomy, 
which they had signed in 1970, but no decisive solution was reached on the issue of the disputed areas, especially Kirkuk. 
However, Barzani officially declared the right of the Kurds in Kirkuk to be a part of the autonomous region. Eventually, in 
March 1974, the autonomy law for the Kurdistan region of Iraq was issued by the Ba’ath regime, but the KDP, led by 
Barzani, rejected it, viewing the new agreement as too far from the agreements of 1970, hence it was declared, but 
without the consent of the Kurds (Karsh, E. and Rautsi, I. 1991: 80). 
Consequently, another round of war began, and as a result, many people were displaced without shelter, food, and 
medication, causing many fatalities among the young and old. According to the Iraqi government’s report, 1,640 Iraqi 
militants were killed and 7,903 were injured on the other side, and although there were many casualties among the Kurds, 
there were no specific numbers recorded (Chaliand, G. 1992: 182-181).  
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Figure 9:  Photograph showing the banners written with the same text as above (Zheen centre, 2015). 
 
Figure 8:  The banners say: “The group of performers and singers of the KDP”. 1060, Mawat Shorshi Ailul 
(Zheen centre 2015). 
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Figure 11:  Sulaymaniyah Cemetery, 1963 (Zheen Centre 2015). 
 
Figure 10:  Burials at the Sulaymaniyah Cemetery, 1963 (Zheen Centre 2015). 
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Figure 12:  Jalal Talabani giving a speech at the KDP meeting at Koyea 18th March, 1963. The text on the 
banner reads: “Long live the Kurdistan Democratic Party leadership of the Kurdish people” (Salah Rasheed, 
Mam Jalal Didary Taman, 2019). 
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Figure 13:  Jalal Talabani and Ibrahim Ahmad in 1960 in front of a banner written in Arabic (Salah Rasheed, Mam Jalal 
Didary Taman 2019). 
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Figure 14:  The celebration of the autonomy agreement, Baghdad, 11th March 1970.  The text on the banner reads: 
“Collective working. Revolution and construction” (Kurdipedia.org 2013). 
 
Figure 15:  The celebration of the autonomy agreement, Sara Square, Sulaymaniyah, 11th March 1970 (Kurdipedia.org 
2013). 
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In the mid-1970s there were several confrontations between Barzani and the Iraqi army. In 
the end, Barzani decided to end his political movement and abandon armed resistance. He 
took refuge in Iran with his followers and after leaving for the USA, eventually died in the 
late 70s.18 
The collapse of the Kurdish movement was a major blow to their hopes of ever gaining 
national rights, and after the KDP forces disbanded, Komala was the only political 
organization left, and it continued its resistance against the Ba’athist regime (Bulloch, J., 
Morris, H. and Bullock, J. 1992: 146).  Formed at the end of the 1960’s Komala was 
grounded on Marxist ideology, but according to Hamid, A. (2015), their ideology was 
actually closer to Mao Tse-tung’s, and they founded themselves as a modern organization, 
appealing to the younger generation. Until 1975, Komala worked underground because they 
were critical of the KDP being a traditional, conservative, and tribal party, through which 
Barzani’s family was trying to dominate the Kurdish political scene. 
  
 
18 In early 1975, the war began intensively and the Barzani-led Kurds, were being supported by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi - 
the Shah of Iran, so they could face Iraqi forces powerfully. In order to undermine them, Saddam signed The Algiers 
Agreement with the Shah. In the agreement, Iraq agreed to move the maritime line of Shatt al-Arab to be the border 
between the two countries and in return, Iran had to cut off all support to the Iraqi Kurds. On the 23rd of March 1975, 
Barzani met with the Shah and decided to stop the fight against Iraq, and as a result thousands of Peshmerga withdrew to 
the Iranian border and the rest handed over their weapons to Iraqi forces. Barzani then went to the United States where 
he stayed until he died in 1979 (McDowall, D. 1992 :98-99). 
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Figure 17:   The 8th KDP congress, left to right: Nouri Shawess, Mustafa Barzani, Kamuran Bedir Khan, and his wife, Natacha. 
Nawpurdan Kurdistanland, Iraq,1970. Certain phrases can be read on banners: “8th KDP Congress. Peshmerga Heroes. Long 
live the Republic of Iraq. Long live the struggling president”.,(Wordpress.com 2015). 
 
Figure 16:  The anniversary of the autonomy agreement, Sara Square, Sulaymaniyah, 11th of March 1971 (Zheen Centre 
2015). 
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New political movements emerged to continue the political and military struggle against the 
central government19, but clashes between Kurdish parties resulted in casualties among 
their followers20. 
 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, significant changes took place in the political situation in 
the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Iran. Saddam Hussein took power in Iraq, and 
meanwhile the Shah's regime was changed to an Islamic Republic21. 
 
 
 
 
1919 In June 1976, Jalal Talabani, a former leader of the KDP, established the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and began a 
coalition of different Kurdish forces; the most prominent of them being Komala (Bulloch, J., Morris, H. and Bullock, J. 1992: 
146). Appearing more modern and socialist, they influenced the urban educated classes in the province of Sulaymaniyah, 
Kirkuk, and the eastern regions of Iraqi Kurdistan. The PUK called for a secular system, a constitutional recognition of 
Kurdish rights, and to be ‘democratic and self-governing’. After the 1975 Algiers Agreement between the Shah of Iran and 
Saddam Hussein, in November that same year, the old KDP was renamed The Kurdistan Democratic Party’s Provisional 
Command (KDPPC) and led by Barzani’s sons Idris and Masood Barzani with Sami Abdulrahman. It relied heavily on Kurdish 
tribes. After their ninth congress in Iran in 1979, Sami split from the party due to differences between Sami and Barzani, in 
particular Idris's relationship with the Iranian Isalmic Republic. He went on to establish his own party which was called the 
Kurdistan People's Democratic Party (KPDP). In addition, Dr. Mahmoud Othman who was one of the most prominent 
Barzani leaders, split from the KDP, and after 1978 he formed the United Socialist Party of Kurdistan, then he decided to 
establish a political party on behalf of the Kurdistan Socialist Party which then split into another organization (Gunter, M. 
1992: 33-34).   
 
20 A year later, the PUK began a military campaign against central government. The relationship between the two parties, 
the PUK and KDP, from the very beginning was rife with competition, tension, and conflict, and the two sides did not 
hesitate to resort to arms if necessary. Talabani sent 800 Peshmerga from the PUK to the Turkish border in order to gain a 
clear supply route - 300 of them were driven straight into the hands of the Iraqi and Turkish army (Bulloch, J., Morris, H. 
and Bullock, J. 1992: 146). The first armed clashes between the two parties occurred in spring 1978. Many died. Ali Askary 
and some of the commanders were taken captive, and later executed by the KDP. 
21 The ‘Republic of Fear’, as it was coined in the book by  Kanan Makiya, emerged when the Ba’athists came to power, 
especially after the 1970s. Iraq turned into a totalitarian regime, disrupting the role of the people, parties, and 
intellectuals. In 1979, President Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr announced his resignation, transferring power to his deputy 
Saddam Hussein - elected President of the Republic and Secretary General of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party, and leader of the 
Council of Revival of the Revolution. The Iraqi people suffered under the ruling elite led by Saddam Hussein, through 
decades of totalitarianism, tyranny, and one-party domination, resulting in the halt of any political activities of the Iraqi 
people and their political forces. The Ba’ath Party had almost half a million members in 1967 (Makiya, K. 1998:39, as cited 
in Stansfield, G. 2016: 98-99), but this number was increased to one million during Saddam’s reign in the mid-1980’s (Moss 
Helms 1984:87, as cited in Stansfield, G. 2016: 98-99). The Ba’ath Party was a nationalist party which adopted the ideology 
of Ba’athism, meaning renaissance, or awakening. They believed in uniting the Arabs under one sovereign state. “One Arab 
nation with an eternal mission, the party’s credo consisted of three words: Unity, Freedom, and Socialism” (Miller, J. and 
Mylroie, L. 1990: 85-86). 
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Banner-making in the Era of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'athists. 
The Ba'ath Party used various means to spread its national and partisan ideology, including 
the education system. Most calligraphers I interviewed confirmed that calligraphy was 
learnt by copying, and that no institution or special department within institutes existed to 
learn it. Muhamad, S. (2015) records in his interview that during the Ba’athist Regime, there 
was a book called The Arabic Calligraphy Notebook - Kuras Al-Xat al-Arabi, which formed 
part of Arabic lessons in schools. Inside the book, texts were Ba’ath Party ideological 
slogans. The texts were written in dots, and the students had to follow the dots to learn 
calligraphy, in a form of subliminal propaganda.  
 
The Iraqi Ba’ath Party adopted the idea of a one-party system because it did not believe in 
pluralism; it was an exclusionary party that believes only in its own ideas22. This was one of 
the cruellest periods in recent Iraqi history. The Ba’ath Party held sole authority and was the 
political decision-maker within the state, and because it did not believe in sharing power 
with opposition political parties, there was no voice for the people. The dictatorship was 
maintained by the most powerful means, and the people were supressed through 
economic, political, and social mechanisms.  
 
Today, colours are used by different parties, but at that time, because of their dictatorship, 
the Ba’ath Party claimed all colours, and Ba’athists used any colours they liked on their 
public banners. Muhamad, S. (2015) in the interview stated that under Ba’ath rule Sira cloth 
 
22 Ba’athism exploited its control of the state to become the main sectarian tool of repression against Shi’ites and Kurds. 
The party was anti-democratic, and during the Saddam era it turned into an organization that promoted extremist Arab 
nationalist thought - reaching the peak of political power was its supreme goal via non-democratic means. As Makiya 
described: the “opposition can no longer arise except in people’s minds, and then it is not really an opposition at all” 
(1998:37-81 as cited in Stansfield, G. 2016: 100). 
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was usually used to write banners in any colour. Consequently, within that period, colour 
held no significance, it was only important for the mottos to be legible.  Banners would be 
written for events such as: ceremonies, elections, or when a location was ‘cleansed’ of 
Iranians. Most banners were made of orange or yellow cloth, so they were highly visible 
(Figure 18). 
 
Hassan, R. (2016) points out in an interview that in the 1970s Khalid Zamdar (Figure 19) was 
a famous calligrapher in Sulaymaniyah, and with the help of assistants in his workshop he 
made most of the banners at that time, partly because demand for banners of protest was 
low. During the Ba’ath Party regime, demonstrations were limited and when they did hold a 
demonstration, people had to abide by Ba'ath conditions. For example, on Labour Day when 
people were taking part in a march with their banners, the slogans written had to come 
from the central authority of the Ba’ath party, distributed via the civil unions. These 
demonstrations were exploited by the Ba’ath Party to present its own ideology as 
propaganda. On Labour Day, for example, when the banner slogans were about workers and 
working hours, these were combined on the same banner with slogans from the Ba’ath 
Party, for example: ‘Unity, Freedom, and Socialism, Ba’athism is the way’.  
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Figure 18:  Hundreds of thousands of people celebrate Saddam's birthday, Mosel (YouTube AP Archive, 2015). 
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Hassan, R. (2016) said in his interview that despite the official demonstrations organized by 
the Ba’ath Party, in 1977 people in Kurdistan protested against the Arabisation of the 
education system in schools. The Ba’ath Party planned to change social science lessons, such 
as history, geography and culture, from being taught in the Kurdish language, to Arabic. The 
Kurds opposed this and carried out mass protests in most cities and towns. Some teachers 
promised to instruct these topics half in Kurdish and half in Arabic. They also promised that 
tests of these subjects would be easy, in the hope of preventing the situation from 
deteriorating. 
Hassan was keen to relay his experiences and share stories from the Saddam era, when he 
had a calligraphy and painting workshop on Sabunkaran Street. “I was interested in Hemin 's 
poems - a nationalist poet. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, he returned to Iran and began 
to read his poems in Kurdish areas as part of the Iraqi KDP's activities. Hemin was a member 
of the IKDP since the time of Qazi Muhammad. The Ba'ath Regime followed those who used 
the names of intellectuals and poets for their workshop names. “I decided to use his name 
as the title for my workshop. I made a plate and I wrote: ‘Hemin Calligraphy and Painting’ 
(Figure 10). I also placed his portrait beside the name and hung it in front of the workshop.” 
 
One afternoon Moulazm Muhsen, a terrifying Ba’athist security officer in Sulaymaniyah, 
responsible for killing and torturing many Kurdish activists, came to my workshop with 
bodyguards who surrounded the street. He himself entered and began questioning me 
about the workshop’s name and what it meant. I explained how it was taken from a Kurdish 
poet. He asked, "Do you know where he lives now?" I answered no, but that I know his 
poetry, and just wanted to use his name as the name of my worksho 
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Figure 19: Khalid Zamdar, standing in front of his banner-making wall. Sabunkaran Street, Sulaymaniyah, 1983. The text 
on the banner reads “Under the supervision of the Governor of Sulaymaniyah and the Directorate of Culture and 
Society in Sulaymaniyah, the opening of the second exhibition of the artist 'Khaled Zamdar’, in the Museum Hall, on the 
16th of April on” (Khalid Zamdar. Facebook, 2016). 
 
Figure 20: Hemin Calligraphy and Painting workshop, Sabunkaran Street, Sulaymaniyah (Rauf Hassan Archive 2016). 
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One of my friends was there and he intervened, saying that it was not an important thing, 
just the name of the poet. Moulazm Muhsen hit him hard. Then he demanded a ladder, 
paint and a brush and climbed up, defacing the sign. He said I had to remove the sign soon 
and that he would be back to check that evening. After that I changed it to a landscape, with 
my own name as the title of the workshop.” 
 
Between 1980-1988, Iraq underwent a period of bloodshed, including the 8-year Iran-Iraq 
War23, which resulted in thousands of deaths (an estimated 500,000 people lost their lives) 
and displaced thousands of families. In parallel, there was conflict between Kurdish parties 
called Bra Kuji (Killing Brothers) in the mountainous regions24 25. In the early 1980’s, as a 
result of divisions within the opposition, especially between the National Democratic Front, 
and the Democratic National and Patriotic Front, a civil war broke out in Northern Iraq. This 
division reflected negatively on relations between the Kurdish parties as they inherited the 
differences of their personal leaders. This added more obstacles to the situation, not to 
mention the overall project. According to Hamid A. (2015) the ICP was present in both 
Fronts, while the KDP and the PUK were on different sides, so that division sometimes took 
 
23 In 1980, the Ba'athist regime began the eight-year war against Iran, in order to end the influence of the Iranian 
revolution that had turned Iran into a Shi’a state. Saddam expressed concern that the Shi’a revolution could spread to Iraq, 
due to the presence of the Shi’a in the South. Saddam wanted to have full sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab. During the 
war, Iran provided assistance to the Kurds in order to carry out uprisings against the Iraqi government, whilst Iraq 
supported Kurdish forces in Iran to fight the Iranian army in the Kurdish area (Stansfield, G.: 111). 
24 Mustafa, N. (1996), stated that, on the 23rd of August 1983, we got the news that the violent fighting occurred between 
the PUK and the SPKI in Kania Rasha near Sekanian in the Jafaiati valley. There were 7 dead and 7 injured from the PUK, 
including Jamal Ali Bapir, the PUK’s commander, and Smail Gawradee. The SPKI said there were 6 dead and 5 injured 
including Sherko Shix Ali - the SPKI’s commander. Both parties accused each other. Sherko was killed by Jamal. Sherko’s 
brother who was called Aras and was a PUK fighter was killed in the Hakari Battle by the KDP. Jamal was killed by Sherko’s 
brother Sherzad. This was the tragic moment of internal Kurdish war (209). 
25The Kurdish parties appeared to be of an armed nature, rather than a political party. Despite the presence of city types 
and intellectuals among the parties, tribes in rural communities dominated (Brown, S. 1999: 217). Nevertheless, the Iraqi 
regime remained concerned about the possibility of a Kurdish-Iranian alliance and displaced about 600,000 Kurds to camps 
on Iranian and Turkish border areas south of the country.  Saddam fought against the Kurds from 1980-1988, destroying 
almost all villages. In the offensive campaign in 1983, he killed about 5,000 - 8000 thousand Barzani and buried them in 
mass graves in Southern Iraq (Brown, S. 1999: 214). 
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the form of violent fighting between the opposition parties, for example: between the ICP 
and the PUK, between the PUK and the SPKI, and between the KDP and the PUK. This 
resulted in the conflict escalating between Kurdish parties, weakening their influence 
against central government, and leading to the outbreak of the Kurdish conflict.  
 
For Ba’ath Party events, calligraphers were forced to make banners. Notably, the election of 
the legislative and executive assembly of the autonomous Kurdistan region. “I remember 
the day we got the message from the governor of Sulaymaniyah Province, and how we were 
forced into the car and taken to the governor’s residence. In the meeting the security 
officials said it was the duty of every calligrapher to participate in this national campaign. 
Sherko refused, but the security officials were aggressive, saying: ‘It’s your duty and as 
important as being a soldier on the front line. If you refuse to participate you are a coward 
in the face of the enemy and if you don’t do your duty it will be seen as national treason.’ 
And he asked again: ‘Did you give blood-money or gold to support the government in its war 
against Iran?’ I said not. He said: ‘You should be in prison.’ and ‘You’re a kind of bacteria’”. 
(Aziz, S. 2015 interview).  
 
Aziz added that once again he was called to call at one of the Ba'ath headquarters, bringing 
a brush as they wanted him for some calligraphy work. When he arrived, he was taken to a 
room, and received by a man in Ba'ath uniform costume, who introduced himself. The man 
asked him to write a letter with his blood to renew a vow to the president. The blood was in 
a vessel. It seems no one could reject the Ba’ath party at that time, which is why he felt the 
need to write the letter in blood. Each time he looked into the blood he felt nauseated, but 
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nevertheless he was obliged to write. It is worth mentioning that the script was as follows: 
“I promise to be a loyal man with my soul and body for the president (God Preserve Him)”. 
 
Muhamad, S. (2015) explained that the slogans and texts were decided on centrally by the 
Ba’ath party: “I dealt with them simply as customers, not as the Ba’ath Party” he said. 
“Directors and local head-men authorised banners. The Popular Army Unit sometimes 
visited me and wanted me to write fifty banners, with maybe four on a single topic, maybe 
five on another. They were distributed widely”. The banners, he said, were written in Arabic 
and sometimes Kurdish. Red, blue, black and green paints were used, and the texts were 
‘shadowed’. “We used white and yellow cloths, since specific colours for the banners were 
not imposed but we were careful not to make mistakes as people were frightened. 
Calligraphers generally complied as we had to earn a living”.  
 
During the ongoing war between the Kurds and the Iraqi army, the two sides held short-
term negotiations which ended without agreement26. When fighting between the PUK and 
the Iraqi army restarted, it was even more devastating27. The Ba’athist regime used all their 
military resources, and also used Kurds against Kurds by forming the so-called Jash (Little 
Donkey) forces, formed of clans who had influence among the Kurds28. When the Jash were 
 
26 The Kurdish Party’s armed struggles against the Iraqi regime continued, and in 1983 the PUK negotiated with the Iraqi 
government alone, without the KDP. These concessions collapsed in 1985 due to disagreements about self-government. 
Pressure from the Turkish government prevented the implementation of the agreement, and it fell to Turkey to threaten 
the Iraqi government by cutting off the Iraqi pipeline that runs through its territory. The PUK directed major operations 
against the Ba’ath regime. The former Iraqi regime, although it was a socialist Ba’athist regime, deliberately called for 
military operations in Kurdish cities and villages. (McDowall, D. 1992: 104-106). 
27 According to a report of Amnesty International Organization for Human Rights, the Ba’athist regime avenged the PUK 
and began to arrest numbers of young Kurds in cities, especially Sulaymaniyah - the centre of PUK support. They alleged 
that these youths were in Kurdish parties. 300 people were arrested. 23 were executed in public. 8 were buried alive in the 
city’s cemetery. Furthermore, around 200 civilians were killed for allegedly demonstrating against the executions. (Bulloch, 
J., Morris, H. and Bullock, J 1992: 158). 
28 For the purpose of fighting the Kurdish movement and the Kurdish parties in the mountains, the Ba’athist government 
formed a national defence battalion called Jash or Little Donkey - formed from the main Kurdish clans. A chief would be 
appointed as a Mustashar or, commander of the battalion, depending on the region. Each battalion included between 
1000 - 1500 Jash. Some joined and became Mustashars because they had disagreements with Peshmerga leaders, and 
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deployed by the Ba’athists against the Peshmerga, hundreds on both sides were killed. A 
major source of confusion and anger in Kurdish society is that many Jash members are 
registered as martyrs by political parties, as well as by the KRG. This source of discontent 
and social disturbance was part of the motivation for the Shaheed exhibition discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
 
 
At the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Kurdish opposition forces took control of several areas, but 
Iraqi forces used chemical weapons to suppress them29. Iraqi forces attacked the so-called 
forbidden areas with brutal force, ending their attacks with a bloody massacre.30  
 
 
 
others joined for money. They became collaborators with the Iraqi Army in most military operations that took place in 
Kurdistan, especially in the Anfal operations, and they allowed killing, capturing, and also, looting and theft in the villages 
and towns. Some Mustashars committed crimes against their own people, and some helped people to escape Iraqi forces 
for bribes. (Brown, S. 1999: 217). Corruption was rife in the appointment of Jashes by the Mustashares, one of whom 
described the situation: “Our situation was not easy. We were three years with Jash. We wanted to keep our people safe. I 
had 1,500 men from tribes. I was defending my people, 1000 of whom were living in peace because of me. There was no 
work in Kurdistan and no way to get money. The government was bringing men from Sudan to work but would not take 
Kurds. By enrolling in the Jash the Kurds did 15 days duty per month. Many had escaped from the army. They were all 
asking me for safety so as not to be killed in the Iran-Iraq war. So we defended them by putting them in the Jash…most 
went to their houses and did nothing, I only took 50 men for duty. My enrolment book says 1,500, so I took money for 
1,500, but I only used 50 people full-time on behalf of the others”. (McDowall, D. 1996: 355). 
29 In spring 1987, the Peshmerga controlled many areas in northern Iraq. The PUK had a strong presence in Sulaymaniyah 
province, the KDP in Badianan, and the Iranian army controlled the mountainous positions near Sulaymaniyah. 
Nevertheless, supplies were provided by the Libyan authorities to the Kurds such as anti-helicopter weapons which put 
huge pressure on Iraq’s army. Saddam decided to send his cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid as secretary of the Northern 
Organization Bureau. He had the authority to use all military weaponry in the Kurdish areas - including chemical weapons. 
(Bulloch, J., Morris, H. and Bullock, J 1992: 159). 
30 Ali Hassan al-Majid was nicknamed Chemical-Ali or Ali al-Kaimawi by the Kurds for ordering the use of poison gas in the 
1988 attack on the Kurdish city of Halabja, killing thousands of Kurds. This was the beginning of the scorched-earth policy in 
Iraqi Kurdistan. (Dirctive SF/4008 1987, as cited in Phillips, L. D. 2005: 22).  
Ali al-Kaimawi began the genocide of the Kurds: he used weapons, and chemical weapons, destroying villages, burning 
fields and farms, and poisoning all water sources. He considered these villages as forbidden areas and ordered the soldiers 
to catch all those found there and execute them.  
On March the 15th 1988, with support from Iran, the PUK seized control of Halabja in the mountainous region of Kurdistan. 
The response was swift, and on March 16th, 1988, the Iraqi army began to bomb the city. The Air Force fired more than 
200 shells filled with mustard and sarin gas. Within five hours thousands of people, mostly women and children, died, and 
their bodies were burnt. Thousands were injured. (Bulloch, J., Morris, H. and Bullock, J 1992: 142-146). Although the tragic 
event was covered by the western media, it was alarming for the international silence - Saddam was a Western ally in his 
war against Iran. (Bulloch, j. and Morris, H. 1991: 88). After the Halabja incident, Hassan al-Majid oversaw another 
campaign against the Kurds, called the Anfal campaign. This campaign went from February to September 1988. (The word 
Anfal is recited in the Koran.) in this campaign Iraqi forces, with the cooperation of the Jash, killed thousands of people in a 
mass murder and buried them in the deserts of Southern Iraq. They burned their homes and fields, and looted their 
animals and goods. (Phillips, L. D. 2005: 23). Ali Hassan al-Majid had all the powers to suppress the Kurds, if he failed in any 
attack with Peshmerga, his response was to arrest young people and execute them in urban squares. It can be said that the 
ruling Ba’ath Party, which followed the ideology of “One Arab Nation", did not tolerate diversity, or the existence of other 
ethnic minorities that did not fit its own ideology. (Bulloch, J., Morris, H. and Bullock, J 1992: 156-160).  
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Figure 22: Ali Hassan al-Majid, nicknamed Chemical-Ali or Ali al-Kaimawi  (YouTube, Al Jazeera  Arabic 2016). 
Figure 21:  The Third Komala conference during negotiations between PUK and Saddam, 20th July, 1984, Mergapan. 
Behind Jalal Talabani and his colleagues are suspended Komala's banners with slogans that read: “In order to strengthen 
Komala in the field of class struggle, in order to apply the principles of Komala organisation” (Salah Rasheed, Mam Jalal 
Didary Taman, 2019). 
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After the Halabja and Anfal campaigns, the Kurdish political movement was vulnerable to 
setbacks and divisions31, and needed to consider unity in order to maintain their political 
integrity and organize themselves for future opportunities32. During the 1980s, victims among 
civilians and combatants reached into the hundreds of thousands, whilst thousands of 
families were displaced 33. 
 
According to calligraphers at that time, banners were made for the Ba’ath Party and 
Saddam Hussein as it was the only ruling party in Iraq, and Saddam was the head of state. 
The Iraqi regime was an authoritarian dictatorship, and the opposition parties were not able 
to engage in any political or civil activity inside the cities, although they were armed in the 
mountains and in the liberated villages of Kurdistan.  
 
Ba’ath Party events were numerous and varied, for example: the 17th of July was the day of 
the Ba’ath Party, and July 14 was the birthday of President Saddam Hussein. On this day, 
there was interest in how the name of Saddam should be written on the banners - the 
colour, line and font style. This the calligraphers did under pressure and out of fear. The 
phrase: God protect him was always written next to Saddam's name. 
 
31 The Kurdish political movement was subject to reversals and divisions. This occurred when the Iraqi government started 
the Anfal campaign - to control all those areas that was under the rule of the Kurdish opposition parties in the 
mountainous regions. In these campaigns many Kurdish political activists were arrested and killed by the government, and 
some of them fled abroad. The Kurdish political parties called for unity after years of divisions and internal conflicts - in 
order to put pressure on the government. (Brown, S. 1999: 216-217). 
32 In June 1988, the parties formed the Kurdistan Front which included the: PUK, PDK, PASOK, KPDP (Kurdistan Popular 
Democratic Party), the IMK (Islamic Movement of Kurdistan), and the Kurdish branch of the ICP. The aim of this front was 
to unite the Kurdish forces and with the cooperation of the Iraqi opposition, to fight the government, and ultimately to 
form a democratic government and gain autonomy for the Kurds. (Bulloch, J., Morris, H. and Bullock, J 1992: 5-6). 
33 In August 1988, the 8-year war ended. During this bloody war half, a million Iraqis and 1 million Iranians had been killed, 
and both urban and rural infrastructure had been destroyed, causing a humanitarian disaster. (Black, I. 2010 The 
Guardian).  Due to the Anfal and Halabja disasters, all the villages in Kurdistan were completely destroyed and were 
uninhabitable for both humans and animals - the government deeming them forbidden areas. The state built settlements 
for the villagers who had been displaced. (Bulloch, J., Morris, H. and Bullock, J 1992: 98).  
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During that period, the Ba’ath party gave orders to all the schools, departments, and other 
governmental establishments and directorates, obliging them to write banners about their 
allocated expenditure fund. People would be interrogated for negligence, and so many 
banners were made and fixed up in the streets, parks and all public places. 
 
Omar Saeed noted in the interview conducted in July 2019, that during the 1980’s - the war 
era - banners were displayed everywhere: in the streets and shops, on the walls of 
government offices, and civil organizations, and so on. In those days two types of banners 
were made: the first were black and used for those who were killed on the battlefield when 
their bodies were returned to their families; the second type were made in red, yellow and 
blue, and utilized for Ba’athist slogans, propaganda for Saddam and his statements, war 
propaganda, the Day of the Province (Figure 23) and other such events. After the end of 
each event, the banners were thrown away. 
 
Saeed said: “My mother salvaged some banners to make her family's duvets from as the 
economic situation was not good and fabrics were difficult to come by (Figure 24). And so, 
my mother transformed banners into items that became an intimate part of the family’s 
daily life”, Saeed states. “People were confronted with pictures of Saddam everywhere, 
every day on television, and even as they slept, Saddam's slogans were covering our bodies: 
Saddam lives, Qadisiya lives, etc. I remember when my little brother was bedwetting. One 
morning my mother asked my brother to stop it because if they found out that he was 
urinating on Saddam's name, they might kill us all!” 
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Figure 23: Schools marching with their banners, Sulaymaniyah Province Day, 1980s (YouTube, kamarantv, 2011). 
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According to various calligraphers, the Ba’athists had little concern for the colour of the 
fabric and the font of the banners, but focussed instead on the text and the size of Saddam 
Hussein's name. A mandatory condition was that the name of Saddam must be different 
from the rest of the text and it must be the largest text on the banners. The colour of the 
text on the banners depended on the colour of the cloth so that if the colour of the cloth 
was dark, a bright colour was required for the text and vice versa. 
 
Muhamad, S. (2015) pointed out that the black in Kurdistan, as with all colours, is symbolic. 
Black is a symbol of death so that when a person dies or is killed, their relatives have black 
banners made upon which the information is written, this then is displayed in public places. 
A number of calligraphers claim the black banner was first used at the funeral of Adnan 
Khairallah (Figure 25). He was the Iraqi defence minister, and also Saddam’s brother-in-law 
and cousin.  According to the official statement from the Iraqi government at the end of the 
1980’s, Adnan Khairwalah died in a helicopter crash in a sandstorm. The Ba’ath Party forced 
all government departments, institutions, and marketeers to make black banners for this 
historic event. On that day, public places throughout Iraq were covered with black banners  
and slogans, and thereafter the black banner became more common, with the text 
containing information about the person who died or was killed - the colour of the text 
changing according to ideology, or the position of the deceased person in the community. 
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Figure 24:  Duvet made from Saddam’s banner, 1980s. The text reads: “Employers Club, Long live the victory maker... Saddam 
is Great” (Omar Saeed, 2019). 
 
Figure 25:  Saddam Hussein honours Adnan Khairallah (Algardenia.com 2015). 
 
113 
 
Muhamad, S. (2015) in his interview said that one of his nephews was martyred in the 
Qadisiya war. The officials in charge wrote out a banner text for him. It said: The Hero 
Martyr [name] was Martyred in [place] Battlefield’. The Ba’ath organization wrote its own 
banners for those who died in the Qadisiya battle. Sarabast argued that outside the cities 
there were calligraphers among the Peshmerga, including the martyr Bekir. They used to 
write things about the revolution, for instance propaganda leaflets, or common slogans like: 
Live Bravely if Briefly’, or Long Live the Hardworking and the Revolutionaries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
114 
 
Banner-making in the discourse of the Kurdish uprising 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Iraq and Kurdistan entered an important historical phase 
with the entry of Iraqi forces into Kuwait34 35, as the Kurds were able to control 
predominantly Kurdish areas during the uprising (Figure 26 & 27). Banner-making developed 
in its structure in parallel with political situation. 
 
According to McDowall, D. (1992) The uprising, or intifada, started on March 4th, but it 
began on March 5th 1991 in northern Iraq, from the small town of Ranya36. This spread to 
Sulaymaniyah and would end up in the city of Kirkuk, which was liberated on the 19th of 
March 1991. The Kurds were able to liberate more than 90% of Iraqi Kurdistan during the 
two weeks of continuous uprising. Worth noting was that all the people of Southern 
Kurdistan - with their vast diversities - all participated. (117).  
 
 
34 On the 2nd of August 1990, the Iraqi Army took Kuwait. 100,000 soldiers occupied it within hours. Saddam Hussein 
recognized Kuwait as one of Iraq's provinces. At the UN emergency meeting, they asked Iraq to immediately withdraw 
from Kuwait. Iraq ignored all international requests to withdraw its forces. Within three months, western countries formed 
an international coalition, led by the USA, to end the occupation.  (BBC on this day 2 Augusta). In the beginning the 
international coalition refused to involve the Kurdish parties in any strikes against Iraq, but the Kurds did not want to 
directly participate anyway having had such previously catastrophic encounters with Saddam. (Bulloch, J., Morris, H. and 
Bullock, J 1992: 9). 
On the 17th of January 1990, the International Coalition began its military campaign against Iraqi forces in Kuwait, resulting 
in the Iraqi Army briefly collapsing, and by the 28th of February, there was a ceasefire. (BBC on this day 2 Augusta). 
 
35 The US President, George W. Bush, asked Iraqis to revolt against the Iraqi regime. The uprising began from the cities of 
southern Iraq - specifically the city of Basra, and the Iraqi army withdrew from Kuwait, and because of the destruction of 
military vehicles by US forces, the Iraqi soldiers were left having to return to Iraq on foot. On the 2nd of March 1991 in 
Saad Square in Basra, an Iraqi soldier opened fire on a statue of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, shouting slogans against 
Saddam. This sparked the popular uprising. The uprising spread from the south to the Kurdish region in the north of Iraq. 
(Galbraith W. P. 2003 The Ghosts of 1991. The Washington Post). 
 
36 The institutions of the Ba’athist Regime, the security services, the intelligence services and the Popular Army were 
subject to the blows and retaliation of the people. The Jashes took an active part in the uprising and most of them were 
joined by the Peshmerga forces against the government - some of the Mustashares becoming commanders in the 
Peshmerga. Furthermore, some of them had their own troops and others still had been involved in the crimes against their 
own people, nevertheless they kept themselves inside the Kurdish parties. (Brown, S. 1999: 217). (Strong-men, such as 
Tahsin Shawais in Chamchamal, remained relatively independent, and though not a tribal leader, gained status as a 
Mustashar in the 1980’s and had a reputation as a brave Peshmerga, but also sided with Baghdad in 1980. (Muller, 1992: 
20, as cited in Brown, S. 1999: 217). 
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The uprising lasted about a month and at the end of March was suppressed by Saddam's 
forces with a green light from Western alliances. The campaign has displaced more than one 
million people to the borders of Iran and Turkey37.  
After the migration of millions, the United Nations issued a resolution to establish the safe 
area, and then people began to return to their cities and villages38. With the establishment 
of the safe area, the Kurdistan Front began negotiations with the Iraqi government, but the 
negotiations failed and then Baghdad withdrew its troops and government administration in 
the majority Kurdish cities. The withdrawal of Baghdad led to an administration gap39, and 
to fill this gap the Kurdistan Front held the first elections for parliament40. The Kurdish 
 
37 The March uprising was brief for a variety of reasons, especially because of regional states, of post-Saddam political 
changes, Turkey's fear of a Kurdish presence in Northern Iraq, and Saudi Arabia as Sunni states feared the forming a Shi’ite 
state in the south. The international coalition and the George W. Bush administration withdrew, allowing Saddam to 
suppress the March uprising. The regime savagely attacked the cities of Kurdistan (Arbil, Sulaymaniyah, Kirkuk and Dohuk) 
began in the hands of the Iraqi military forces due to the unequal balance of the Iraqi military with the Kurdish forces. 
Eventually more than 1.5 million Kurds were forced to escape to the two neighbouring countries. Hundreds of children, 
women and elderly people died in the harsh climatic conditions. (Phillips, L. D. 2005: 24-25).  
38 International news agencies and satellite TV broadcast the tragic images of this migration, shocking the world, forcing 
leaders across the world to step in protect the Kurds. As a result, on the 5th of May 1991, the UN Security Council issued 
Resolution 688 - a decree to establish a no-fly zone for the Kurds.  (Stansfield, G. 2016: 136). After establishing this safe 
zone, people began returning to their towns and villages. At the beginning of 1992, the Iraqi government withdrew, leading 
to an administrative vacuum. People began looting. Kurdistan was in chaos and there was a lack of food and medicine. 
(Gunter, M. 1992: 88-89). 
39 The Kurdistan Front (KF) was one administrative area the government withdrew from but decision-making among the 
Kurdish parties was difficult because they would veto each other. (New York Times, February 1992, Kurd’s Dream of 
Freedom Slipping Away, as cited in Brown, S. 1999: 245).  According to Kutschera (1997: 122), the division of revenue was 
30 percent each to the KDP and the PUK, and 10-15 percent each of the smaller parties. (As cited in Brown, S. 1999: 245). 
The United Nations imposed an economic embargo on Iraq and the Iraqi government imposed another siege on the Kurds. 
The Kurds suffered economically, and all humanitarian supplies were cut off. (Laizer, S. 1996: 49). 
 
40 Kurdish negotiations with the government failed due to the subject of autonomy. In January 1992, The Kurdistan Front 
(KF) withdrew from the negotiations and decided to hold elections for the Kurdistan Parliament in order to manage the 
administrative vacuum in the region. (Brown, S. 1999: 219). The KF decided to run elections on the 3rd of April 1992 but 
this was delayed to the 30th. The excuse given was ‘technical problems’ at the polling station, and then it was postponed 
to a further 48 hours under the pretext of ‘defective ink’. The KF was eventually appointed on the 17th of May. The 
Kurdistan Front was composed of eight parties; seven of them participated in the elections. Each party decided upon a 
designated colour as the symbol of their political party: KDP - yellow; PUK - green; SPKI and PSOK - black and blue; for KPDP 
- Blue (when united); white with a red star - Kurdistan Toilers party; red - the Kurdistan section of the ICP; indigo - The 
Assyrian Democratic Movement; among other Islamic parties. (Gunter, M. 1992: 90). Elections were held for 105 seats; 5 
Seats were for Christians and the remaining seats were distributed by the two main parties. The government formed a 50-
50 system, and if the minister was from the KDP party, his deputy must be from the PUK party and vice versa. This affected 
government decision-making. The election for the president of the Kurdish Liberation Movement was held simultaneously. 
Barzani and Talabani were among the most prominent candidates to compete for this post, but this did not work because 
the votes for each of the main candidates were equal; Barzani receiving a little more than Talabani. (Stansfield, G. 2016: 
137-138). 
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people had hoped that the elections would reduce their tragedies, because their people had 
suffered greatly from the economic situation, lack of salaries and corruption41. 
The political differences between the two sides were embodied in colours or so-called Shara 
paro. This began in the first elections in May 1992 while power was divided 50/50 between 
the PUK and the KDP. These two sides were in the struggle against each other in various 
political stations, and as a result, Kurdistan was divided into two different regions: Green 
and Yellow. Talabani, in the areas of influence of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, offered 
his authority (with his green flag and a green building) and on the other side, the KDP 
divided a neighborhood with walls, and yellow flags. (Laizer, S. 1996: 126). 
 
As Abdula, S. (2016) pointed out in the interview that after the uprising, gathering in public 
places became the norm, and it was not uncommon to see about 500 people gathering 
around someone if he/she was reading a script on a wall. For instance, when a party 
member was giving a speech in the cultural public hall it became so crowded that people 
assembled to listen outside, on the off-chance of getting a seat inside. The situation now is 
very different, for even if a leader gives a talk, no one cares. Initially people were thirsty for 
Kurdistan and freedom, as the blood they had shed was for this reason.  
 
 
41 The Kurdish elections brought hope to the Kurds to improve and stabilize the political and economic situation. However, 
in some districts, the two parties clashed as they did not accept the election results. In Chamchamal, 10 people died as a 
result. Nevertheless, the other parties were loyal to the main parties. (Brown, S. 1999: 220). The economic situation had a 
negative impact on local life, and people had to sell off their personal property to survive - even their doors and windows 
from their houses. This situation led to class strife in Kurdish society, the vast majority being poor. Rice, bread, potatoes 
and dates, became the staple food for most people and they could not buy meat. Some people were getting richer as a 
result of their relationship with party leaders - smuggling goods to other countries. (Laizer, S. 1996: 125). Peshmerga 
salaries were higher than the normal salaries and therefore most people, especially young men, joined the Peshmerga. The 
police authority was weak and political parties intervened in court decisions and having an influence on decision-making. 
Many problems arose among villagers over the land ownership on the villagers return home to their burned lands. In some 
cases, such problems led to killing, and if the murderer was a relative of the parties, the problem was resolved by them and 
the murderer had released him from prison. (Brown, S. 1999: 221-222). 
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Figure 26: The uprising, or intifada of March 1991 (BBC News 2016, Photograph Richard Wayman). 
Figure 27: The uprising, or intifada and the gathering for the Halabja anniversary at Sara Square, Sulaymaniyah, 
16th of March 1991 (K24 2016. Photograph Fayaq Hamasalih). 
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Abdula (2016) stated that the communist movement also influenced the youth, and they 
had a young following (Figure 28 & 29). Most of their slogans appear superficial, and 
gradually their influence waned, with many followers slipping into the other parties. 
The phenomenon of banner-making changed considerably from Ba’ath party times, with its 
formal constraints, especially in the colours used, because the political situation changed 
from one party to a multi-party system, and most banners were made for political events. In 
the Green Zone, the PUK was the ruling party, and on the annual anniversary of the party, 
banners were made for martyrs at the battles of Anfal and Halabja (Figure 30). 
 
The human rights situation at that time was poor, as there were many abuses by powerful 
parties such as the PUK and the Kurdistan Democratic Party against rival parties42. 
 
 
42 42 Authority was in the hands of the two main parties (PUK and KDP) who had their own militias, security and 
intelligence, and they also had their own slogans about democracy, pluralism and freedom of political action. But these 
were only propaganda and rumours and not reflected in reality because they arrested and persecuted other party’s 
followers. The only party that posed a threat to them was the Islamist movement in Kurdistan, because they also had 
militia present in the border areas close to Sulaymaniyah. (  ینەوەتەنوان 
یندروبێل یوارخکێڕ یناکەوارکو
ا
ڵب ەل١٩٩٥ :٢١ .) . The human 
rights situation was bad, and the parties arrested members of the Communist Party, PKK, Tekoshen, and the Workers' 
Union who were imprisoned without trial. Protesters were shot and arrested, for example, in the demonstration of the 
26th of September 1992, against the Turkish bombing. ( ( . ینەوەتەنوان 
یندروبێل یوارخکێڕ یناکەوارکو
ا
ڵب ەل١٩٩٥ :٦٠ The Kurdish parties 
violated against human rights in 1991 by killing prisoners, executing the opposition after the virtual trial, and violations 
against demonstrators. In 1993, when a war broke out between the parties, violations reached their worst; the situation 
deteriorated when fighting between the PUK and the KDP began, with the participation of the Islamist movement against 
the PUK. ( ( .کەوارکو
ا
ڵب ەل ینەوەتەنوان 
یندروبێل یوارخکێڕ ینا١٩٩٥ :٧٧ Political parties in Kurdistan did not want to assist investigations 
conducted by human rights organizations to uncover crimes against humanity. In this way, suspects were constantly 
violating human rights, and those mainly responsible were the two parties as they governed the region. The PUK was the 
most powerful and dominant in Sulaimaniya, and the KDP was in full control of the areas of the Badinan areas.   (. ەل
 ینەوەتەنوان 
یندروبێل یوارخکێڕ یناکەوارکو
ا
ڵب١٩٩٥ :٧٨)  . At the end of 1993, the conflict between the KDP and the socialist (HSK) 
party was brought to the brink of military tension and armed conflict. As a result, the Democratic Party controlled the 
Socialist Party headquarters in Sulaymaniyah. In order to ease this tense situation and restore peace to the city, a large 
group of people demonstrated peacefully in front of KDP headquarters, but in response, to disperse the demonstrators, 
the KDP’s Peshmerga opened fire on the demonstrations, killing four and injuring 60 of them. ( . یندروبێل یوارخکێڕ یناکەوارکو
ا
ڵب ەل
 ینەوەتەنوان١٩٩٥ :٩٧) . In another gathering in Sulaymaniyah on the 13th of June 1994, the funeral of Osman Qala Manuor 
was held, which was a large march. The PUK opened fire on crowds, killing dozens of them (Osman was a leader of the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party and was killed by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in the Punjab region). According to the PUK, 
14 people were killed and 46 injured but the PDK argued that 51 people were killed but later 22 people were killed in the 
event. According to Amnesty International reports PUK forces fired at the crowd. ( ( . ینەوەتەنوان 
یندروبێل یوارخکێڕ یناکەوارکو
ا
ڵب ەل
١٩٩٥ :١٠٠ . In another incident, PUK forces opened fire on protesters on the 1st September 1994, when the Kurdistan 
Workers' Organization carried out a demonstration with the participation of the Kurdish refugees who had fled from Kirkuk 
(under the policy of Arabization and displacement that Saddam had enforced against the Kurds). This demonstration 
opposed the decision declared by the Governor of Sulaymaniyah to destroy those homes made by the displaced people. 
On this day, Bakir Ali the poet and one of the organizers of the demonstration was killed by the PUK forces. Some sources 
say that the Special Forces followed him and then killed him. ( ( . ینەوەتەنوان 
یندروبێل یوارخکێڕ یناکەوارکو
ا
ڵب ەل١٩٩٥ :١٠٣-١٠٤  
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Figure 28:  The text on the banner reads: “Long live socialism, down with capitalism”. Communist (Shuara's) 
processions in Sulaymaniyah, 16th of March,1991 (Bahar Munzir’s Archive, 2015). 
Figure 29:  Communist (Shuara's) protest in Sulaymaniyah in front of KF office, 18th of March, 1991 (Bahar 
Munzir’s Archive, 2015). 
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In addition, the KRG, formed after the uprising, was weak because the two main parties had 
the greatest power outside the government. 
Conflict and competition for power lead to the civil war43 resulting in thousands of deaths, 
and many people went missing44. There were numerous memorials after the uprising, most 
of which were held in March, such as those for the chemical bombardment of Halabja, 
Anfal, Neuros, the liberation of Kurdistan from the Great Intifada, and the establishment of 
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. It should be noted that most of the banners for these 
events were made throughout the area for PUK events.  
 
 
43 At the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1994, conflicts between the two parties reached their worst and led to armed 
fighting and civil war. The PUK, led by Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, led by Massoud Barzani were the 
most prominent parties at the time, prompting them to share money and influence. These two parties did not agree, and 
the war intensified. The dream of a unified government was not achieved. Erbil was controlled by the PUK. Moreover, the 
Talabani Party was ahead of Barzani Party politically and militarily and confined it behind the border areas adjacent to 
Turkey. (Dodge, T. 2005: 51). The geographic location of each party influenced events and conflicts between the Kurds, in 
particular, the two main parties, because the PDK was geographically connected to Turkey, KDP was assisted by Turkey to 
fight the PKK. On the other hand, PUK was close to Iran. (Stansfield, G. 2016: 150). On the 31st of August, Saddam 
Hussein's Republican Guard invaded the city of Erbil at official request, and a call from Massoud Barzani personally to the 
Iraqi leadership at the time asking to extract the city of Erbil from the hegemony of Jalal Talabani. The Republican Guards 
marched towards Erbil with Barzani’s Peshmerga, who were supplied with the yellow striped cloths of the Democratic 
Party leadership which they tied around their arms to distinguish them from the rest of the Peshmerga. Jalal Talabani's 
party were swept away in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah and driven over the Iranian border. About 39,000 people fled their 
homes and were displaced into Iran. (Dodge, T. 2005: 51). In October, Sulaymaniyah was controlled by the PUK with Iranian 
weapons and support. After controlling the Erbil, the KDP was more powerful than ever before. (Stansfield, G. 2016: 150-
151). In September 1998, Barzani and Talabani signed The Washington agreement to establish a formal peace treaty. The 
two sides agreed to end conflict and share revenues and power. (U.S. Department of State 2001). 
 
44 According to some sources, during the fighting between the PUK and the KDP between 1994 -1998, approximately 3,000 
fighters and civilians were killed and around 10000 were displaced. (Abdulrahman, F., Archive, Niqash). In the course of 
this conflict, thousands of Peshmerga and civilians were killed, and a number of people were missing. There was no 
information about their graves or place of death or any evidence of their fate. According to the reports of the Kurdistan 
Parliament there are 120 files for the missing, but other sources refer to 200 to 850 files. There was no evidence or 
accurate information on how they were killed or whether they were still in prison and the responsible parties have 
concealed the information and have not prepared to disclose any information about them. The parties and government did 
not say they were killed or alive. And their relatives continually demonstrated to have their fate revealed or whether they 
had in fact survived. However, the government paid the salaries of the missing people in the Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal. 
(Abdulrahman, F., Archive, Niqash).   
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In the Green Zone, green cloth was used especially on PUK occasions and national events. 
For example, the uprising memorial was written on a green cloth, but the other parties 
wrote in their own colour, e.g. KDP used yellow, the Communist Party used Red, the Social 
Democratic Party used blue, and the Kurdistan Islamic Union wrote in brown. 
 
As Rasheed, H. (2015) pointed out in the interview, “we wrote on the green cloth in white, 
but we used a different colour for words such as PUK, Intifada, and chemical bombardment. 
For example, we used a black banner for events such as the chemical bombardment 
memorial because it inferred sadness. The word Halabja was written in green, and red was 
used so it looked like bloody drops sprayed on the surface of the banners, suggestive of 
bloodshed. But as for the colour of the word intifada, we used a bold, clear orange.” 
 
Beyond the political problems in Kurdistan, there were, and still are, social issues, especially 
that of women’s rights, an important issue in Kurdish society linked to family reputation and 
honour (Figure 31). 
According to Munzir, B. (interview 2015), after the uprising in 1991, many women were 
assassinated in southern Kurdistan, in particular those who supported the Ba'ath party. 
Many women were killed because of the Sharaf issue - important for the Kurdish man 
because they see women in terms of the reputation of their families. Weapons were 
present in every family and every house. The political parties distributed weapons to the 
tribes to gain their members for their parties - forming tribal systems in the Kurdish society. 
The court and the police were weak, and the Kurdish parties had no experience in the 
administration because they came from the mountains, having been fighting against the 
state system for a long time. 
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Figure 30:  Anniversary of Halabja, Halabja Taza, 16th of March 1991 (Dana Halabjaiy, Kurdistanpost.nu, 2016). 
 
Figure 31: Women protest in Sulaymaniyah against killing women on the 28th of May 2014. The text on the white banner 
on the right reads: “The Unity of women is the key to solving problems. Women’s Liberty Organisation in Kurdistan”, and 
the purple banner on the left reads: “No to the trading of women, Women’s Liberty Organisation in Kurdistan” (Jian 
archive 2014). 
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Munzir said that most women's organizations belonged to other parties, and that their role 
was passive because they did not consider or defend the rights of women in society but 
were interested in Kurdish national rights. In those days if a person or any of the activists 
invoked the issues of women, they were regarded as members of the Communist Party. 
He states that “ after 1991, people had the opportunity to organize their activities as we did. 
As a group from the left wing, we organized an event on the 8th March - a women's day at 
the Sulaymaniyah secondary school. We had activities such as reading about women's 
rights, reading poems and singing. Also, we had banners which we displayed. 
There was a commune in Sulaymaniyah interested in the left wing, and this grew quickly, 
but the Kurdistan Front was barred from joining. People who supported the left-wing 
organized mass protests against the KF decision, raising red banners with slogans.” (Munzir, 
interview 2015).  
 
Faris, J. (2015) said that black banners were made for martyrs during the civil war, and that 
he made a number of banners for each martyr (Figure 32), and placed some at the front of 
the martyr’s house, some in the mosque, and some on their graves. On their Memorial Day 
(which was after fourteen days had passed) some banners were placed in front of a 
ceremonial hall. The fighting took place daily and there were casualties, and each month 
there would be about ten memorials for martyrs in Sulaymaniyah. Rasheed, H. (2015) said: 
“During the civil war I made ten banners for ten different people in just one day. On another 
day, I made eleven banners for martyrs who had visited on the day of Arafah, the day 
before Eid Ramadan.” 
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Figure 32:  Families of victims of the internal war gather. The text on the black banner is “Martyrs of Revenge storm ... 
Defend the Homeland” (Fayaq Hamasalih, Kurdipedia.org 2016). 
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As Abdula, S. (2016) states, “during the conflict between the PUK and the KDP, commanding 
officials, even the PUK leadership officials, had no problem traveling to Turkey by land 
through the ‘Badinan’ zone. It was only the common people who suffered in this respect; 
the struggle was there among the lower classes: brother against brother and family against 
family. I believe that the leadership members with their spouses and children moved easily, 
travelling to Europe through the zone of the KDP with no problem. Simple people were not 
aware of that.” 
 
Abdula also observed that the struggle between the PUK and the KDP was clearly visible in 
the form of banners. For a period, the SDP was united with the KDP, and they merged their 
slogans and colours; even their banners were half yellow and half blue. They also had a new 
slogan which was significant for them, saying: yellow and the sky like blue, Mr. Mohammad 
and Barzani are the two and written on the banners of both those two united parties. 
 
Despite political and military concerns, both Presidents Talabani and Barzani’s differences 
and divisions were deepening. Their aggressive behaviour towards each other was to have a 
significant impact on the fracturing of the social structure of the Kurdish society. The 
differences and divisions spread into the city, villages and even within the Kurdish family, 
and were embodied in colour on the line of conflict, the yellow being Barzani's share, while 
green was exclusive to Talabani members. The supporters wore clothes of their party 
colour, and showed disdain for the other colour to express their loyalty. (Salih, S. 2015, 
Interview).  
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Muhamad, S. (2015) faced a problem once: “when I wrote a banner for someone. I chose 
the colours and shaded the text with another font, and I shaded one part yellow just to 
aestheticise it with nothing further behind that decision. When the person returned for the 
banner and saw it, he was angry and said ‘what is that yellow you added? Don’t you know 
two of my brothers got killed by their hands45?’ Having argued about it loudly I then flushed 
away a gallon of yellow and erased the text. During the civil war the colour yellow was not 
allowed to be used for any occasion in the Sulaymaniyah zone, whilst the colour green was 
not allowed in the Badinan zone - one might even get knocked down for carrying a green 
rosary bead. A martyr’s name was written in green if it belonged to the PUK, while a martyr 
of the Communist Party was made in red, and the SDP’s in blue.” (Muhamad, S. 2015, 
interview). 
 
In my interviews, there are a number of accounts of political issues affecting social relations, 
even within families, e.g. if one of two brothers supported the PUK and the other supported 
the PDK, they would not accept each other. Neighbours would also fight each other over 
their political differences. 
 
After 1991, most banners were made for party events, such as the annual anniversary of 
political parties, election campaigns, events related to party martyrs, as well as party 
propaganda. Each party would use its own colour for making banners (PUK: green, KDP: 
yellow, ICP red and so on). When government departments held national or party events, 
 
45 The hands of the PDK who use yellow as their symbolic colour. 
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the writing of the information would be on a green banner, because most of the directors of 
government departments were loyal to the PUK.  
 
Despite the influence of nationalist and leftist parties in Iraqi Kurdistan, certain Islamist 
parties retained an influence on Kurdish society, and remained in conflict with other 
parties46. Muhamad, S. (2015) in his interview recalled an incident which happened when he 
was writing banners: “One day a man approached me. He told me to write a number of 
banners to mark the occasion of the killing of Mullah Abdul-Qahsari at the Tasluja 
checkpoint in a conflict between the Islamic party and the PUK. I was unaware of that 
problem, so I wrote the banners and put them outside to dry. My neighbouring shop owner 
came into my shop and asked me: ‘What have you written?! Don’t you see the security 
guards are hanging around the area?’  I rushed out and gathered in the banners. The day 
after, the man came back for the banners and I blamed him and told him: ‘You should have 
told me about the problem. Because of you I was about to get into trouble.’ I now always 
inquire when I write a banner for someone, because I know only some parties are allowed. 
If the party is not well known I inquire, and if I realize that something is against the regime47 
I will not write it. For example, if one asks for a Daesh48 flag I will not make it.” 
 
46 Islamic parties have a presence in Kurdistan, particularly the Kurdistan Islamic Movement, which was established as a 
result of the Islamic revolution in Iran and supported Iran from its war with Iraq. After 1991 they became stronger. And in 
1994 after their differences with the PUK and then led to the bloody war, which weakened them, but after the events of 
the 31st of August 1996 they were able to control Halabja near the Iranian border. They became more radical when some 
of their leaders returned from Afghanistan. The Islamic Movement faced divisions and splits which were led by the 
establishment of other Islamic parties such as an Islamic Group of Kurdistan (IGK) in 2002 which is led by Ali Bapir. The PUK 
in its zone was a dominant party and they had problems with other parties such as Islamic parties. On the 4th of March 
2003, when Mullah Abdul-Qahsari returned from his party's meeting from Ahmed Awa district to the city of Raniya, he, 
along with four of his bodyguards were killed at the Tasluja checkpoint by the PUK forces. (Dodge, T. and Simon, S. 2007: 
142-143). Some of the members who believed in the jihad against the PUK and the KDP broke away from the Islamic 
movement and on the 31st of August 2001, Jund al-Islam was founded under the leadership of Mullah Karekar. According 
to some PUK reports, Osama bin Laden had tried to separate the group to establish the Radical Group. (Dodge, T. and 
Simon, S. 2007: 142-143). 
 
47 Kurdish regime 
48 Islamic State  
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“When the PUK attacked the Communist Party in 2000, our organization was banned 
because it was treated as part of the Communist Party, but our organization was not a 
communist organization, but in some respects, had similar policies to women's rights 
parties. The PUK closed our shelter, and at that time we kept a woman named Nahida, who 
had escaped from her family. Unfortunately, the PUK handed Nahida back to her family and 
she was killed by them. One day later and she was buried with five members of the 
Communist Party who were killed by the PUK” (Munzir, B. interview 2015).  
 
Munzir explained that there were many activities organized for women in Sulaymaniyah - 
such as seminars, workshops and protests. Banners were raised to protest for women's 
rights. Mamusta Sakar, who was from the Sar Kapkan region of Rania, was killed by her 
father in her bed while she slept because of her wanting to marry her colleague. "They 
protested as a group of women, free people, and activists on the 8th of March, against the 
murder of Mamusta Sakar, in front of the Sulaymaniyah court building. We made several 
banners showing people's anger at this brutal violence against women in Kurdistan. The 
banners were all pink and the texts were written in black. Unfortunately, her father was 
released in a public amnesty.” (interview,2015). 
Munzir explained that they have an organization for women, with goals such as: changing 
personal status laws, preventing men from polygamy, preventing female genital mutilation, 
and preventing violence against women. “There were brutal acts of violence against women 
in some tribal areas because we found two women in the Rania area (Kazhal Xidr and Kazal 
Jamal) who had their noses cut off because of Sharaf issues. We found another woman 
whose hands and feet were bound with a chain, and imprisoned in a bathroom because she 
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was suffering from mental health. We had a shelter to keep these women who had fled 
their families because of the threat of death and those who had been violated there”. 
In the Second Gulf War, Saddam's entire regime fell, and Iraq entered a new political era. A 
new constitution provided for a federal system of Iraq in which the Kurdistan Region 
achieved autonomy. The two main parties in Kurdistan (PUK and KDP), unified the 
administration49 and also held a number of elections for the parliament and the presidency 
of the Kurdistan region.50 
The main authority in the region was subject to the politics of the two ruling parties who 
often used human and economic resources for the benefit of their parties and families. As a 
result, the region suffered from bureaucratic and financial corruption, and those who 
exposed or criticized this corruption were often assassinated or arrested 51 (Figure 33 & 34). 
 
49 The political situation in Iraq changed after the fall of Saddam Hussein and the rule of Ba’ath’s regime in 2003. The US-
led International Coalition attacked Iraq in March 2003 and ended the Ba’ath regime in Iraq. (Angrist, M. 2013: 287). In 
2005, Iraqis began writing the country's new constitution, and Iraq is now known as a federal state. (Washington posts 
2005). Under this constitution, Kurdistan enjoyed autonomy, the right to form a parliament, and the election of a president 
for the region. The Kurdistan region was divided into two separate government administrations. In early 2006, the two 
administrations were unified, and the Peshmerga forces were selected to be the military forces to protect the territory. 
(Romano, D. and Gurses, M. 2014: 144). 
 
50 After the fall of the Saddam regime, the administration in Kurdistan held a number of elections for the Kurdistan 
Parliament in 2005, 2009, 2013. (Romano, D. and Gurses, M. 2014: 144). Kurdish power in the Kurdistan region is party 
authority, because the two main parties have control over government institutions, the government suffers from non-
independence, and the two main parties intervene in government policy and decision-making. The creation of employment 
opportunities in the public sector is not by skill, but through party relations and loyalty to the families of political leaders. 
The party intervention in the KRG was very clear in all aspects of government - even in universities and education. The two 
parties, the PUK and the KDP, have full authority over the movement of trade, constrictions, and the oil sector, using all the 
financial capacities of their parties. (Romano, D. and Gurses, M. 2014: 144-156).  
 
51 There have been numerous violations against human rights and freedom of expression, particularly against journalists. 
The people of Kurdistan were not silent against these violations, and they did great protests in most cities. When Sardasht 
Osman was killed and his body was found on the 26th of May 2010 in Mosul, this tragic event led to the anger of people in 
all cities, and they held demonstrations against the parties and the government to uncover the criminals. Sardasht was one 
of the journalists criticizing corruption in Kurdistan and he wrote the story about corruption, referring to the name of 
Masoud Barzani and his daughter. Such criticism led to his killing. (Al Jazeera 2010, The murder of Sardasht Osman). He is 
not the only journalist killed under the Kurdish authorities, but there is a list of names of journalists who have been 
assassinated at different times. This happened only because of their criticism of the administrative and financial corruption 
of the parties and their political leadership. On the 21st of July 2008, Suran Mama Hama was assassinated in Kirkuk, on the 
4th of May 2010, Sardasht Osman was kidnapped in Erbil and his body was found in the city of Mosul, Kawa Ghermiani was 
assassinated in front of his mother on the 5th of December 2013 at 9 pm, and Widad Hassin was kidnapped in Dhoek 
August 2016 and found dead, and Shakri Zinadin, a KNN TV cameraman’s body was found near his village on the 1st of 
December 2016.  .ب ،یرون(٢٠١٨ :١٢٥)  
 
 
 
130 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33: A protest about the murder of Sardasht Osman in Sulaymaniyah. The text on one black banner 
reads: “No to the killing of freedom. Yes to try those convicted.” The red banner reads: “KDP and the 
government must uncover the murderer of Sardasht Osman” (AP/Yahya Ahmed. cpj.org 2011). 
Figure 34: Protest for Kawa Ghermiani, who was assassinated on the 6th of December 2013 (Shwan 
Mohammed. RT 2013). 
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According to most calligraphers, the writing of slogans and banners for government 
institutions was centralized, and distributed by the ruling party in Sulaymaniyah. As the 
heads of the institutions were all from the PUK green dominated all the banners made by 
government offices at this time.  
 
There have been numerous protests in Kurdistan, particularly in Sulaymaniyah, against 
corruption, non-transparency, and monopoly of power by the two parties, the PUK and the 
KDP. One of the most prominent demonstrations took place in Sulaymaniyah on the 17th of 
February 2011, under the influence of the Arab Spring, when seven demonstrators were 
killed and 250 injured in the centre of the city, called Sarai Azadi. (Human Right Watch 
2011).  
Kurdish relations with the central government in Baghdad have not been good from the 
beginning of the formation of the Iraqi state to the present day. The main reason for this 
bad relationship has been Kirkuk, a city rich with oil. Kirkuk was the main reason for the 
failure of agreements between Iraqi authorities and Kurdish politicians, especially in the 
fight for Kurdish rights. The issues around Kirkuk are complex, but banner-making provides a 
different view of the political issues in the city.  
 
In my interview with Faris, J. (2015) a PUK calligrapher in Sulaymaniyah, I asked if he had a 
special memory. He replied: “I have a sad memory: when the Iraqi government issued Law 
No. 24 in 2010, against Kirkuk, it caused anger among its people; they held mass protests 
inside the city, and asked me to write 2500 banners quickly. I started banner-making with 
sixteen assistants and under some pressure, finished by morning, and sent the signs to 
Kirkuk. I was happy because I finished all the banners, and saw them on television, in the 
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protest that rose up from the people. But suddenly my happiness turned to sadness 
because the protest became a tragic event due to an explosion among the demonstrators, 
which killed many people and injured a lot of them. That's all I saw on television. I saw the 
banners that I made mixed with the blood of the demonstrators. We had made the banners 
on white cloth and we wrote slogans in black.” 
 
Banners are also made for religious events such as the birthday of Prophet Muhammad. 
White banners are made for such events and the text is written in different colours. 
(Rasheed, H. interview, 2015).  
 
Ramadan is one of the occasions in Kurdistan where banners are made by people to offer 
their respect. Haji Mohammed Rostam said he sets up a banner for Ramadan every year 
(Figure 35). “The reason for making this banner is to advise people that God has imposed 
Ramadan on all Muslims. God states in the Holy Qu’ran that Muslims should fast and 
respect this month. When people come to my place or pass on this road, there are many 
Kurds who cannot understand the Arabic language, so I decided to divide the banner into 
two parts - the upper Arabic text in black, and the lower in Kurdish and in blue”. He 
explained that he chose white cloth, because the colour white is sacred and used by 
religious people in religious customs, and Imams also use it for their turbans. (Interview 
2015).  
 
In fact, according to Faris, J. (2015), most of the banners in Sulaymaniyah were written in 
Kurdish, although on certain occasions they would make banners in other languages, such as 
Arabic and English. When Iraqi leaders visited Sulaymaniyah, some banners were made in 
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green and the text written in Arabic, depending on the political or government leader. 
However, when American arbiters of power after the fall of Saddam visited the city, (e.g. Jay 
Garner and Louis Bremer), authorities raised banners in English to welcome them. Faris said 
at some point between 1993-1994 he also made a black banner in English in honour of a Mr. 
Stewart - an employee of the Australian CARE humanitarian aid organization who was 
murdered in Chamchamal.: 
 “One evening, two people from the PUK came to my house and asked me to make an 
English banner for Mr. Stewart's murder because they wanted to send the body to his 
country. I had just got married and I was living in one room. There was no electricity and I 
had an oil lamp. So, I wrote a text in the dark of the night, the text was in green on the black 
cloth because it was at the PUK’s request. They took it the next day to cover the coffin”. 
 
 
All the interviewers agreed that colours have been divided among political parties and 
turned into political symbols. This means there is no neutral colour in Kurdistan, and such 
strict division reflects the lack of social cohesion. In cases of political or military conflict, the 
wrong use of colour, including the colour of clothing, can causes problems for individuals. In 
government institutions, the use of colour is important, especially the colour of official files. 
When someone has papers requesting something in a government department, he needs to 
be aware of the file colour, as otherwise the request may be rejected or delayed.  
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Figure 35: Haji Mohammed Rostam sets up a religious banner for Ramadan every year in Naly street, Sulaymaniyah, 14th 
of July, 2015. The blue and red text is the same written in both Arabic and Kurdish: “O you who have believed, decreed 
upon you is fasting as it was decreed upon those before you that you may become righteous” (Photograph Rostam 
Hakeem). 
135 
 
 
Islamic State, the radical Islamic group that emerged in Syria in 2013, attacked several areas 
in northern Iraq in mid-2014. Iraqi army forces collapsed in these areas and withdrew. These 
military gaps in the areas were filled by Peshmerga forces, and hence in certain regions, IS 
carried out heavy attacks on the Peshmerga who in some areas were forced to withdraw 
and cede control to IS. One of the most horrifying events in the period was the massacre of 
the Yazidis, which was carried out by IS in Sinjar in August 2014. (BBC News 2017, Who are 
the Kurds?).  
 
According to a UN investigation, about five thousand young boys and men were killed and 
up to seven thousand women and girls were abducted to be used as sex slaves.  The 
remainder of the population not captured by IS escaped to Mount Sinjar. (Beck, J. 2016, 
Aljazeera).  According to the Minister of Martyrs at a press conference, 1760 Peshmerga 
troops were martyred during the beginning of the war of IS until mid of 2017. (Omaraway, 
A. 2017, YouTube). All calligraphers interviewed made many banners for Peshmerga’s 
martyrs during the war of IS, and recalled the PUK and the PDK using their own colour for 
those martyrs belonging to their party. Strangely perhaps, the PKK did not use the colour 
black as a background for their martyrs. Rasheed, H. (2015) states that “I once made 
banners for martyrs at Kobani on black cloth, and when family came to collect their banners 
and saw they were in black, they told me that the colours were all wrong, because the PKK 
uses white on red in their burial ceremonies. They also advised me that the PKK itself had 
changed their symbolic colour from black to red. The PKK had special texts for their martyrs 
such as: ‘We are sad about the death of this martyr’; ‘This martyr did not die’; "A real martyr 
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of Kurdistan’ in addition to the name and the title. These are very different to party slogans 
in southern Kurdistan”. 
 
After 2010, Kurdistan faced many political and military events, most notably, the war on the 
Islamic State in Iraq from 2014 until the end of 2017. The other major upheaval was the 
Kurdish request for independence in September 2017. Such events have had profound 
repercussions for the people of Kurdistan, across all human and economic fields. 
 
According to Abdula, S. (2016), the war on IS led to an economic crisis, a situation was 
characterized by unusual circumstances, which were harsh especially because the 
government cut salaries of their employees in half, which then affected every aspect of the 
economy. “So, if you look at the backing-board, you can see colours such as red, blue, and 
black left from white banners written for commercial purposes, for example, selling 
property, renting houses or shops and so on, because people were unsure about their 
future, so they tried to sell everything they had in order to get money for basic needs such 
as food and heating”(Figure 36). 
 
Following the outbreak of war on Al-Da’esh in 2014 the political situation deteriorated in 
the Kurdistan region, and the economy was severely impacted by a drop in the price of oil. 
During that period, the KRG issued a partial deduction from state employees' salaries, in 
order to reduce the financial crisis experienced by the region52. As well as the deduction, the 
government also failed to pay salaries on time, and a delay of two months or more was 
common (mof-krg.org).  
 
 
52 A decision was issued by the Council of Ministers of the Kurdistan Regional Government No: (64) of 2/3/2016 and 
circulated this decision by a letter from the Council Secretary No: (824) of 16/02/2019. (mof-krg.org). 
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Figure 36: Commercial banners, Sara Square, Sulaymaniyah, 23rd of June, 2015. Text on one banner 
reads: “Friday market in Freedom Park is now open for goods at wholesale prices. The main street behind 
Freedom park, Park Tower Mall” (Photograph Rostam Hakeem). 
Figure 37: A demonstration against corruption, Sulaymaniyah. 18th of July, 2015. Text on the banner reads: 
“Requirements of the Kurdish people: 1. Constitution of the Parliament; 2. Independent Commission; 3. 
Freedom of expression; 4. Facilitate and change the education system; 5. Management of military forces 
under the supervision of parliamentary committees; 6. Bring the oil agreement to parliament; 7. Statistics 
of the number of employees in electronic form: etc., (Photograph Rostam Hakeem). 
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As a PhD student in the UK, I was severely affected by that political and economic situation, 
as I was funded by the Kurdistan Regional Government - funding, which was postponed, and 
has not yet been paid.  
 
Meanwhile, in Sulaymaniyah, many protests that took place during the war against IS about 
the economic crisis in Kurdistan. Most of the protests were organized by employees of 
government departments and teachers, because of the salary cut by the government. As an 
employee and as an artist I participated in a number of protests in 2016 and 2017. Most of 
their banner slogans were anti- corruption, demanding transparency of financial resources, 
and also requiring the government to pay and compensate their salaries for previous years 
(Figure 37). 
 
In the past ten years, there have been regular and numerous mass protests against the 
government in Sulaymaniyah, often organised due to public perception of government 
financial corruption. Public demonstrations were often supported by opposition parties, 
especially the Change Movement, (founded in 2009). Various communities participated, all 
making their own demands and making use of different slogans  either written on banners 
and leaflets, or delivered by chanting and shouting. 
 
I participated in some of the protests in Sulaymaniyah and documented them (Figure 38). In 
late October 2017, I heard that a large demonstration involving many teachers, employees 
and activists was to take place on 13 November. That morning, I took my specially-made 
banner to the protest venue. Near the demonstration square, I saw several security men in 
civilian clothes carrying assorted weapons, heading towards the demonstrators.  
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I was fearful for my safety and the safety of others, because of the protests of February 
2011, where 10 protesters were killed, and hundreds were imprisoned (Salih, B. 2012. 
dengiamerika.com).  
 
The banner was made of red cloth and clipped to two wooden sticks (Figure 39). My choice 
of text for the banner was based upon selections from the interviews I made with 
calligraphers and was an accumulation of various slogans painted in white. Aesthetically, the 
colour composition of white on red cloth shows up clearly, and it is very attractive in a 
crowd. On the other hand, the accumulation of the texts due to their over-layering, meant 
that the sentiments expressed became illegible.  The demonstration began in front of the 
Directorate of General Education in western Sulaymaniyah, where one of the main roads 
had been cut off. Demonstrators formed in the square and began chanting slogans against 
the government and the ruling parties. Some slogans related to employees’ rights, such as 
the provision of salaries to employees by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and 
demands for the government to abolish the rule that reduced employees’ salaries. 
There were various factors that led me to participate in this protest in this way. The key 
point concerned my relationship with my own historical research on banners in the history 
of Kurdish society, and I was especially interested in the role of the banner in conveying 
Kurdish demands during political events in recent Iraqi history. Banners have always been 
used to convey specific messages from particular community groups, all relating to the 
discourse of the era. As an artist working in another culture, however, with a different view 
of events, I purposely developed a different approach to the use of banners, the intention 
being to give the banner an unfamiliar role. 
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Figure 38: Large demonstration involving many teachers, employees and activists, Sulaymaniyah 03rd of October 
2016 (Avar Hamid). 
 
Figure 39:  A demonstration against corruption, Sulaymaniyah, 13th of November 2017. The banner reads: “Close the 
party's offices to set up schools” (Avar Hamid). 
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The protests were quite confused, and there were contradictions in the messages of the 
protestors, so I felt that any one individual text could not adequately represent the 
demands of the demonstrators. I decided instead to present an ambiguous banner slogan, 
derived from my process of transforming familiar information into unfamiliar states, to 
provoke a more complex response. My idea was to suggest a multi-layered debate, one that 
has continued over many decades, often with the same themes and expressing the same 
desires, but without achieving resolution. The banner thus behaved in the manner of an 
‘open work’ according to Eco’s definition. 
 
Certain decisions were also informed by continuing research into artist Jeremy Deller, and 
particularly his sensitivity to the cultural and political environment in his use of banners in 
protests or processions. His participation in the 2009 Manchester International Festival, for 
example, involved him commissioning a range of banners to pick up on the many 
contradictory elements used in the festival. Deller described the atmosphere as a “social 
surrealist event full of bizarre, funny, wrong-seeming things" (Deller, J. 2009). One example, 
designed by David Hockney (Figure 40), consisted of image and text, with the phrase “The 
Unrepentant Smokers” set above a depiction of an ashtray, carried by a group of avid 
smokers as a form of freedom of expression and mild confrontation. Audience is a clear 
consideration for Deller, as this mode of presenting ideas differs from exhibiting in galleries 
and museums mainly through its accessibility, and hence the potential for communication 
with a wider audience. 
 
In the Sulaymaniyah protest, hundreds of teachers and other staff formed a mass 
demonstration, marching from the Directorate of General Education towards the court and 
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the office of the governorate of Sulaymaniyah to present their demands. During the march, 
participants asked me about the banner - why the texts were indecipherable, and why there 
was no clear message. The idea of using a banner as an artistic act was totally new to them. 
Some of the organizers of the protest thought I was a member of the Communist Party and 
asked if I would leave the event because they did not want a party agenda to exploit their 
protest. Others who I spoke to about my intention, and who knew it was an artistic 
performance or intervention, were delighted to have an artist at their event.  
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Figure 40: A banner designed by David Hockney, made by Ed Hall the banner reads: “The Unrepentant Smokers, 
DH 09” 2009 (jeremydeller.org 2016). 
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Timeline: Banner-making in The Modern History of The Kurdish People in Kurdistan 
Banners in the new Iraqi state: from Monarchy to Republic: 
Events Effects 
1918 Following the collapse of the 
Ottoman Sultanate at the end of the 
First World War, British forces 
occupy the province of Mosul. 
Agreements are signed between the 
major countries. Kurdistan is divided 
up between four main countries: 
Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria.                                      
                                                                
P: 74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first appearance of banners in Iraq is 
in response to the creation the new Iraqi 
state. Early banners are used in civil 
protests to express Kurdish political 
motivations and appeals for cultural and 
national rights. Poets and intellectuals play 
an instrumental role in organising initial 
protests, and thus are partly responsible 
for the appearance of banners.  
 
 
 
 
 
Due to the economic situation, banners 
are only made in small numbers  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Banners appear as part of a major protest, 
displaying short nationalist slogans. 
1920 Britain and the Ottoman Empire sign 
the Sèvres Treaty, under which the 
Kurdish people are granted their own 
independent state.  
                                                                
P: 74 
1921 A referendum is held to appoint King 
Faisal in Iraq, but Sulaymaniyah 
boycotts this. 
                          
 P: 74                                                               
1922 Sheikh Mahmoud, declares a 
revolution, and takes control of 
Sulaymaniyah. He declares himself 
king of Kurdistan.    
                                                                 
P.74 
1923 Britain decides to end the authority 
of Sheikh Mahmoud and they attack 
Sulaymaniyah. The Treaty of 
Lausanne is signed, replacing the 
Treaty of Sèvres, thus worsening the 
Kurdish situation.                                  
                                                                 
P:74 
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1930 Britain removes the Mandate, and so 
Iraq becomes an independent 
country.                                   
                                                                
P: 76 
1930 6 September. A large demonstration 
is organised in Sulaymaniyah, 
resulting in the killing and wounding 
of many demonstrators. 
                                                          P: 
78-79 
1934 Announcement of the founding of 
the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP).   
                                                                
P: 79 
 
1946 The Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(PDK), is established. Mustafa 
Barzani becomes leader of the party. 
Their political agenda is Kurdish 
autonomy, independence, and 
democracy in Iraq.            
                                                                
P: 82 
 
1948 The Portsmouth Treaty is signed, and 
students immediately respond 
angrily in what is termed the Al-
Wathba Uprising. Several 
demonstrations take place in 
Sulaymaniyah against colonialism 
and for the independence of Iraq.  
                                                    P: 82-84 
The phenomenon of banners becomes a 
familiar sight in the Al-Wathba uprising 
and associated events during this period.  
The Communist Party organise protests in 
all cities, and slogans derive from the 
ideology and political orientation of the 
Communist Party.  Kurds highlight their 
new demands and political dreams in 
banner texts. 
Banner-making in the era of the Republic of Iraq: 
Events Effects 
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1958 Iraq becomes a republic, and the 
new Iraqi constitution recognises 
Kurdish "national rights". Politicians 
enjoy the freedom of political action, 
and Barzani returns from the Soviet 
Union. 
  
P: 87-90                                                          
National and cultural rights of the Kurds 
are reflected in the development of 
banner usage, where protest is no longer 
the only area for their use. 
Banners appear in cultural events, such as 
Nowruz. Student organisations are now 
permitted to express their viewpoints and 
demands through banners.  
1960s The situation deteriorates in Iraq, 
with a number of military coups 
occurring in the Iraqi government. 
Clashes and negotiations take place 
between the Kurds and the central 
government, at the same time the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party splits 
into two wings.   
 
P: 91-92                                                          
A dissident group from the KDP uses 
political banners in the cities, due to their 
privileged relationship with the central 
state in Baghdad. 
1970 After Ba'athists take power, a March 
agreement is concluded between the 
Kurds and the central government, 
granting autonomy to the Kurds, 
including recognition of the Kurdish 
language and the Iraqi constitution, 
indicating that the Iraqi people 
"consists of two nations, the Arab 
and the Kurdish".  
                                                                
P: 93 
The agreement creates a new opportunity 
for banner slogans to appear in public on 
political and cultural occasions. Banners 
appear in both Arabic and Kurdish 
languages. 
1974 After four years of relative calm, the 
Iraqi government changes the terms 
of the agreement, but the Kurds 
refused, and military conflict begins 
again. 
    
P: 94 
 
1975 The Kurdish revolution collapses 
following the signing of the Algiers 
Agreement between Iran and Iraq, 
putting an end to Iran's support for 
Barzani.  
                                
P: 100 
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1976 The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK) is established, led by Jalal 
Talabani - previously a dissident from 
the Kurdistan Democratic Party.  
                                    
P: 102 
 
1978 Violent fighting takes place between 
the Kurdistan Democratic Party and 
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
leaving many dead.                
P: 102 
 
Banner-making in the Era of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'athists: 
Events Effects 
1979 Saddam Hussein takes over the 
presidency and authority in Iraq.  
 
P: 102 
Events organized by the Ba’ath Party and 
Saddam increase significantly, and the 
production of banners increases 
accordingly.  
 
Colours at this point are not symbolic, as 
the Ba’ath Party is the only party. Instead 
colours are used to attract attention for 
propaganda, and banners serve Ba’athist 
ideology and Saddam's authority. 
 
Ba'athists are concerned with the size and 
clarity of the texts, especially in the use of 
Saddam's name.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Black banners become commonplace in 
funeral situations, due to deaths from the 
Iraq-Iran war, in particular the killing of 
Adnan Khairallah. 
1980 War erupts between Iran and Iraq 
which will last for 8 years. A violent 
military conflict breaks out between 
the Kurdish parties and the central 
government.    
                       
P: 108 
1983 Negotiations on Kurdish Autonomy 
between the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan and the central 
government in Iraq.                
P: 110 
1985 Negotiations end, and military 
violence starts again. The Ba'athist 
regime retaliates against the PUK 
and begins to arrest several Kurdish 
youths in various cities, especially 
Sulaymaniyah, the PUK support 
centre.    
                                      
P: 110 
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1988 The PUK, with the assistance of Iran, 
seized Halabja. The response of Iraq 
is swift. On March 16, 1988, the Iraqi 
army begins bombing the city with 
chemical weapons, and within five 
hours thousands of people, mostly 
women and children, die.  
                                     
P: 111 
1988 Iraqi forces launch the "Anfal 
campaign" against the Kurds, killing 
thousands of people and burying 
them in the deserts of southern Iraq. 
They burn their homes and crops. 
                                    
P: 111 
1988 After reconciliation between Kurdish 
parties, they form the Kurdistan 
Front, which aims to unify Kurdish 
forces in cooperation with the Iraqi 
opposition.  
                           
P: 113 
Banner-making during the Kurdish uprising: 
Events Effects 
1991 After Saddam’s defeat in the first 
Gulf War, the Kurdish uprising starts 
on March 5 and Kurds take control of 
a large area in Kurdistan. The 
uprising is suppressed due to the 
refusal of the US-led international 
coalition forces to intervene in 
support of them. More than a million 
Kurds flee to Iran and Turkey. 
 
P: 119 
The uprising marks an important stage for 
the development of banners, as they begin 
to reflect the authority of Kurdish parties; 
Kurdistan transforms from a one-party 
system to a multi-party system.  
Cloth colour and text colour on banners 
take on symbolic roles.  
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1991 In April after international news 
agencies release tragic images of this 
migration, the world is shocked, and 
the United Nations establishes a 
"safe area".  
                                                              
P:120 
 
Each party chooses a specific colour as 
symbol in the 1992 elections, and this 
symbolism is reflected in all banners 
commissioned by party institutions and 
supporters. 
The political party colours are:  
KDP - yellow;  
PUK - green;  
SPKI and PSOK - black and blue; 
KPDP - Blue (when united);  
Kurdistan Toilers party- white with a red 
star; 
Kurdistan section of the ICP - red;  
The Assyrian Democratic Movement -
indigo 
 
 
 
Banners are now made in large numbers, 
especially for nationalist propaganda, 
election campaigns, national events, 
remembrance of the tragedies of Halabja 
and Anfal, and martyrdom events. 
 
 
 
 
 
Banners are now seen in many areas 
where they were previously not common, 
such as religious occasions, and for 
commercial advertisements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1992 After negotiations fail at the 
beginning of this year, the Iraqi 
government withdraws from 
Sulaymaniyah, Erbil and Dohuk, 
leading to an administrative vacuum.  
On May 17, the KF decides to hold 
elections for the Kurdistan 
Parliament to manage the 
administrative vacuum in the region. 
  
P: 120 
1994 In May, clashes begin between 
Kurdish parties, the most intense of 
which are between the KDP and the 
PUK (until 1998), which leads to 
division of the region into two zones, 
green and yellow. As a result, 
thousands of people are killed.  
 
P: 125                                                     
1998 Under the supervision of the United 
States, Talabani and Barzani signs a 
peace agreement. 
   
P: 125 
2003 The second Gulf War leads to the fall 
of Saddam Hussein and the end of 
thirty years of Ba’ath rule.  
   
P: 134 
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2005 Iraqis begin writing the country's 
new constitution, and Iraq is now 
considered a federal state. Under 
this constitution, Kurdistan enjoys 
autonomy, the right to form a 
parliament, and to elect a president 
for their region. 
                          
P: 134 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shaheed exhibition. 
I participate in the major protest in 
Sulaymaniyah, displaying a red banner 
with indecipherable script, caused by 
overwritten texts accumulating, thus not 
providing any specific meaning. 
2005 Within this new political situation in 
Iraq, the administration in Kurdistan 
holds several elections for the 
Kurdistan Parliament. 
 
P: 134  
2008-
2016 
Within the Kurdish authority, 
numerous violations occur against 
human rights and freedom of 
expression, especially against 
journalists.   
                          
P: 134 
2010-
2017 
Kurdistan faces many economic, 
political, and military difficulties, 
most notably the war on the Islamic 
State in Iraq. Meanwhile, in 
Sulaymaniyah, many protests took 
place during this time against 
corruption and the economic crisis in 
Kurdistan.    
                     
P: 142-143 
2017 Kurdish authorities hold an 
independence referendum, but it 
does not obtain international 
recognition.  
 
P: 141 
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Chapter 4 
Shaheed (Martyrdom) Exhibition 
In this chapter I record and discuss the most significant exhibition arising from my research, 
a major public installation at Sulaymaniyah Archaeological Museum.  
The exhibition is important both on its own terms, as a challenging and provocative event in 
the life of the city, and for my research, because it represented a major change of focus in 
my methodology. 
 I will record and discuss the exhibition in four parts: Background; Preparation; Martyrdom 
Research; Exhibition (including the cube narratives and diagrams).  
Reflections on the exhibition, along with comments on my transition from studio painting, 
will be housed in the Conclusion.  
Note: In Kurdish ‘Shaheed’ means both martyrdom and martyr - depending on context. The 
title of the exhibition, Shaheed, was intended to convey both of these definitions. 
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Background 
My installation, sited at Sulaymaniyah Archeological Museum, Iraq, in October 2017, 
represented the culmination of a three-year period of research, yet took an unexpected 
form, in that it embodied an abrupt shift in my methodology.  
Until the installation, the emphasis of the practical research had been the use of texts either 
appropriated from, or informed by, interviews with Sulaymaniyah calligraphers (and a few 
carefully selected non-calligraphers), to forge a specific strand of abstract painting.  
Interviews had been conducted with the calligraphers in order to understand their personal 
connection or engagement with the material they turned into banners, and to uncover 
background stories to some of the texts. Continually repeating their stories in paint, through 
my own studio ‘banners’, to create ‘trace paintings’, had allowed me to appreciate the 
important role calligraphers played in my culture, and the richness and relevance of their 
memories.  
I recognised that a more empathetic approach to my source material was moving my 
concerns away from the production of aesthetic artefacts, towards a more socially or 
politically engaged practice, a method I had encountered whilst researching the British artist 
Jeremy Deller. I wanted the often-traumatic narratives of my fellow countrymen not simply 
to be layered as abstract traces on a canvas, causing recognisable meanings to become 
obscured by multiple iterations, but instead to find ways of retaining some meanings in the 
finished work. One worrying issue with this was that many of the stories might lead to 
revenge attacks or hate attacks, so control of the narratives (and their legibility) appearing 
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in a collaborative work needed through some mechanism to be returned to the 
calligraphers themselves. 
From Eco’s writing I had absorbed his notion of the two types of artistic message, univocal 
and plurivocal. Through a position of openness (which he claims is the foundation of all art) 
pluralistic communication may be integrated, and Eco states that “plurivocality is so much a 
characteristic of the forms that give it substance, that their aesthetic value can no longer be 
appreciated and explained apart from it” (Eco, 1989: 42 as cited in Elmo Raj, 2015: PP. p, 
329). 
Art of all ages has addressed historical events, but a considerable body of contemporary art 
now excavates (to use a word taken from my own methodology) historical detail to re-
evaluate it. An important artist in this regard is the British artist and Turner Prizewinner, 
Jeremy Deller. One of Deller's key methodologies focuses on examination of historical 
narratives through the re-staging of the original event, which he notably did in 2001, by 
arranging the re-enactment of the Battle of Orgreave using some of the original participants 
of the demonstration. "Basically, I was asking the re-enactors to participate in the staging of 
a battle that occurred within living memory, alongside veterans of the campaign. I've always 
described it as digging up a corpse and giving it a proper post-mortem, or as a thousand-
person crime re-enactment" (Deller, J. 2001).  
The Battle of Orgreave Archive (An Injury to One is an Injury to All) includes texts, 
documents, objects, videos, and other archival material in an installation that describes two 
different events: the first a strike by the National Union of Mineworkers, specifically a clash 
between the miners and the police at the Orgreave Coking Plant in Yorkshire on June 18 
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1984; the second, the re-staging by Deller in 2001. The exhibition was divided into two 
rooms, and presented in such a way as “to blur the boundaries between its status as 
objective document and historical monument” (Tate 2001). 
Deller explains having seen the event in a television report when he was eight years old: 
The image ... stuck in my mind and for years I wanted to find out what exactly 
happened on that day with a view to re-enacting or commemorating it in some way. 
It would not be an exaggeration to say that the strike, like a civil war, had a 
traumatically divisive effect at all levels of life in the UK. Families were torn apart 
because of divided loyalties, the union movement was split on its willingness to 
support the National Union of Mineworkers, the print media especially contributed 
to the polarisation of the arguments to the point where there appeared to be little 
space for a middle ground. So, in all but name it became an ideological and industrial 
battle between the two sections of British society (Deller 2002, p.7). 
 
Memory, history, and document are the main resources of Deller's work, through which he 
presents his personal vision on socio-political issues. Deller's choice of theme and source 
material resonate with those of my project, and although the cultural context, methodology 
and presentation are all very different, both approaches fit with Roelstraete’s description of 
artists “that attempt to shed the light on the dark corners of the past” in that “they either 
make artworks that want to remember, or at least to turn back the tide of forgetfulness, or 
they make art about remembering and forgetting: we can call this the meta-historical mode, 
an important aspect of much artwork that assumes a curatorial character” (Roelstraete, D. 
2009).  
In 2017, whilst presenting my research in Sulaymaniyah, I was approached by a well-
respected curator Zana Rasoul. At first, we discussed the idea of an archaeological 
methodology in the visual arts (which triggered the idea for the eventual venue), but I also 
outlined the change of emphasis I was experiencing in my practical research, and the desire 
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to have the calligraphers of Sulaymaniyah participate in an exhibition of mine in a more 
open way. 
Rasoul made an initial approach on my behalf to the Director of the Sulaymaniyah 
Archaeological Museum, Zana Rasoul, who requested a more detailed proposal. The 
concept I eventually presented to him – as outlined in the next section - recorded the shift 
in my intentions, and it might be argued that this proposal for the Shaheed exhibition 
defined the moment when my concerns adopted more socially-engaged strategies. 
Despite the potentially controversial nature of the proposal, the Director appreciated the 
significance of the material, and agreed to my idea of an installation in the main atrium of 
his museum. This was a great privilege, but also presented great challenges in terms of 
practical visibility and audience interaction and reaction. 
 
 
  
156 
 
Preparation 
My research is intended to work against forgetfulness through a process of recreating the 
past, and, as Benjamin states: “he who seeks to approach his own buried past must conduct 
himself like a man digging.” At this stage, my focus had become the excavation of 
appropriate personal memories and narratives from (mainly) calligraphers, to transform 
them, in the way Foucault suggests, into a monument, so that we can understand our 
present. 
My research methodology shared certain aspects of Freud’s approach to psychiatric illness. 
Freud considered himself to be an ‘archaeologist’ of the mind, and through dreams, 
memories and stories he would navigate layers of the unconscious, delving into childhood 
histories to reveal possible causes behind present problems, in order to suggest appropriate 
treatment. The archeology metaphors offered by Benjamin and Freud presented me with a 
way of conceptualising my task. Archaeology for the Shaheed exhibition took place within 
the field of memory, especially the living memories of people directly in contact with events 
that concern the theme, specifically the calligraphers of Sulaymaniyah, gaining a unique 
awareness of events in their society through the medium of banner-making. 
While interviewing these calligraphers, I noted that ‘Shaheed’ was one of the most frequent 
and compelling words recorded, so much so that it was impossible to speak of banners 
without using this word. ‘Shaheed’ was used both as a positive recognition of a martyr, but 
in some cases, was associated with exploitation, because families of martyrs are rewarded 
through state funding and hence the naming of martyrs is subject to corruption and 
falsehood. Hearing various stories from different perspectives revealed to me that, because 
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each party has notably different approaches to ‘martyr’ and ‘martyrdom’, the meaning of 
the word was unstable. One calligrapher’s story in particular intrigued me:  
Once upon a time a Mullah wearing his mantle and turban visited my shop, he 
had a photo of a soldier in his hand whom he claimed to be his son. He asked me 
to redraw the photo, but to change his military beret to a Kurdish turban 
because a political party promised him to name him as their martyr. 
 
This story was a key factor in inducing me to research other cases in which victims gain 
martyrdom falsely and undeservedly. The exhibition plan thus began to focus upon war and 
its victims, as a means of questioning how both the slain and the murderer are accounted 
for, who is entitled to confer the title of ‘Martyr’ or, ‘Shaheed’, and in what manner it is 
conferred. In a territory that has witnessed much fighting, most of the concerns related to 
the legalisation of warfare, and its narratives, symbols and expressions, have gathered 
around the word ‘Shaheed’. 
Once I had decided on central concern of the installation in the Sulaymaniyah 
Archaeological Museum, the theme awoke personal memories of the civil war of the 1990s. 
As a young man, I would walk to the centre of Sulaymaniyah, along the way encountering 
banners for those deemed ‘martyr’, killed in clashes between the KDP and the PUK (or 
between the PUK and various Islamic parties). I recall being fascinated by these martyrdom 
announcements, with their written evidence, e.g. "on that day X was killed ... in this area… 
at the hand of mercenaries” or “at the hands of the enemy of the Kurdish people and its 
national identity” etc. This personal reference gave me strong motivation in the curatorial 
phase of the planning and design of the installation. 
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I returned to the calligraphers’ workshops for this new research phase. Key decision-making 
in the installation relates directly to an interview conducted in August 2015 with 
calligrapher Sarbast Namiq Muhamad, who explained that the black banner is an essential 
means of displaying news of a death or tragic events (such as those at Anfal or Halabja). 
Henceforth texts written on black banners and their historical context, became a specific 
line of inquiry. It caused me to imagine whether the black banner might prove to be the 
most consistent witness to all the tragic events that have occurred in Kurdistan. 
During an interview on the 3rd of August 2015, the calligrapher Sarbast Namiq Muhamad 
recalled that during the Ba'ath Party regime when soldiers were killed, the Ba’athists would 
display black banners on the walls in the neighborhood of the martyrs' families. The banners 
proclaimed the martyr as a national hero, among other anti-Iranian slogans of propaganda 
— the regime thereby attempting to justify its war against Iran by convincing the Iraqi 
people that the war was for the protection of its people and its land. 
 
My initial methodology was to visit the workshops of many calligraphers and explain the 
exhibition concept and its relation to the subject of martyrs and martyrdom, discussing with 
each of them the implementation phases of my project, and the manner in which their 
profession and their ‘witnessing’ (albeit at one remove) of martyrdom would be used.  
The calligraphers were initially astonished at how an artist could question the ‘Shaheed’ 
issue, as it is sacred to the majority of people, especially those Kurds still struggling for 
independence. Kurds were involved in the war against IS during this time, as well as other 
external threats, drawing them into further sacrifice for their national interests. 
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I was fortunate that the calligraphers I approached were willing to participate in my project, 
and were often intrigued by the theme of my exhibition and the opportunity to use their 
professional ability in another arena.  
I made daily visits to calligraphy workshops to work with them to produce banners from 
their stories. Normally the text within each banner is divided up: the first section consists of 
information about the martyrdom itself, while the second consists of propaganda. We 
would discuss the usual approaches, but I would make it clear that their participation was 
now predominant, and they were free to choose colours, fonts, and text composition. In 
discussions about relevance and meaning, each calligrapher selected their own stories. If 
any story had the potential to get them into trouble, I suggested they use the repetition 
method, whereby text is painted in layers in such a way as to render it illegible. Another 
tactic (employed only once) was to reverse the banner when displayed on the cube 
structure.  
 
As well as the participation of calligraphers, I discussed the subject of the exhibition with 
people from institutions associated with ‘Shaheed’, including Mala Bahadin (full name: 
Bahadin Mohammed Abdulrahman) of the Martyrdom Directorate.  
 
After long discussions with each calligrapher, information and narratives uncovered 
important issues. The narratives related to different epochs, including the period of the 
Ba’ath regime, extending to the fall of the Ba’ath Party in Iraq.  
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Martyrdom Research 
In parallel with further visits to calligraphy workshops, once I had determined the exhibition 
would focus on the crucial concept of martyrdom in Kurdistan, in which the identity of my 
people, and the delineations of parties were wrapped up, it was necessary to uncover 
further contextual information. My artistic intervention was designed to examine the nature 
of martyrdom through the use of multiple informed voices, to call attention to the way in 
which the Kurds attempt to sanctify their tragedies, encouraged by financial rewards, rather 
than consider the full implications of individual deaths.  
Firstly, it was important to establish some definitions and distinctions which could inform 
my selection of narratives, depending on the opinions expressed, and my decision as to 
where they should be placed upon the cube: 
The word ‘shaheed’ (plural ‘shahada’) has the meaning of ‘martyr’ and is closely 
related in its development to the Greek ‘martyrios’ in that it means both a witness 
and a martyr (i.e., a person who suffers or dies deliberately for the sake of affirming 
the truth of a belief system). (Cook, D. Intro. Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
According to Khosrokhavar, the definition within Islam is slightly different, martyrdom being 
a death resulting from fighting against the enemy of the religion of Allah (Khosrokhavar, F. 
2005:11). He also states there are important differences between the culture of martyrdom 
in Sunni and Shi’ite Islam:  
The Sunni martyr is one who dies ‘in the path of God’ by taking part in a jihad. In 
Shi’ite Islam, martyrs have something in common with the tragic saints that we find, 
for similar historical reasons, in southeast Europe. …Shi’ite communities have often 
been persecuted or, which is more important, have perceived themselves as being 
persecuted by Sunnis. (Khosrokhavar, F. 2005:4). 
 
Cook (2012), states that “Contemporary martyrdom is closely associated with nationalistic 
resistance movements in the Muslim world” and this definition appears true in the Kurdish 
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case. According to information received from interviews, the word ‘martyr' regularly 
appeared in political conflicts, particularly in relation to the conflict between Kurdish parties 
and the central system in Baghdad. The definition of martyr is further complicated by 
internal conflicts between the Kurdish parties. 
According to new Iraqi laws after the fall of the Ba’ath regime, the definition of ‘Shaheed’ 
changed from that of the Ba’ath era. Chapter two, Article (5) defines who is the ‘Shaheed’ 
and who is included in this law: 
 First: The martyr: Every Iraqi citizen who lost his life because of his opposition to the 
past regime…or by the acts of that regime directly, or due to imprisonment or 
torture, or due to genocide, or the victims of chemical weapons and crimes against 
humanity and coercive displacement.  
Not considered a martyr for the purposes of applying the provisions of this law: 
everyone who was working with the past regime in its various institutions, or of the 
Baathist party, or loyal to the regime, or killed because of internal authoritative 
liquidations. Chapter two, Article (6). (AI-Shuhada'a Establishment law, Establishment 
of Martyrs 2006). 
 
On November 21st, 2015, the Iraqi Government amended the ‘Shaheed’ Foundation Act, for 
example with this new paragraph: 
The provisions of this law shall not cover the death of an internal party, or power 
struggle, or personal disputes with the former Ba’ath Party in its repressive 
apparatuses (General Security, Intelligence, Special Security, Special Protection, 
National Security, Military Security, Saddam Fedayeen, Military intelligence and 
other repressive formations) or was cooperating with them or covered by the 
Accountability and Justice Act. Chapter two, Article (5). (AI-Shuhada'a Establishment 
law, Establishment of Martyrs 2015). 
 
53A number of KRG  sources were examined, and interviews conducted, but no precise 
definition of ‘Shaheed’ was available. In an interview with Mala Bahadin, conducted in 2017, 
he referred to the ways in which the ‘Shaheeds’ were registered, and how they were 
 
53 Kurdistan Reginal Government (KRG).  
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classified according to their contribution to the Kurdish revolution (e.g. ‘Battlefield’, 
‘Citizen’, ‘Sarwari’, ‘Anfal’, or ‘Halabja’). Bahadin pointed out that names of martyrs were 
recorded during the 1961 until the war against Islamic State. He also stated that victims of 
internal wars from other Kurdish parties, including Islamist parties fighting against the PUK, 
had been registered. The Islamic Movement in Kurdistan, however, registered their martyrs 
in Arbil54, because they were killed by the PUK.  
 
During the internal war, some Islamic parties supported the KDP against the PUK, which is 
why Islamist parties tried to register their martyrs in the KDP's sphere of influence.  
Bahadin stated that during the internal war when the KDP recorded their martyrs they 
55would write: “this martyr was killed by Jash Jalalis ”, and that remains in their records, 
whereas the PUK wrote that they were killed in the civil war. 
 
When the curator and I began preparing the Shaheed show, I realised that visiting the 
General Directorate of Martyrs could be important in order to expand the concept of the 
exhibition. I first arranged an interview with the General Director of the Directorate, I asked 
for permission to visit the archives to gather information, to which he agreed. He told me 
about the challenges facing the Directorate in recording a dead person as martyr. They 
require a list of documents to prove that the person has been killed due to a political 
context. They also have to verify that the person was not a traitor, “nor had anything to do 
with the enemies of the Kurdish movement” (Interview with The General Director of the 
Directorate of Martyrs and Anfal: 2017).  I was given a copy of the martyr registration sheet 
 
54 Arbil is a capital of KRG.  
55 Jash Jalali is a word used by Massoud Barzani's party against Jalal Talabani and his party. Talibani and his followers 
were named (Puppet, Jash) of the Kurdish enemy. 
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- those approved by the Director. According to archive department staff, a major problem 
with the registration of martyrs is that if a person comes and requests to register their dead 
relative as a martyr, but the case cannot be accepted for not meeting the requirements for 
registration, that person may then go to the KDP party, who would accept their dead 
relative as a KDP party martyr in order to increase the membership of their party.  
 
Staff of the Directorate of Martyrs, (in a confidential discussion) stated that they do not 
know how the KDP record martyrs – the KDP have a specific section within the Directorate 
of Martyrdom to record their martyrs but the decision-making is hidden. Directorate staff 
went on to say that if they refused to register a person due to lack of reliable evidence, the 
KDP might accept them as a martyr, simply in order to increase their followers.  
 
A specific question I asked Mala Bahadin concerned those who collaborated with Saddam 
against the Peshmerga, and were killed during Saddam's time, who are now registered as 
martyrs. He replied that he does not accept that interpretation as “it would be shameful to 
register someone as a ‘Shaheed’ who was in the Iraqi army, or Jash, or collaborated with the 
Ba’athist regime against the Peshmerga”. (18 September 2017). 
 
He recalled a memorable meeting: “Once a lady came to my office and asked to talk to me 
alone. She wanted to know why her father's martyr payment was no longer being paid to 
her family, to which I replied, that according to rumours her father was a Jash. She 
responded: “If my father was a Jash, then why did you accept him as a Peshmerga fighter 
after 1991 and send him to the battlefield — where he was killed for you?”  
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Figure 1: A martyr registration sheet (2017).   
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As shown in the report of the Ministry of Martyrs, there are many people registered as 
martyrs of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) who were not killed as a Peshmerga on the 
battlefield, but who died in various other incidents, such as: “fell from a horse, cave 
collapsed, stung by scorpion, moving household goods, consuming the wrong medicine, 
while giving birth, injections, mountain collapse, fell from the ceiling, thunder, suicide, 
unknown bullet, electric shock, unintentional shot, accident, died from the cold, illness, by 
the will of God or social problem” (Awene.com report: Many KDP's martyrs have no 
connection to the term Shaheed. 2018). 
According to a statement of the Shaheed minister, there are also significant numbers of 
people alive, who have nevertheless registered themselves as martyrs and receive salaries 
from the government. Anas Daski, a member of parliament, has stated there has been 
corruption in the registration of martyrs and accepts that in some cases, Peshmerga have 
been identified as a Shaheed who are still alive”. (Salih, S. Minister of Martyrs: There are still 
people alive but registered as martyrs, 2018). 
 
There are established procedures when dealing with archives and archival material, but I 
focused on artistic approaches in order to consider a new piece of work (made after the 
Shaheed cube). Artist-curator Uriel Orlow has drawn on various archives for his artworks, 
and provides an insight into his archival method via letters exchanged with Ruth Maclennan. 
Orlow argues that the site visit is an important first step, and reveals a context through the 
location and storage method of the archival material. He asks: “Indeed, what is the meaning 
and status of the archive as a whole, operating as it does like a memorial behind closed 
doors?” (Orlow, U. and Maclennan, R. 2004: 80). The second step relates to navigating 
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through those layers of materials, whether physical or oral histories. Orlow emphasises that 
the artist needs to find diverse ways to deal with this “memorial behind closed doors”, and 
that he himself is directed by the material's associations whereby the archive turns into a 
"model and as a prompter for art" (Orlow, U. and Maclennan, R. 2004: 80). He points out 
that the significant role of the artist is in selecting the material, because the artist is thinking 
of "matter and meaning". For him the "archive is a central component of the ambivalence 
that artists can feel towards making things at all, and situating them in the world at large, 
and within their own story of their life and work" (Orlow, U. and Maclennan, R. 2004: 86).  
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Figure 3: The martyr archive department. 2017 (Photograph Zana Rasoul). 
 
Figure 2: The martyr archive department. 2017 (Photograph Zana Rasoul). 
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Exhibition 
The final installation consisted of a four-sided cube, without a top or base, 3 meters high 
and 5.25 meters long, stitched from 24 individual banners, either black - normally signifying 
death, or red- normally referencing left-wing opinions or parties. The structure resembled a 
sacred cube, or Ka’aba in shape and colour. Each banner contained an event recollected by 
a calligrapher, and written by that calligrapher, its legibility and emphasis partly determined 
by myself and the individual calligrapher. The process of selecting and writing the banners 
took five weeks, and the stitching together and installation took two weeks. 
The Ka’aba at Mecca was the central reference for the form. As a place of pilgrimage and 
worship for Muslims, the Mecca Ka’aba is perhaps the most important structure of all, and 
therefore gives the cube a peculiar potency. The idea of constructing this cube from banners 
was in part informed by the tradition of pre-Islamic poets, who wrote poems specifically to 
be hung up on Ka’aba walls in Mecca. According to Robson, there might be seven or ten of 
these poems, and they were referred to as The Suspended Odes or The Hanging Poems, 
which subsequently became the title of a collection of poems selected from the most 
56famous pre-Islamic poets  (Robson, J. The meaning of the Title Al-Mu'allaqa 1936, pp. 83-
86).  
In order to view all the banners, the audience had to walk around the cube, evoking the 
Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca (Arabic: Maka) and the concluding walk, once in Mecca, around 
the Ka’aba. This rotational movement of the viewer was deliberately designed to induce 
interaction with the narratives represented, and engagement with the meaning of the word 
 
56 “Noldeke has pointed out that Hammad collected these poems, and that therefore they did not form a collection which 
already existed under the title of Al-Mu'allaqat. Ahmad al-Nahhas (d. 338 or 337) was the first to say they were hung on 
the Ka'ba, and he did so without quoting any authority. Noldeke also doubts the genuineness of the poetic contests on the 
ground that it would have been very difficult to find impartial judges. He concludes that we should keep to the meaning of 
the word " suspended ", but interpret it as meaning that they are put in a place of honour because of their value”. (Robson, 
J. The meaning of the Title Al-Mu'allaqa 1936, pp. 83-86). 
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‘Shaheed’, and how it has been used by ruling authorities for their own interests through 
various periods in time. 
In producing the installation over several days, with many assistants, I wanted to explore 
the role and uses of language. The texts themselves bear witness to the various historical 
issues, all of which, according to my research, have an impact on present day Kurdish 
culture and politics. But specifically, by deploying language in various degrees of legibility is 
to question the use of word Shaheed, and to demonstrate that interpretations of the 
concept of martyrdom vary enormously, to the degree that they resemble a form of 
propaganda. 
In the fabrication of the cube, the banners were used in an unfamiliar way, most obviously 
because they were stitched together in blocks. This action gave the process a additional 
significance, as it reminded me (as I recount in Chapter 2) of the mother of Omer Saeed 
having stitched banners together to make bed covers for him when he was young. Those 
banners, once threatening and insulting, were rendered into something safe, protective, 
and caring. Similarly, with the cube, the assorted accounts of tragedy, and corruption were 
sewn together as a collective act of resistance and redemption. 
The cube concept also bore a resemblance to Mona Hatoum’s 1996 piece, Current 
Disturbance, which proved a useful secondary reference when planning the installation. 
Hatoum’s works have strong socio-political narratives bound up with the concept of 
national identity. Her visual language involves some strategies adopted from Surrealism but 
her more sculptural, structural work incorporates aspects of architectural design, some 
formed as site specific installations, deriving meaning from historical, geographical or 
political contexts. In the Shaheed installation the viewer could encounter the cube in 
relation to the exhibition environment, specifically, the archaeological objects, and vice 
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versa; they could now encounter the museum’s artefacts in relation to the cube. They could 
experience the relationship between the cube as contemporary art within the historical 
context of the museum. I found it helpful to frame this approach to the viewers’ 
engagement with the Shaheed installation with approaches discussed by Claire Bishop in 
Installation Art: A critical History (2005). 
Bishop notes that Ilya Kabakov’s installation art has often been interpreted as theatrical, 
with Kabakov describing the spectators as actors and the role of an installation artist as a 
kind of director of a play (Kabakov as cited in Bishop 2005: P.14). And with regards to his 
term ‘Total Installation’, Kabakov describes the effect on the spectators as an ‘engulfment’, 
stating that “we are not just surrounded by a physical scenario but are ‘submerged’ by the 
work” (Kabakov as cited in Bishop, 2005, P.14). Bishop also writes about the influence on 
early installation art of pragmatist philosopher, John Dewey, and specifically his impact on 
Allan Kaprow, who states: 
Dewey maintained that we can only develop as human beings if we actively inquire 
into and interact with our environment. Being thrust into new circumstances means 
having to reorganise our repertoire of responses accordingly, and this in turn 
enlarges our capacity for ‘experience’, defined by Dewey as heightened vitality … the 
complete interpenetration of self and the world of objects and events (Kaprow cited 
in Bishop, 2005 P.24).  
The necessity of activating the spectator and giving them the opportunity, through creating 
an environment, to heighten their awareness, and experience the world anew, may be 
undertaken in order to achieve multiple interpretations. As Bishop explores with regards the 
feminist art practice of Mary Kelly, the way that installation art can provide multiple 
perspectives releases the viewer from the traditional single point perspective “which 
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centres the viewer in a position of mastery before the painting, and by extension, the 
world” (Bishop 2005, P.35-36)57. 
In Shaheed, decentring, immersion and experience were combined - the spectators entered 
into a multidimensional space in which they encountered many historical objects from 
different eras, and were surrounded by multidimensional relationships between those 
objects, which place the subject of martyr in both familiar and yet unfamiliar historical 
contexts, enabling new interpretations.  
Bishop also emphasises the direct presence of viewers, and in Shaheed I wanted to generate 
the atmosphere of a culturally-specific artwork, and a site-specific artwork, that could not 
be replicated anywhere other than in this museum, in the city of Sulaymaniyah. 
The curator, Zana Rasoul having chosen the venue of the exhibition - the Sulaymaniyah 
Archeological Museum - gave the inauguration speech, in which he remarked that a 
provocative installation had been produced, and how the concept of the exhibition 
resonated with the museum’s ethos , for here was a place dedicated to the display of the 
archaeological history of an important Middle-Eastern culture, while my research 
demonstrated a visual and verbal delving into social, political and religious histories of the 
Kurdish people. He continued “What happened in this region is the result of our past 
mistakes as a nation. We could have reduced or prevented violence, but this did not 
happen. Art in our society was not involved in socio-political life or in conveying a 
humanitarian message. So, what is important in this exhibition is that although the Kurdish 
revolution has not achieved its ambitions, Rostam is concerned with the holiest word for 
 
57 As Merleau-Ponty puts it, “I do not see [space] according to its exterior envelope; I live it from the inside; I am immersed 
in it. After all, the world is all around me, not in front of me” (Merleau-Ponty cited in Bishop, 2005, P.50). 
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our people — Shaheed or martyr, and he has brought this word into the context of visual 
art, and questioned it.” 
Reben Majid58 argued that the word Shaheed; the sanctification of death, is unstable. He 
asserts that martyrdom is dependent on who holds power, so for instance, if someone was 
killed and declared a martyr during the Ba’athist regime, he is no longer seen as a martyr in 
the new regime. More recently, if a person from the Hashd Al-Sha'abi (People's Mobilization 
Committee - PMC) is killed, he is considered a martyr by the Iraqi government, but Kurds 
have different definitions and may not recognise this. Definitions of Shaheed therefore rely 
on the power structure. 
Other comments by Zana Rasoul to introduce the exhibition reflect the conversations I held 
with him leading up to the exhibition:  
Writing has a long history in Iraq, where it appeared in human civilisation for the first 
time. Writing has become an important means of expression in human history, and 
has become a tool in contemporary art, where artists have the opportunity to use 
multiple methods. Language is an important tool in every society to communicate 
and express emotion, and it possesses an expressive and aesthetic character that 
may be used in the making of artworks. The stories written by calligraphers allow the 
audience to understand how people express their feelings, experiences and 
information through the use of simple phrases and sentiments. After long 
discussions with Rostam about his ideas for the exhibition, we proposed the 
exhibition to the Sulaymaniyah Archeology Museum. Rostam explained that he 
employs methodologies that could metaphorically be described as archaeological, 
both in his practice and his theoretical research, excavating and moving between 
layers of Kurdish memory. This archaeological approach… dictated that the museum 
became the relevant option. Both within the museum and within Rostam’s research, 
there is an exploration of ideas and objects that have historical value in this society. 
This relationship can produce new knowledge in the context of the museum. 
Reben maintained that the word ‘martyr’ is questionable in this context, and related this 
questionability to the historical artefacts that surround the cube. The kings of Mesopotamia 
 
58 Reben Majed is a contemporary artist and curator who graduated from Goldsmiths, University of London. He 
documented the process of making Shaheed, and he participated in the TV program commenting on the show. 
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would request or commission workshops to inscribe stone or ceramics with details of their 
lives and victories, as they were constantly vying for immortality, and there can be no doubt 
that history has been written by those with a connection to power: “for example: these 
large vases used to preserve the body of kings after their death, or those texts written in the 
Assyrian civilisation, made to record the activities and wars of the kingdom” 
On the opening day, the poet Qubad Jalizadah read his famous poem: The Martyr Walks 
Alone: 
For fear of the neighborhood heckling 
For fear of stoning 
For fear of shame 
He took himself to a ruined place 
He burns his colourful posters 
He strikes his head with both hands 
He crys profusely over his perfect record 
Shaheed 
Until his martyrdom 
He is walking with his red coffin 
This Coffin 
Is full of loneliness 
full of regrets 
full of disappointment 
Shaheed 
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A mosquito tells him 
Your wife has married a traitor 
Your daughter is desecrated by a traitor 
 
(translation: Rostam Hakeem 2019) 
 
 
 
 
  
175 
 
The Cube Narratives 
These notes are provided on each of the banners I chose for inclusion in my Shaheed 
exhibition. As previously described, banners were formed from conversations between 
myself and individual calligraphers, but the final responsibility for the specific memory, 
story, phrase etc., was left to the interviewee. The explanations are therefore not intended 
to be exhaustive, but are derived from first imagining myself in the position of viewer, 
attempting to decode each one without background knowledge, and then adding a few 
intimate details from the interviews for the purpose of clarity. My role as interviewer, 
commissioner, artist and curator produced complex theoretical interference patterns, which 
in the end I was forced to solve through creative engagement with each banner, according 
to their textual and visual properties. Their arrangement was consequently a combination of 
curatorial and aesthetic considerations. 
 
  
176 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 04: Entrance view of the Shaheed cube, 2017 (Photograph Halo Lano). 
Figure 05: Diagram of entrance side, 2017. 
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Entrance Side: 
Banner 01 
This banner contains layers of stories relating to the 1994-98 civil war between the KDP and 
the PUK. According to the calligrapher H. A. in Kapki Hamad Axa, there lies a hill between 
the yellow and green political zones, where many Peshmerga were killed. The hill was a 
strategic place for them, and so its name became known to most people, though now we 
hear nothing of it. The banner was made in accordance with the decisions of the 
calligrapher who was commissioned for the original banner, and who I later interviewed. 
The yellow text represents the KDP and green the PUK. What we see between them is the 
white colour that represents death. 
 
02 consists of layers of linguistic expressions published by the party's TV and radio station 
which was related to the battlefields between the Kurdish parties during the civil war. The 
phrase "martyrdom of a group of Peshmerga heroes" was very familiar to those who 
remember the civil war because they hear it repeatedly. Through the repetition of 
expression, the composition becomes a linguistic echo. 
 
03 is located in the upper corner and half the banner is on the other side. The cloth colour is 
symbolic of left-wing parties, in particular the Communist Party. The text describes a story 
Communist Party martyrs killed by the armed forces of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. The 
audience would be familiar with the signification of the colour red, but the text is repeated 
and therefore illegible. The contextual relationship of the signs, however, points a pathway 
that allows the potential for interpretation. 
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04 combines some expressions used by Kurdish parties during the bloodiest wars of modern 
Kurdish history (as I recount in the chapter 3). The phrases consist of: in the heroic 
resistance; martyrdom of a group of Peshmerga heroes; Peshmerga brave; but due to the 
process of repetition, and collapse of linguistic rules, they remain incomprehensible. 
 
05: The text says: “Once upon a time a Mullah wearing his mantle and turban visited my 
workshop; he had a photo of a soldier in his hand whom he claimed to be his son. He asked 
me to redraw the photo, but changing his military beret to a Kurdish turban and add a 
Kalashnikov barrel behind his shoulder because a political party promised him to name him 
as their martyr. I told him, you are a religious man, do you not feel embarrassed? Why 
would you wish to do that? He said he would give me extra money, and he repeated his 
demands, but I refused because I would feel guilty if I made these fake things. 
Unfortunately, the parties were competing to increase their numbers of martyrs, which led 
to corruption. People were making up these fake stories in order to get a monthly salary”. 
 
06 consists of layers of text that have accumulated one atop another to switch the banner 
from its narrative purpose to a purely visual one. In this contextual relationship the message 
hints at issues of martyrdom, but gives no clear message. 
 
07 says: “My uncle was an old man of about seventy years old. In the Ba’athist era he died 
on the street when a car hit him. The driver was a man from Jash and in those days the case 
was resolved quietly. After the Kurdish uprising in 1991, my uncle was registered as a martyr 
by one of the dominant political parties running the government.” 
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08 says: “During the civil war between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party, when a person was killed from, for example, a member of the KDP, the 
name would be written in yellow. Then they wrote an apologetic expression about the 
incident of (the name of the person) and they wrote martyr's brothers name and they 
indicated that he was martyred during a heroic battle by (the name of the party). And rest in 
peace.”  
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Figure 6: Side of the cube opposite the Sumerian Cylinder, 2017 (Photograph Halo Lano). 
 
Figure 7: Diagram of Sumerian Cylinder side, 2017. 
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Side of the Sumerian Cylinder: 
Banner 01 is the story of how banners were written for martyrs during the internal civil war 
called Bra Kuzhi. “When a person was killed on the battlefield, for example if he was a 
member of PUK's Peshmerga, the full name of the person was written in green, followed by 
other information such as the date and place of the incident ... The opposing party would 
also be mentioned, as in: “he was martyred by the Turkish Jash or Yellow Tail (in reference 
to the KDP party). The last line indicates that the dead person has reached eternity”. 
 
02 This is the story of a war. “Although IS had a plan to control Kurdistan and began their 
repeated attacks, they were foiled by the Peshmerga defending their country. This holy land 
was not a place for those terrorists, but was gained through the sacrifice of many 
Peshmerga soldiers. One time when they fought in a specific area, a group of heroic 
Peshmerga were martyred, and their martyrdom ceremonies were announced by their 
military units and a banner was made for each of them. I made all the banners at night for 
each of those immortal martyrs, but the next day when they came to collect banners they 
said that Peshmerga (P.M.Q.A.M.) was not killed but only injured, and captured by IS”. 
 
03 shows layers of phrases, and one of them referring to the name of a hill, Kapki Shilana. 
This hill was a part of conflict zone during the internal war. Many Peshmerga were killed on 
both sides in order to control it. The other text is illegible, but nevertheless allows glimpses 
that serve as a reminder of the conflict, and the number of the victims. 
 
04 This banner has the aspect of an image, in that rather than simple text, it is an onslaught 
of text that causes blurring. It creates curiosity in the audience to move closer in order to 
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obtain the specific meaning, but continues to frustrate up close. This lack of intelligibility or 
specific meaning encourages the viewer in their own interpretation, informed by the loaded 
context59.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59  Glenn Ligon says: “I’m interested in what happens when a text is difficult to read or frustrates legibility—what that says 
about our ability to think about each other, know each other, process each other.” (Art news. The Writing on the Wall: 
Glenn Ligon on Borrowing Text to Expose American Racism, in 2011. 2016). 
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Figure 8: View of the Jar side of the cube, 2017 (Photograph Halo Lano). 
 
Figure 9:  Diagram of the Jar side, 2017. 
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Side of The Jar: 
Banner 01 is an accumulation of the phrase: “they were martyred in Sarkabakan”. 
Sarkapkan is a name of the place which was a strategic area during the internal war for both 
the KDP and PUK. The names of certain hills and mountains was common during the civil 
war because so many Peshmerga (on both sides) sacrificed their lives to control terrain. 
According to the calligraphers, when the martyr's body reached his family, black banners 
would be hung over the wall of the mosque, on the house of the victim, and also in public 
areas. Phrases on the banners give some information and sentiment. The current 
government do not want memorial days for victims, as they do not want any justification for 
martyrdom. 
 
02 provides a story that goes back to the Ba’athist era. “During the Iraq-Iran war, if a soldier 
was killed on the battlefield, the Iraqi government registered him as a martyr. Black banners 
were placed by the local Ba’ath Party office. The government would then provide food for 
the martyr's family. Later the government would invite the family to visit them in order to 
honour them, and compensate them with a car, piece of land, a telephone and monthly 
salary.” 
 
03 This red banner appears in the top corner, showing no specific message or story, but the 
red colour suggests a connection with the Communist Party or the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK), who use red in their martyr ceremonies.  
 
04 Here the viewer/reader faces difficulties in how to read the text, because it is not a 
simple story, more a wave of words and sentences. The reader may grasp certain words 
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such as: Anfal, Halabja,  Shaheedi Sarkrda (Martyr-leaders) as they mingle in a complex 
palimpsest60.  
 
05 The story on this banner goes: “During the Ba’athist regime, there was a man who was a 
puppet of the Ba’athist regime, and quickly becomes the commander of the Special Forces 
tasked to seek out and arrest opposition members, the Peshmerga's families and the rebels. 
He is no longer alive, but the strange thing is that he was registered as entitled to the martyr 
“leader” denomination …donation? in the martyrdom registration list by the ruling party in 
Kurdistan. In addition, “the martyrs are immortal” was written in gold colour in large size 
font as a background for the text. Because of the sensitive nature of the subject matter, I 
decided to display the banner in reverse, to make it difficult to understand.  
 
 
 
  
 
60 This structure of this object does not imprison meaning but allows it mobility and potential for transformation, in the 
way that Dillon notes in his Revelation of Erasure: “What the eye picks out as meaningful on a printed or marked surface is 
mostly down to learning and convention: the legible text or image floats free of the surrounding remnants of abandoned 
language, meaningless doodles or flaws in the texture of the flat support. The real message hangs in the air like a street full 
of neon. Still, there is something seductive about the idea of an erased truth lurking between the lines(Dillon, B. 2006, The 
Revelation of Erasure. https://www.tate.org.uk/tate-etc/issue-8-autumn-2006/revelation-erasure). 
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Figure 10: View of the Gilgamesh side of the cube, 2017. (Photograph Halo Lano). 
Figure 11: Diagram of Gilgamesh side, 2017. 
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Gilgamesh side: 
Banner 01 The text reads: “During the Iran-Iraq War, there was a specialised group on the 
battlefield called the Death Squad, wearing a magenta colour beret. They were responsible 
for monitoring and killing soldiers who did not fight or fled the battlefield. They would put 
their bodies into a plain wooden coffin and write “cowardly” on the coffin. Although the 
Iraqi flag was used to cover Iraqi martyr coffins, it was not used on the so-called cowardly. 
They did not receive government privileges because they were not registered as martyrs, 
and the government forced their families to pay for the bullets that killed them.” 
 
02 This operates as a type of mass grave in which everything becomes mixed, the surface 
filled with words and colours displaced from their origin61.   
 
03 The texts are located on the left and do not cover the entire surface. They are written in 
plain white, and the Kurdish viewer can decipher Kapki Hamad Axa, from three words in 
different locations on the banner surface. It is the name of a hill, and familiar to most 
Kurdish who remember the PUK-KDP as many Peshmerga were killed on both sides in trying 
to control it. To reconstruct the name, viewers must consider the context of the exhibition 
and piece together the connotation. 
 
 
61 I included this banner partly for its illustration of Kristeva’s ideas on intertextuality, in particular the role of pheno- and 
geno- text, clarified by Johnson as “the pheno-text is the surface phenomenon of a text present before us, whereas the 
geno-text is the operation which engenders the pheno-text, is the cause of its genesis.” (Dillon, S. as cited in The Chicago 
School of Media Theory. 2003). Through the intersection of pheno-text and geno-text, a paradoxical sense is generated, 
which does not stabilise, reminiscent of Barthes’s notion of “ideal textuality” which has a slippery nature:  
“In this ideal text, the networks are many and interact, without any one of them being able to surpass the rest; this text is a 
galaxy of signifiers, not a structure of signifieds; it has no beginning; it is reversible; we gain access to it by several 
entrances, none of which can be authoritatively declared to be the main one; the codes it mobilises extend as far as the 
eye can reach, they are indeterminable […] the systems of meaning can take over this absolutely plural text, but their 
number is never closed, based as it is on the infinity of language”. (Barthes, R. as cited in The Chicago School of Media 
Theory. 2003). 
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04 The text reads: “At the end of the 1980s, the Iraqi's defence minister (Al-Friq Al-Rukin, 
Adnan Khairalh al-Tuffah) died when his helicopter crashed. The Iraqi government declared 
mourning throughout the country, forcing all government departments, schools, markets, 
and districts to make black banners for the event, since which time the use of a black 
banner has become common practice in most Iraqi cities (although in southern Iraq it was 
already common during the Iran-Iraq War)”. 
 
05 The text reads: “The funeral of the martyr (62*…) one of the Peshmerga in battalion ... he 
was martyred by the IS terrorist group in the area of ...Battalion 1.” This is the standard text 
structure for martyr banners during IS war, a formula which continues to this day. 
 
06 This banner consists of repeating the phrase that dates back to the war between the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Ansar al-Islam or Jund al-Islam. The phrase is "Martyred in 
Xel Hama". On the 23rd of September 2001, 43 PUK's Peshmerga were captured by Ansar al-
Islam or Jund al-Islam in the village of Xel Hama. They brutally killed them, then mutilated 
their bodies (GKsat.tv 2015).  
 
07 is composed of repeating a story relating to banners made during the Ba’ath era. Words 
such as: “Ba'ath era”, “Don't remember” “Jash” can be seen, but the meaning collapses 
under the accumulation of the text.  
 
 
62 This space is for writing the name of the martyr.  
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08: These layered stories deal with a ‘Shaheed’ case, but does not have a conventional 
narrative. Repetition, linguistic relations and structure is effaced and new relationships 
begun, concerned with the problem of inadequate representation, or when the subject 
requires an overt frustration of clarity.  
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Reflection  
 
My Shaheed installation was highly successful in generating public engagement with its 
theme. For a piece of contemporary art in Iraq, it employed unfamiliar methods and a 
controversial setting. These methods of social-engagement, collaboration and installation 
were also new territory for my own practice, even though the material being examined and 
presented was similar to that in my studio-based paintings. 
 
There was also some controversy attached to the reception of the exhibition, which resulted 
in demonstrations outside the museum, extensive press coverage, and interviews on radio 
and television, recordings of which are included in the appendix. I judged the controversy a 
positive thing, as a key objective was to give the calligraphers of Sulimaniyeh their own 
voice on the concept of martyrdom, thereby exposing the inconsistencies and corrupt 
practices the concept encourages. 
 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s thinking on the interrelationship between subject and object 
provides some perspective of the Shaheed installation. In The Phenomenology of Perception 
(1945) he argues that perception is not just visual, but an act of the whole physical body. 
The requirement to walk around the cube, in the manner of circling the Ka’aba at Mecca, 
viewing the stitched banners in relation to objects in the collection of the Archaeological 
Museum produced a powerful interaction. An example was the connection of the Shaheed 
cube with an object recently acquired by the museum representing Gilgamesh, one of the 
most important mythical figures concerning death and immortality in Mesopotamia. 
Gilgamesh struggled for eternity but failed, and became convinced that death was inevitable 
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and unavoidable, but that individuals could gain immortality through their deeds and works. 
The connection to the theme and narratives of Shaheed cube was consequently a stark and 
powerful one, particularly for an informed museum-going audience. 
 
All stories on the cube focus on the subject of martyrs and martyrdom, yet as we have seen, 
‘martyrdom’ does not have a rigid definition, but alters in meaning according to the 
ideology and the structure of governing power, whilst the stories presented were uneven in 
their legibility. These two main factors gave the cube an intertextuality that fits Derrida’s 
description in Position: 
No element can function as a sign without referring to another element which itself 
is not simply present. This interweaving results in each ‘element’ … being constituted 
on the basis of the trace within it of other elements of the chain or system. This 
interweaving, this textile is the text produced only in the transformation of another 
text. Nothing … is anywhere ever simply present or absent. There are only, 
everywhere, differences and traces of traces (Derrida, Position 1981: 26). 
 
In selecting the cube narratives, I did not wish to leave the audience to search for a hidden 
meaning, but rather to engage in the production of multiple interpretations with different 
connotations. This was encouraged through strategies employed to promote interaction 
between the installation and the viewer, for as Duchamp says: 
The creative act is not performed by the artist alone; the spectator brings the work 
in contact with the external world by deciphering and interpreting its inner 
qualification and thus adds his contribution to the creative act (Duchamp 1957, 
WMD, 140 as cited in Judovitz, D. 1995: 149). 
 
This approach to making and receiving again comes back to Eco’s Open Work, as “a work 
that does not generate a definite conclusion (in both the physical and intellectual sense) but 
implicates the viewer in imagining an appropriate end to the artwork” (Park, S. 
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Understanding “Open Work” in Interactive Art. 2006: iii).. ..making the Shaheed cube “a 
closed form in its uniqueness as a balanced organic whole, while at the same time 
constituting an open product on account of its susceptibility to countless different 
interpretations which do not impinge on its unadulterable specificity” (Eco’s The Open Work 
1989: 4). 
No singular or ultimate meaning was conveyed, rather the stories contributed to a 
democratic work. By reading the texts as they moved around the cube, the audience 
encountered multiple layers of meaning, some intended, and others generated as a 
consequence of the interference patterns established between the narratives, in this way 
authorship of meaning is transferred from the artist to the audience (Park, S. 2006: 4). 
A crucial intention was to engage the audience by placing a radical, potent composition in a 
space normally only used for the conventional display of historical artefacts. This 
juxtaposition was intended to be thought-provoking, and to invite the audience to involve 
themselves in new interpretations.  
Although the Shaheed cube and Hatoum’s Current Disturbance (1996) share a basic form, 
they are technically quite distinct, particularly, in the case of Shaheed, the collaboration 
with other makers. From a conceptual point of view, however, they share intellectual 
dimensions as both come from political conflicts, and include a critical dimension to socio-
political issues, transforming memory into a creative product. In Hatoum’s piece, the 
audience is also “invited to circumambulate, but here the wire cages, electric lights and 
sounds serve to heighten the vacancy of the interior space thus inferring human absence” 
(Al Quds. 2013). Hatoum’s concern that her audience experience familiar objects in an 
unfamiliar context was a useful reflection on Shaheed:  
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I always try to make the work in such a way that it can include you and your 
experience as well as mine. If I’m trying to convey a feeling of instability, I’m not 
doing it in a kind of documentary sense. I’m creating a work that you can experience 
physically – it’s not necessarily an illustration of a specific event. (Mona Hatoum -as 
cited in Sbitti, R. 2018). 
 
 
Baudrillard’s thoughts on language and propaganda remained a useful reference 
throughout the design of the exhibition, especially the way in which I selected stories with 
different levels of legibility to sit beside one another. Baudrillard saw that language as a 
means of communication prevents us from reaching "reality". He also described ideology as 
a "false consciousness" that did not represent the truth but rather concealed it (Felluga, D. 
2011) and that reality becomes inauthentic when language is used to represent an event.  
 
Language remains one of the most important tools of propaganda for politicians in Iraq, and 
banners as cultural media within Iraqi and Kurdish communities have been exploited by 
politicians to justify their wars. The Information provided by these banners, including news 
stories, relates to Baudrillard’s warning in The Gulf War Did Not Take Place (1995) that news 
and propaganda are used to blur the collective vision: “Iraqis blow up civilian buildings in 
order to give the impression of a dirty war. The Americans disguise satellite information to 
give the impression of clean war.” (Baudrillard (1995, p62). 
 
When the words of a martyr, or the description of a martyrdom, are brought into an 
archaeological museum, their meaning is detached from normal usage, and must contend 
with a place traditionally used for research, information and inquiry. In removing the idea of 
the ‘Shaheed’ from its sacred context and placing it in the historical context of the museum, 
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the subject matter is deconstructed and reformed (in the manner of Derrida’s 
“intertextualite”) rendering it open to debate and questioning. 
 
As previously documented, the use of calligraphers was an integral part of developing the 
Shaheed exhibition. One aim of this process was to heighten their awareness of their daily 
work, and to demonstrate the role banners can play in life, as well as in art. As a result of 
living under the totalitarian Baathist regime, and then in various states of warfare, Iraqi 
Kurds were isolated from the world and their artists had no connection with the West. Art 
education at Universities and Art Institutes remained in the system established for academic 
training established in the mid-twentieth century, and hence most Kurdish artists used an 
academic style. After 2003, when Saddam's regime collapsed, Kurdish artists could travel to 
Western countries, and experience new ways of practicing art, but this openness occurred 
away from the educational institutions in Kurdistan.  
 
The generation of contemporary artists in the west, particularly after the 1970s, increasingly 
engaged with fields beyond the personal (Bishop, C. and Sladen, M. 2008: 9). As Nicolas 
Bourriaud points out in his text Relational Aesthetics (1998):  
  
The possibility of a relational art (an art that takes as its theoretical horizon the 
sphere of human interaction and its social context, rather than the assertion an 
autonomous and private symbolic space) is testimony to the radical upheaval in 
aesthetic, cultural and political objectives brought about by modern art. To outline 
its sociology: this development stems essentially from the birth of a global urban 
culture and the extension of the urban model to almost all cultural phenomena. 
(Bourriaud, N. 2002 as cited in Bishop, C. 2006: 160).  
 
Bourriaud proposes that changes that have taken place in the socio-political context, allied 
with technological progress, have opened up the field of art. As a consequence, 
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contemporary intentions in art have altered aesthetic and intellectual structures, and 
artistic tendencies have tried to get closer to social groups to exchange knowledge. 
Although the Shaheed exhibition reflects these new strategies, it should be made clear that 
my decision-making developed organically from my personal interactions with the 
calligraphers. Once I recognised the direction of travel for my work, I found it necessary to 
further understand its place in the global contemporary art scene.  
 
Bourriaud also emphasizes the role of art in social cohesion and the promotion of dialogue 
among various components of society:  
  
We can leave aside the problem of the phenomenon’s historicity: art has always 
been relation to some extent. It has, in other words, always been a factor in 
sociability and has always been the basis for a dialogue. One of the image’s 
potentials is its capacity for ‘linkage’ [reliance], to use Michel Maffesoli’s term: flags, 
logos, icons and signs all produce empathy and sharing, and generate 
links.(Bourriaud, N. 2002 as cited in Bishop, C. 2006: 161).  
  
 
The use of banners in Kurdish society might be understood as this type of ‘linkage’, 
providing the basis for dialogue through the texts presented in public places, although the 
quality of the dialogue has changed according to the governing political systems (c.f. 
chapter 2). The participation of the calligraphers provides a new relation between social 
groups, as well as a sharing of skills and knowledge. This discourse of participation is an 
attempt to counter the passivity, isolation and lack of sharing that has occurred due to the 
past political and social system. 
 
According to Bishop, a key objective of participatory art is to work against isolationism 
within society, that can lead to alienation. Alienation may occur as the product of dictatorial 
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regimes, contemporary capitalism, or totalitarian socialism. She proposes that “Art must be 
directed against contemplation, against spectatorship, against the passivity of the masses 
paralyzed by the spectacle of modern life” (Bishop, C.  as cited in Thompson, N. 2012: 36). 
Bishop also suggests how these goals might be achieved: 
  
Beginning from this premise, participatory art aims to restore and realize a 
communal, collective space of shared social engagement. But this is achieved in 
different ways: either through constructive gestures of social impact, which refute 
the injustice of the world by proposing an alternative, or through a nihilist 
redoubling of alienation, which negates the world’s injustice and illogicality on its 
own terms. (Bishop, C.  as cited in Thompson, N. 2012: 36). 
 
Socially engaged practice has the potential to cohere society, because it helps communities 
to feel that they are part of the ‘fuller picture’ of society – according to Bishop, “to re-
humanize social bonding contemporary artists may try to fill those interstices between the 
classes of society caused by the ruling regimes, especially capitalism”:  
For many artists and curators on the left, Guy Debord’s indictment of the alienating and 
divisive effects of capitalism in The Society of the Spectacle (1967) strike to the heart of why 
participation is important as a project: it re-humanizes a society rendered numb and 
fragmented by the repressive instrumentality of capitalist production. This position, with 
Marxist overtones, is put forward by most advocates of socially engaged and activist art. 
Given the market’s near-total saturation of image repertoires - so the argument goes - 
artistic practice can no longer revolve around the construction of objects to be consumed by 
a passive bystander. (Bishop, C. cited in Thompson, N.2012: 35).  
 
Until the Shaheed exhibition, most calligraphers could not see how banners connected to 
other fields of knowledge. They certainly did not realise the potential for contemporary art 
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to draw attention to their banner-making, or that their knowledge derived from banner-
making could be valued. Through their participation, the ‘interstices caused by totalitarian 
systems’ such as Baathist regimes in Iraq, one-party ideology, and one-Arab nation, 
(denouncing minorities such as the Kurds, as described in Chapter 2), would be filled. The 
democratic intention behind their inclusion was made in the hope that this small step would 
be a step toward a re-humanization of Iraqi society. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
As I have noted previously, the practical and theoretical research contained in this thesis can 
be traced back to my childhood awareness of the calligraphers’ workshops of Sulaymaniyah. 
 
In revisiting the workshops as an artist many years later, I was struck by the visual potency 
of the banner-making processes, in particular the residues of that process left on the 
backing-boards in the workshops, and sought to use this potency in the context of global 
contemporary art and my ambitions as a painter. 
 
During the course of the research this intention has undergone profound changes. Initially 
the issue of appropriation was paramount, and remains to this day a background concern 
that I pay constant attention to. Next came the recognition that the banner-making process 
through a studio mimicking, offered two methods in one – a ‘positive’ method of 
calligraphic paint onto cloth, and a ‘residual’ method of layered marks, which eventually 
produced, or recreated, a palimpsest abstraction. Both processes contained the question of 
cultural specificity, which forced me to consider whether paintings made from such sources 
could escape their cultural origins, and whether they would wish to.  
 
This consideration, which certainly remains relevant if I decide to produce paintings again in 
future, was superseded by the realisation that, in my interviews with the calligraphers, 
powerful narratives were being generated. I began to use these narratives as the content of 
the calligraphy I applied to cloth in order to produce traces, but at this point realised that 
the visual/verbal palimpsest, instead of being an abstraction, had become an obscure 
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receptacle for the history of my people. Layering the stories repeatedly in paint, to achieve a 
similar density of layering as I had found in the calligraphers’ workshops, impressed upon 
me their relevance to contemporary Kurdish society, whereas the act of rendering them 
illegible grew less important. It was at this point I embarked on a more systematic history of 
banner-making, sources for which were sparse, employing a mix of historical research and 
photographic interpretation, with the eye-witness accounts of the calligraphers themselves. 
 
This recognition produced a marked shift in both practical and theoretical approaches, in 
which linguistic and painterly strategies were overturned in favour of socially-engaged, 
collaborative, and installation practices. Having been forced into this shift by the demands 
of my subject matter and my intended audiences, I recognise them as new developments, 
and because mine is not an artistic practice with a defined end, I also understand there is 
much more research and theoretical underpinning to do. 
 
The realisation of the Shaheed cube marked a crucial step in this respect, in that I was able 
to incorporate my own research in an installation that depended upon collaboration with 
the calligraphers themselves. The collaboration allowed me to activate a process through 
which their informed voices on the subject of Martyrdom – a consistent theme of their 
narratives, and for their banner-making, to become heard in combination, to a degree of 
legibility that each calligrapher was comfortable with. 
 
Due to its timing, the insight that led me to the archive at The Directorate of Martyrdom 
and Genocide, that has since prompted further works, is only lightly touched upon in this 
text, despite its relevance to the last phase of the Shaheed cube installation.  
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In the first phase of the project, contributions to knowledge were offered through the 
formulation of highly particular processes. These began with appropriation, and also 
involved mimicry of the calligraphers, but developed into a more complex method, in which 
the transcription of detailed narratives produced a loaded form of abstraction, with 
relevance to both Kurdish and non-Kurdish viewers. My practice from this phase is therefore 
intended to provide new understandings about painting in relation to embedded socio-
political issues, and the manner in which gradual accumulations of meaning might pass via a 
form of palimpsest into near-illegibility, and thereby abstraction, without losing all their 
significance. 
 
Through continued interviews with the calligraphers, preserved in the Appendix in Kurdish 
as original reference material, relevant narratives were collated alongside conventional 
historical methods to form a brief history of banner-making, a further contribution to 
knowledge, as such a history previously existed only in the form of anecdotes and 
photographs.  
 
The historical perspective arising from the eye-witness accounts of the calligraphers directly 
impacted the design of the Shaheed installation, in which the idea of the palimpsest is 
supplanted by the notion of multiple perspectives and multiples voices as expressed in the 
ritual form of the cube, to be walked around, itself a loaded action for an Islamic audience. 
The contribution to knowledge in this piece includes a radical new proposition for 
contemporary art in Iraq, in terms of it incorporating sensitive, emotionally charged 
narratives; employing approaches unfamiliar to artists in Iraqi and the region; and the final 
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installation being sited within an important archaeological connection, emphasising that 
history is continuous and also present. 
 
Local and regional feedback to the exhibition was strong, and the exhibition received 
considerable media attention, some of it captured in the media archive in the Appendix. For 
my own reflection on the process I naturally noted the protests against the exhibition, in 
particular the defacing of promotional material around the region, but I was more 
concerned with informed responses. When interviewed about the Shaheed exhibition on 
KNN TV, Journalist and curator Bakhtiar Saeed remarked that “it is evident that the idea for 
the exhibition in Sulaymaniyah museum is a new one, not seen before. Furthermore, the 
way in which the idea was implemented differs from traditional approaches, in that Rostam 
took advantage of the banner form by using the calligraphers’ narration to review and 
revisit historical events. Through those stories, he also remembers the victims killed in 
various events.” He went on to explain, “the calligraphers are important sources because 
they bore witness to events that took place in Kurdistan through the making of banners”. 
In the same television interview, the artist and poet Shara Rasheed reflected on how the 
exhibition offers a set of important considerations around the issue of the martyr and 
martyrdom: “the question that arises is: do we have a common opinion of a martyr, or do 
we have a specific definition of a martyr? Who is the true martyr?” She goes on to explain 
that in the continuous wars of the Kurdish region there are many victims, but the exhibition 
asks: how may one martyr be distinguished from another, and how the sanctity and value of 
martyrdom might be approached. 
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Hashim Hama Abdula, Director of the Sulaymaniyah Museum, commented that he saw the 
banners as a form of historical narration, and when placed alongside archaeological objects 
that incorporate ancient writings (cuneiform, Aramaic, Arabic) a historical dialogue is 
sparked between the contemporary artwork and the archaeological objects. 
 
He also recognised the exhibition’s relation to the archaeological context as a means of 
reanimating the collection for contemporary audiences, and was made more aware of the 
role of the viewer as activator in the museum. In the exhibition he noted that as the viewer 
walks around the Shaheed cube trying to make sense of the banner narratives, they 
encounter the archaeological objects (and their information captions) encircling the cube63.  
The viewer thus experiences a rich interweaving of information and connotation, and is 
invited to bring them together in a broader awareness, as Derrida would encourage.  
 
The exhibition had a markedly positive effect on Sulaymaniyah Museum visitor figures, with 
many hundreds who had not previously visited the museum attending. Abdula recognised 
that art installations in Western museums have had a similar significant impact on visitor 
numbers and visitor appreciation as the Shaheed show. He now envisages an expansion of 
the museum building to accommodate more projects and more visitors.  
 
The positive reaction to the museum exhibition demonstrated to me the effectiveness of 
socially-engaged artistic practice in bringing together the fractured communities in 
Sulaymaniyah and Kurdistan. I saw that this held potential for further developments, and 
 
63 Abdula reported that the exhibition had inspired him to display the Paikuli inscription nearby, as he felt a resonance. The 
Paikuli inscription is a relic from the Sassanid period, consisting of texts carved on stones that originally formed the wall in 
the castle of Paikuli, written in Pahlavi and Ashkani language. 
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began to prepare proposals for further related works. The first project envisaged an open-
air situation, to which calligraphers are invited to make banners for participants while they 
debate issues crucial to current Iraqi society, as it transitions from dictatorship to 
democracy. Participants will request sentences or phrases that arise from the debate to be 
made into banners, that then become available for other purposes, such as performances, 
meetings, demonstrations, and independent artworks. A second project is designed 
specifically for art institutions, with the intention of activating debate on cultural issues in 
Kurdistan and Iraq. A banner will be used to invite prospective participants to a discussion 
inside the selected cultural institution, and other banners will be used to prompt debate, 
with the aim of promoting inclusivity and allowing each participant ‘finding their voice’. 
Banners will also record the ideas that emerge, to be used in future events. Potential topics 
for debate might include: the culture factory, the Artist Union, Sulaymaniyah Contemporary 
Art Museum, and the Venice Biennale64.  
 
In contemplating the wider relevance of my research, I consider that the history of banner-
making should be of interest to a spectrum of social scientists in the Middle East and 
beyond, whilst the martyrdom testimonies of the calligraphers will perhaps interest a 
Kurdish and an Iraqi audience more directly. The distinctive processes and methods 
employed in the studio will have relevance to artists working in diverse cultures, with 
different subject matters, whilst the methodological innovations that the Shaheed 
installation required should prove a powerful example to a contemporary artist operating in 
Iraq or the broader Middle-Eastern region, but will be more familiar to a Western audience.  
 
64 I have also designed a performance piece prompted in part by the museum director’s own reflection on the exhibition 
outcome (and recorded in more detail in the Appendix) in which an activist research methodology responds to a reference 
object from the Archaeological Museum. 
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In forging a connection between ancient artefacts from the region, a central Islamic ritual, 
the everyday witnessing of the calligraphers in their daily practice of transcription, and the 
layered social history of the Kurds, the Shaheed exhibition proved a fitting conclusion to this 
research project, a conclusion which, when I commenced this research prompted by a 
childhood memory, I certainly could not have envisaged. 
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Appendices  
 
Interview 1 
The famous calligrapher (Hiwa Saeed Rasheed) August 1st 2015 
 
Q. when have you commenced as a calligrapher? 
A. After 1988. 
 
Q. How did you learn to do that? 
A. I have practiced on Hashim Al-Baghdady brochure. In the beginning, I learned Ruqa’a font 
theme then the other font theme. I used to write small banners and not big ones. 
 
Q. And when have you worked in a shop? 
A. It was around 1988 after the chemical bomb attack and later then I moved to Iran. 
 
Q. What was the first banner’s title about? 
A.  It was a morning banner that I wrote it in an erroneous way for a teacher, once he has 
come back to fetch it he said why have you written it like that?  
 
Q. How did you write banners after the uprising?  
A. I used to work for a party and later I was arrested, in 1984 I was released. After a period I 
travelled abroad when I heard that my father had been arrested I returned and I was arrested 
and released again. After the uprising I worked as a calligrapher in a PUK Committee. 
 
Q. What were the works? 
A. They were mostly the party slogans especially about PUK. 
 
Q. What colors were used? 
A. Green was always used. 
 
Q.  Did you purchase cloth in rolls for banners? 
A. After the year of 2000, writing the banners has evolved for the memorial occasions of 
uprising, sometimes we were writing banners for a month for all the parties. I had sometimes 
bought around eight to nine rolls. Even if I had bought a hundred rolls they were certainly 
used up. A person who works for PUK headquarters 1 in Sulaymaniyah named: Jabar Sabir; 
said that it sometimes we use five hundred rolls. 
 
Q. What were the cloth colors mostly used up? 
A. Green and yellow. 
 
Q. How were they written? 
A.  In Ruqa’a font theme and with white paint. 
 
Q. Were there any other color used? 
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A. Sure, the PUK was used in a larger font size in red or a light shaded green, and/ or the June 
1st was written in a large font, if the memorial was for Halabja, then the word Halabja had to 
be written in large font. 
Q. How did such writings come to you?  
A. If they were PUK’s then they were coming from PUK Sulaymaniyah HQ-1. The total of thirty 
to forty banners were written for all the department buildings thus all around were covered 
with green. 
 
Q.  Were the governmental directorates writing banners? 
A.  Yes, the writings were in white colour on green cloth. 
 
Q.  Were they writing on other colored banners apart from green? 
A.  Depending upon my memory, the governmental departments were writing just on green 
banners. 
 
Q.  And what if the occasion was for KDP or another party’s memorial? 
A.  For KDP memorial I had not seen banners fixed on the department buildings except for 
their headquarters and in the quarters. 
 
Q. In what period have you received lots of work within your work history? 
A.  In 1999 and 2000 till 2012 the city was full of works, as far as I’m concerned, I were 
sometimes inquired to write about forty or fifty and sometimes one hundred banners for PUK. 
 
Q. Were there any problem in banners writing? 
A. There was rivalry among the colours. It happened that when someone asked me for a work 
and meantime seen by the other party’s member by chance thus he did not come back for 
anything else. 
 
Q. Does it mean that it had influences on people? 
A. Of course it had influences because he has been brain washed. For instance, if some one’s 
two brothers were martyred in the front of PUK then he would never concede for the 
opposition party as he shared his suffering with that party. The internal civil war had too many 
effects on people, like my family; we have sixteen members martyred in the hands of these 
parties: three were hanged by Baath party, two sentenced with death in Mosul, two were 
killed by KDP at Grdi Gosha and the rest were killed by the Islamics. If you won’t belong to a 
party in this country your condition will not remain well. Being independent and not belonging 
to any party it’s for many years and they are not going to issue my working permit. If you 
interview the calligraphers you will realize that each of them belongs to a party and each has 
his own salary. 
 
Q. How can a burial ceremony banner be written? 
A. The name of the deceased person would be written in a big  font size, his/ her father, 
brother and son or daughter as well as the directorate where the deceased had worked 
before in addition to the date and the mosque where the burial feast would be held. If the 
deceased person belongs to a party then they ask me to write with different colours and not 
only with white and they also ask for writing with their wanted colour. Many times I have 
received some certain people who belonged to officials asked me to write eight 2meters sized 
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banners while the ordinary people’s banners are one meter size, and sometimes asked for 
more than ten to fifteen banners. I couldn’t realize that he/she belonged to which party 
because I have written banners for all the parties... Even if the banners have no misprints or 
mistakes in but sometimes, they asked to write a new one due to the colour. I have once 
written a banner for a real estate agency in Zargata quarter. It was the property of two 
persons whom they each belonged to a party, I have had the colours with me and there I 
asked one of the owners how to write, he inquired that he wanted green colour for the whole 
writings but I urged him to let me write the numbers in red in spite of that he insisted to write 
the whole in green. When his partner returned and saw the green banner he became upset 
and said they are erroneous while there were no errors in the writings but he disliked the 
green color that’s why he asked me to change them with yellow or he will bring another 
calligrapher to erase this green writing and change it to yellow besides the other guy was still 
insisting on the green, they were arguing till I left. Let me narrate something else for you, 
once upon a time I went to Erbil and wearing a dark green Kurdish national costume because 
green is nicer to wear than yellow. As I reached the first check point of Erbil they asked me to 
get out of the vehicle and later they insulted me so much. 
 
Q. How were the banners written for the religious occasions? 
A. Sulaymaniyah was the advanced city regarding to that aspect, at Mia’araj night which is 
one of the annual occasions; a white banner was written which was twice bigger than the two 
parties’ banners, they were fixed everywhere around Sulaymaniyah quarters and blocks. 
There was also the prophet’s birth date occasion when banners were written for it as well. 
 
Q. Is colour regarded as a significant point for the religious occasions? 
A. No, what is important is only the banner background that must be white otherwise it can 
be written with red, yellow, green, blue and multicolour. Only the parties focus on colour. 
 
Q. Has any other colour been used apart from black for ceremony banner? 
A. Yes the PKK use other colours, I noticed that when I have written some banners for their 
martyrs of Kobani city on black banner, once they have seen the banners they told me that 
they are wrong colours because PKK use white and red for their burial ceremonies of the dead 
ones. They have also advised me that PKK itself has changed from black to the mentioned 
ones. 
 
Q. What about their slogans? 
A. They write that they are saddened with the death of …, later they write martyr is immortal 
and above they also write: “the real martyr of Kurdistan plus the name and nickname” this 
differs so much as if compared to our banners, they use their banners for graveyard and 
marching. 
 
Q. Does the civilian society organization have banners to write? 
A. Yes it has and as follows: 
✓ Students Union with pink and red 
✓ Halabja: light green script on white background 
✓ Women Union: white script on purple background 
✓ Socialist Democratic Party: with light blue 
✓ The miserable occasions like (Halabja, Mass Exodus and martyrs) all were in black 
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Q. What about the restaurants which fix banners in Ramadan fasting month? 
A. This is just like imitating of a tradition, I write them every year otherwise formerly the 
governor was not granting permits to all of the restaurants to fix banner. 
 
Q.  How many times have you changed your calligraphy board so far? 
A. Only once because each three to four months period we scrape it but the flex paper should 
be changed between 6 to 7 month otherwise it became useless and makes trouble in writing. 
 
Q. Do you make your brushes by yourselves or you buy them? 
A. We had made them by tins and cut their heads with scissors but they were more convenient 
during writing because they were not flexible. 
 
Q. How big were the banners? 
A. There were the following sizes for writing as follows: 3 mtr, 7 mtr, 10 mtr and 15 mtr 
 
Q. Were there any odd request from people that you could not write? 
A. Yes for instance, demagogic people, although my career is calligraphy but my conscience 
won’t let me to write such things. 
 
Q. Have you received requests for writing banners at the beginning of Daash war? 
A. Yes just for the Peshmarga martyrs, I personally have written 4 to 5 ones but during the 
internal civil war I have written 10 banners for 10 different persons in a day. Once I have 
written for 11 martyrs who all came to me in Arfa day prior to feast. 
 
Q. How was your career during the elections? 
A. It was a very good period because we had got a fruitful work. 
 
Q. Which colour seems independent within your work? 
A. White background banner with black font script, otherwise green belongs to PUK and 
Yellow belongs to KDP 
 
Q. And how is your career by now? 
A. Unfortunately due to shortage and delay of governmental staff salary our working level has 
decreased so much, it’s just as a dried out lake in which grooves are visible at its bottom 
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Interview 2 
Bahar Munzir, Head of Human Development Organisation   July 9th 2015 
 
Q. Could you tell us about your political and feminine work? 
A. My work will return to after the Revolution in 1991 that occur some political changes, some 
ideologies and beliefs were born, a political circumstance which was extremely different from 
the political conditions under the rule of Saddam who was totalitarian and no one was 
allowed to work freely except some concealed movement of Islamic and communists. Since 
the revolution of 1991 a wide domain has been created allowed everyone to work and 
organize themselves especially to be active in the field of women work. Within our society 
everything was not organized and they work in single person. One of the projects was 
presented on 8 of March 1992, the women’s day, at Sulaymaniyah High School. A lot people 
were present. It was like a ceremony with anthem and narratives and clarifying the women 
rights which was organized by some communists. 
Q. Did you write mottos? 
A. Yes, but now I cannot remember the contents, but we had a request list and one of them 
was housework that marginalizes women and cannot communicate with society then after a 
year we founded an organization. 
Q. What was your relationship with the communists about?  
A. I was not in relation yet but some of those women had political relation since Baath time 
for example Sarnjee Kreakay was one of those group as well as the vanguards crew and 
communist movement were available. After 1991 Communists movement party had armed 
people in public. 
Q. Were they named as Shurah (council)? 
Yes, but it was not conditional to be a Shurah member meanwhile you belong to communist 
party and the contrary is true as well. At that time they had headquarter and armed people 
men and women co-existentially even in Halabja as it was difficult because the political Islamic 
were in power and due to the area’s neighbourhood and closeness to Iran. 
Q.  Did you have any activity like demonstration? 
A. After the other women organizations has joined, this independent organization had its role, 
for instance regarding women assassination as during that time  the court and police 
directorates were not carrying out their duties accordingly, it was easy to have weapon at 
home. The issue of the political forces entered into the city from the mountains that had no 
urban experience; has regenerated the tribal matters as they armed the tribes. This induced 
Kurdish people to take honor into their consideration strongly. Those women who had 
relation to Baath party through Iraqi Women Union or if had worked in any Baath 
organizations; were assassinated as per a list. There were some women who had relations 
and also some people while who were Baathist; as a result their sisters were murdered.  
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Q. Was the assassination source familiar? 
A. The source was terror, at the time that Kurdistan United Fronts had power. When they 
entered the city they started killing the Baathists. It was easier for the men to join a party and 
become an armed but being a Baathist for a woman had a weak role. 
Q. Which organization was active for women issue then? 
A. There were organizations which protested, the women organizations inside the parties 
were not protesting in the form of remonstrance, as far as they are concerned; Freedom for 
Kurdistan was the core of the issue. But anything would not connect communist notion to 
liberation. 
Q. Were your critics against Kurdistan United Fronts? Did the other organizations hide their 
subject matters? 
A. During that period if anyone had talked about women issue, they might have been named 
them communist or independent organization. It’s apparent that too much pressure were 
practiced especially by the political Islamic, that circumstance within itself has increased the 
political Islamic since the Islamic parties have rearranged themselves after the uprising and 
also they were supported by other states thus they had a considerable fund while during that 
period everything was too expensive as Baath regime was not letting stuff reach Kurdistan in 
addition to that Iraq was under economic sanction due to Kuwait war. This had created a bad 
effect and resulted in expensiveness and poverty. This was one of the factors which 
strengthened the political Islamic. During the economic blockade they were approaching the 
quarters to distribute breads and veils. We were working for that case that it had drawback. 
Q. Where had you received financial aids?  
A.  From outside by our people and some rich people, none of the states subsidized us. We 
had showed our agendas and programs in our offices once people approach and see them 
they soon understand our intentions. For example we had written: No for terror and women 
assassination, Yes for a justice law between women and men. No Islamic law, not directly, 
but through  amendment of personal affairs laws. The domestic duties must be socialized; 
polygamy must be stopped as well as forced marriage. 
Q. What were your activities and actions like, were they in the form of demonstration or 
seminars? 
A. Shutting the councils has resulted in a massive and crowded demonstration some leftist 
and modernist people have raised red banner which was written with this request: Don’t shut 
down the councils, Kurdistan united Fronts must not shut the councils. 
Q. Were you using red color during your demonstration? 
A. yes of course we were using red colors because we were leftist and the red color is a symbol 
of leftism. What I have stated was the first demonstration which I took part. Many seminars 
and colloquies were held. No vacant and free seats were left in the cultural hall of 
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Sulaymaniyah where the seminars were held. We had arranged a series of seminars about 
criticizing the terms of women lives in the cities and towns. 
Q. Were there any censorship on you? 
A. One of the incidents that I can never forget was that we entered a seminar held by 
someone belonged to the political Islamic in the cultural hall, the available women were in 
veils and the men were in bushy beards. Once we reached there we realized that the seminar 
was held against us in the name of (the red nights) the red you mentioned, the one who were 
managing the seminar belonged to Islamic movement party. I don’t like to mention as he has 
different thoughts at the moment. Five members’ women of the independent organization 
come out to register for participation. As one of them wrote down her name to talk they 
couldn’t find out that she was one of us although we were different among them while 
entering the hall with our costumes unlike theirs. They were hinting to that these communist 
people want to preserve the sexual relation between brothers and sisters. When the lady 
went up to the stage, she explained the statements and come down we realized that 
something will happen that’s why we went to her and then they started spitting us. That 
comrade of us remained for two months in a village with her brother because they threatened 
to kill her. 
Q. Which parties mostly share this conflict? Was the government absent during that period? 
A. It was between us and the Islamics. Our newspapers had lots of readers, our seminars were 
crowded as we were holding them in public areas, for instance we held March 8 seminar in 
the square of driving Trial in the presence of too much people. We didn’t participate in the 
election of 1992. There was disunion between patriotic union of Kurdistan and Kurdistan 
Democratic party Thus later they imposed 50 by 50 system but never the less they didn’t 
concord and after two years started internal war. This catastrophe had made our act and 
activities difficult among two militia parties, PUK was governing green zone and KDP was 
dominating on yellow zone. We were working in both sides as they couldn’t come to us due 
to their frictions and problems till they reached an agreement in 1997 and after three years 
PUK struck our organization and shut it down. 
Q. Was the war between PUK and communist party? Were you a part of communist? 
A. Yes the war was between PUK and communist party. We were not a part of communist but 
there were some closeness between our opinions. Some people of communist party were 
believing in our acts but meantime shutting communist party, caused to shut our organization  
as well. 
Q. Were there any killed ones? 
A. Yes there were. A shelter was established with the cooperation of Norwegian NPA 
organization which was one of those that assisted independent organizations for opening a 
shelter to protect women. Our armed girls were moving to Pishdar and Bitwean districts to 
save women from murdering. They were bringing to the shelter. Two girls whose noses were 
cut had been brought to our shelter. 
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Q. Where were they from? 
A. From Raniya, both girls’ names were Kazhal as follows:  Kazhal Jamal and Kazhal Khidir. 
Q. What was the reason behind that? 
A. The reason of relationship, their father in law family had deformed them as a disgrace; 
they were protected by the shelter. We had brought another girl whom was roped with a 
chain inside a bath due to her unhealthy mental state. 
Q. What was your meeting or demonstration mostly for? 
A. March 8 was one of those occasions when activities were carried out, prior to shutting the 
organization activities were organized for substituting personal affairs law, equality between 
men and women and women circumcision.  
Q. For which women issue you had the most activities? 
A. For women murdering which is the most significant aspect I still work for. It’s for about 24 
years and the government couldn’t issue a law for women and men equality. Our organization 
was shut in 2000 and its permit paper was withdrawn. One of those women who were 
protected by the shelter had been handed to her family by PUK at night, her name was Nahida 
and she was murdered the day after. The bodies of that woman and the five communists 
whom were killed, buried by municipality next to each. 
Q. Was demonstration held accordingly? 
A. No because they were searching for those people who were members and fans so that 
they would be arrested and /or killed. 
Q. Which year? 
A. 14- 7 – 2000, every year we visit their tombs and memorialize them . We protested against 
PUK. Two years were also memorialized in the black spot where assassinated. 
Q. When has this organization been established in which you’re working for? 
A. It has been established in 2007. We had a logo, in which its color was black the word LIFE 
was scripted and it also has a yellow sun inside. But upon the request of the Yazidees, we 
have changed the black color into purple. We had a voluntary project in Duhok in the months 
of July and August 2014 for registering the names of those children, girls and women   who 
were kidnapped by Daash. We could meet the Yazidees there and we had the forms which 
had LIFE group logo in black color. When they saw the forms they hesitated because the black 
color symbolizes Daash. Once we declared the names of the kidnapped people we also stated 
that we have changed the black color into purple. 
Q. I have seen purple banners written with white what about them? 
A. Our banners are white and written with orange color because orange is an anti-violence 
color. 
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Q. When a woman is assassinated, what do you do for? Do you write on black banners as 
some parties and people do? 
A. No, we never write on black banners neither do ceremonies but we demonstrate. One of 
the cases that introduced us among Kurdistan society, KRG and Parliament everywhere was 
a case of lady in the name of the teacher Sakar, she was a teacher aged 28 years old, she was 
killed by her father whilst she was asleep because she wanted to get married to the man she 
loved. Both of them were teachers in Sarkapkan village near Rania district. Once we heard the 
news we were stunned. This incident took place before the establishment of Zheyan (LIFE) 
group. Thus we announced the campaign of the teacher Sakar and invited people for. The 8th 
of March that year after a month and few days we collected people in front of Sulaymaniyah 
court and raised banners and slogans saying justice for the sake of teacher Sakar and her 
killer should not be freed in addition to some other slogans I can’t remember all. The banners 
colors were pink written with black. It was a great treachery practiced against that girl even 
the government president has talked about this issue. But her father was freed with an 
amnesty decision. We were around 20 to 30 women who participated in 13 court sessions, 
we twice could take photos with us and later they didn’t let us anymore. 
Q. Will you do your activities in November 25th ? 
A. yes we have our activities every year. 
Q. What have you done for the Yazidees women? 
A. After a short period we were going to the camps during our weekly days off including: 
Badgit Kandal and Khankea camp where 6500 families dwell as well as the cities and anywhere 
they dwelled. We were visiting them for registering the names of the children, girls and 
women who were under Daash irruption. We collected data and submitted them to Kurdistan 
and Sweden Parliaments. After Daash war we have organised an armed group and trained on 
the weapons although we faced criticism saying that we are a civilian group how should we 
carry weapons but; the situation requested so as Kurdistan was in danger. 
Q. Are you doing political activities? 
A. Yes I’m politburo member of Communist party. 
Q. How are your supporters like?  
A. I believe that our supporters numbers will get increased because of the political gap in 
addition to that there are no more opposition parties left and all the parties are running the 
government. 
Q. Was the communist party striking  by the PUK  effective to decrease your supporters? 
A. Certainly yes because our activists opted out to leave abroad. 
Q. To the best of my knowledge you had too much people during Shurah period, so what 
was your debilitating related to ? 
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A. It was related to that we were continuously struck, for example the Islamic parties were 
declaring that we are against Islamic law and we won’t fit with Kurdistan culture. 
Q. Wasn’t it relating to that PUK was dominant and had great number of armed forces here? 
A. Yes it’s apparent that PUK was in power, what had concerned them was that this 
movement was growing, attracting the youth and won the women case. Another significant 
point that Iran inflicted against us was publicized in KAYHAN newspaper mentioning that Iran 
praises PUK for striking communist party. We still keep the newspaper. This cannot be seen 
as just an accident but it was a planned conspiracy because communist was also banned in 
Iran and PUK has close relationship with Iran that’s why Iran asked it to do so. The same as 
now Turkey inquires KDP to move against PKK. Kurdistan Region has never been free and the 
neighboring states have always intervened; Iran from one side and Turkey from another. Thus 
striking communist party is partially relating to Iran demands. 
Q. How is your state and what are your activities by now? 
A. We have regained permits, do activities and acts and we don’t have funds form the 
government because we don’t believe in it. 
Q. Will you manage activities for communist party memorial or Marc 8th ? 
A. Yes we are going to do it, lest I should forget in 1999 two of our friends got martyred in the 
hands of Islamic movement with the collaboration of KDP. So they are going to be 
memorialized and also we have done a great campaign for constitution issue. 
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Interview 3 
Sdiq Salih (Historian) 03-08-2015 
Q. As a member of this organization and well aware of history, can you inform us about the 
history of banners in your archive, in regard of writing banners in the social and political 
history of Kurdish nation. 
A. We do not have evidence of written scriptures, but photos might serve as a vital 
evidence for your work. To my knowledge, banners coined after the Ottoman Empire reign, 
which was used during the political occasions. Some photos for the ottoman era published in 
books which show that banner came to being in late Ottoman era. 
In particular in late 19 century when Itihadw Taraqi party established, it was a green party 
asking for the establishment of constitution and application of parliament under the shadow 
of Ottoman rule, to put limits on the authorities of the Caliphate and Ottoman Sultans. 
Since then the parties were established by people who were educated and come from the 
cities and even the Kurds were involved in the establishment of the party too. 
Two of the participants in this activity were (Abdullah Jawdat and Isac Scoty Dyar bakir) they 
were educated and knew languages, aware of the European lifestyle, since then political 
movements arouse in the Ottoman rule and banners were used the demonstrations. 
Izadeen Kaka in his journal mentioned that at Sara Square in Sulaimaniya where 
demonstrations took place against the Ityhadyakan who came to power, it is possible that the 
demonstrators used banners. 
In the twenties and thirties in this particular part of Kurdistan at that time the political 
terminology for this part was Kurdistan the south the British named it like this, and was known 
as state of Musul in the Ottoman era in 1921was linked to Iraq. 
After the decision to link this part of Kurdistan to Iraq, in sulaimaniya particularly the 
recommendation of the investigation committee to the United Nations is not implemented 
which consist of the formalization of Kurdish language in the Kurdish resident areas and to be 
use in the schools and the courts. it was like some kind of autonomy for the Kurds, neither 
the Iraqi government nor the British comply with the recommendations, So due to that 
disagreement provoked. 
These disagreements will take different forms; I believe banners during that time until the 
revolution of Kurdish nation in 1991 used for a political reason. In the political occasions 
where there was a chance banners used. 
From the political unrests in the twenties and thirties there is one or two photos from the 
demonstrations at Sara Square on 06-09-1930 there was banners raised in the gatherings in 
which the banners stated (legitimate Kurdish demands, long live the justice of United 
nations). 
Q. Was it written in Kurdish?       
A. Yes, it was. 
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Q. Were the texts in the banners influenced by any party? 
A. they were not for any parties, these unrests were led by a cluster of educated people, and 
they named themselves (National commission), they were a very civilized group, even they 
published announcements. 
Now we have a copy of this announcement which was published on Sept. 1930 within some 
points talk about the squad of demonstrators. State that, where the demonstration started 
and marched and gathered at Sara square. 
In the assembly point Ramzy Fattah who was one of the leaders of the National commission 
who spoke on behalf of them and prior agreements on what would be their slogan. Once they 
achieved what they have come for then they stared to dismantle the gathering. But because 
the Iraqi Government was not intact they feared this unrest to persist and spread widely. 
In fact this was a focal point in the history, and the government did not listen to the demands 
of the demonstrators. There were several demonstrations one of them was in July, and the 
massive demonstration took place on 06-09-1930, Fayaq Bakas led the demonstration as it is 
mentioned in the historical sources. 
Q. Is there any photos? 
A. There are two photos that I can show it to you, this was a focal point if the government 
fulfilled the demands of the people at least this bloodshed would not happened. Same for 
Kurds it would not be like to start carrying weapons and struggle for the Kurdish cause in 
which it affected badly on the Kurds in Iraq same for the Arabs who were affected like the 
others. This became a cross-cutting matter which is not solved until now in Iraq. 
The British were ethically responsible for this because they established this government; they 
should have transferred same experience for governance like what they have in Europe to 
Iraq, so Iraqi monarchy system might have survived up until now and these accidents would 
not happened. Amen Zaki Bag who was one of the Kurdish  historian mentioned in his book 
Motakhylat Aswad  some awareness for the King Faysal which is about some Iraqi authorities  
that conducting a policy which  is going to lead to distraction not for the Kurds only ,but also 
for all Iraq in general. He gave example in his book one of them he talk about if the an English 
could change a Scottish person to English then the Kurds will become Arabs also. 
So I appeal you to stop this injustice against Kurdish people and let them to have their national 
identity preserved in Iraq and not feel that they are second class citizen. Unfortunately this 
was not heard, there was not any broad thinker in Iraq. The British were responsible for 
establishing such government especially Baath regime. 
The matter of writing banners for political reasons, once there was freedom banners were 
raised after the Sara square demonstrations banners were banned.  
Q. Were there any killed in the demonstrations? A. yes ,20 killed and wounded and some of 
the wounded died due fear of taking them to hospital, according to the documents from the 
British government that lately revealed, even there were 10 minors who got killed they were 
students of science school. 
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Q. Who were the shooters? According the British government documents, the unrests were 
massive so the government had to bring Tofiq Wahbi to be the chef of Sulaimaniya even he 
was the dean of the military college and the people were happy for that. But the government 
were skeptic about him so they move him from the position, then the unrests began one more 
time, the y put an English person in his position his name was (Iliam). 
People were throwing stones that were their weapon they threw stones at the windows of 
Sara Building. They cannot control the people so they brought other forces from Hamiya and 
this group started shooting at people based on the documents the name of the officer who 
ordered the shooting I think his name was Mahmood Hilmi, and banners after this incident 
perish. In the 40th there were demonstrations took place but I think there was not enough 
freedom to raise banners. 
In the demonstrations on January 1948 which all over Iraq against the Portsmouth convention 
with the British at that time Salih Jabir was running the Iraqi government in Baghdad. The 
demonstrations made the government to move from the power and a new government 
established in Iraq Said Mohammed Sadir set up the government, a new era for Iraq arouse 
numerous magazines and newspapers came to being. In the history of Iraq the first Kurdish 
political magazine published named Nizar in Kurdish and Arabic languages Aladen Sujadi was 
the editor. 
At that time freedom was prevailing for demonstration, the Kurds participated in the 
demonstrations even in Baghdad were the delegations of the cities gathered the Kurds 
participated in the demonstration wearing Kurdish clothes, but the situation changed rapidly 
and the rule of oppression began many of the magazines and the newspaper closed this 
continue until the time come to the revolution of 1958 I say it was an military coup because 
the military coup happened over the monarchy. In this time there was freedom until the 
revolution of September started. Once the monarchy is overthrown and the establishment of 
republic there were freedom and demonstrations, during the monarchy there were no any 
political parties exist. It was approved in the law of assembly 1922 in Iraq it was applicable 
during the monarchy era I think in point number 5 article 4 it says parties are not to establish 
based on national or religion, while there were lots of national Arab parties ,but for the Kurds 
it was prohibited, so most of the movements were secretly active for example Komalay 
Sarbakhoye Kurdistan (Kurdistan Liberty Group) Zardashi assembly and fraternity party , 
Kurdistan democratic party they were all secretly active until the republic established, it was 
for the first time one Kurdish party permitted to work Kurdistan democratic party in 1959. 
Then formal organs of struggle the editor was Ibrahim Ahmad until 1961at that time there 
were freedom to demonstration took place to support Abdulkarim Qasim there are photos 
evidence of banners were used. 
Q. At the time of the convention of March the 11th were there any banners used?  
A. Yes,  may be in the cities where KDP split up into the followers of Jala Talabani and the 
followers of Mal Mustafa , the followers of Jala talabani used banner because they were living 
in the cities in Sulaimaniya there is chances that they used banners. 
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Q. Why the political bureau of KDP is called the red turban?  
A. Mala Mustafa was alone; he was the follower of left wing and the communist ideology in 
Iraq, so that KDP intervened a clause in their by-law that was derived from the ideology of 
Marks and Lenin for their works. At that time the world was divided into western block and 
eastern block Soviet Union which they stand before the western world and capitalism to bring 
people from the followers of Jala Talabani Mawi ideology (Masiton) it was very popular at 
that time. 
Q. the yellow color of KDP was it exist long time of it came to being after the 1991 revolution. 
A. in the 70th may be I have not observed that, but I think it came to being after the 1991 
revolution. 
Q. What about the red color of communist party? 
This was existed long time ago the axe and the red star . 
Q. Komala used the color red?  
A.  Yes that is right. 
Q. Was there any conflict between them? 
A. Yes , even Khabat magazine which was published in Baghdad they working in the sun light  
then they start to work secretly , when KDP split into two parts in 1962 , the abstracts that 
were published by the political bureau headline was red and Jalal Talabani part , I think the 
KDP was blue I cannot remember well. 
Q. after March 11th convention how was banners written?  
A. writing banners increased for political reasons we are talking about it in general,KDP was 
more like a party. 
Q. Do you remember the calligraphers of that time?  
A.  the one that I remember who was very well-known was Khalid Zamdar at Sara square , at 
Kawa street Ali Omer they were writing the signs for the shops and beside that they wrote 
banners as well after the year 1973 till 1991. 
From 1930 the banners were mostly Kurdish the March 11th convention was written in both 
Kurdish and Arabic. Those ones made in Baghdad was written in Arabic and those ones that 
written in Kurdistan were written in Kurdish some times in Arabic as well, then after 1957 
banners were all in Arabic because the demonstrations led by the Baath party. 
Q. do you remember any banners from the Baath party for the election, Sadam’s birthday, 
14th of july or 17th of july? 
A. they were all in Arabic language there was not any occasion related to the Kurdish people, 
like Nawroz, even March 11th that was related to the Kurds was not celebrated. 
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Q. before the Kurdish revolution, did color represent any significance for the Kurdish people 
in politics, was there any specific color that reflected the Kurdish people? 
 Q. in fact the color red had some significance after 1975 and the establishment of PUK, 
including Komala were a left wing party , the communist party were in agreement with Iraqi 
Government until 1978 they were using banners in red color  in the occasions or the axe and 
the hammer the communist logo. 
They had a magazine published in Arabic and Kurdish it was in red and black color same like 
the banners they used. 
Q. these colors at Baath regime era where they able to representing anything in the cities? 
A. No, it was so hard wearing black color was a risk growing beard was a risk, there were 
courageous people who wore black like those who were mourning for the lost of their love 
ones. 
The colors with a meaning mostly were red and black even the writing on the wall were mostly 
in these two colors it was attractive and the government was trying to erase them as soon as 
possible. 
Q. In the time of the Iraq Iran war where there any occasions took place? 
A. yes, one on of the things I remember I was a student in the University, and they forced us 
to demonstrate against the convention of Anwar Sadat with Israel in 1977 , they were mostly 
Arab worlf occasions and had nothing to do with the Kurds, often they were forcing people 
to make gatherings against Iran during Iraq Iraq war ,but most of the people were trying to 
avoid the gatherings or to sneak out of it. 
Q.  I remember when I was student a gathering held for unveil a statue by Ali Hassan Majed 
it was for the war with Iraq , there were banners , but I do not know whether the people made 
it of the Baath party made it for the gatherings? 
A. the party wrote it and gave it to people to carry them. Before the Kurdish revolution the 
party start to built wall within the neighborhood to make sure people cannot run, I remember 
when the situation was in chaos in the main street it was too hard to get away and flee. One 
of the wall built was Qazazakan wall, I still remember I was with brother Rafiq he was a 
teacher in Najaf we were walking from Sara to twi malik and there were two Arabs walking in 
front of us, my brother told me do you know these two are from the security forces I told his 
how do you know that he said one day I was going back to Najaf one of them was sitting next 
time and he told me that he works with the security forces in Sulaimaniya and he said 
Sulaimaniya is a dangerous place how could you manage to live their. All of a sudden while 
me and my brother were walking Peshmarga showed up and killed both and we did not know 
where to run. 
Unfortunately these incidents are not recorded I as a historian I did not write them down to 
know about our self K and what is Anfal one of them is Mam Jalal who said to the Arabs we 
forgot about the Anfal. 
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Q. After the Kurdish revolution the Kurdish society divided into the colors why it that is it 
because of the elections? 
A. When the revolution happened and the government administration organized again there 
was kind of freedom , a new political era came to being , but without any planning all the 
parties were working for the sake of themselves only , it spread out in a way that cause serious 
disorder after the talks with Baghdad did not lead to any understanding. the election is due 
to the rule of the Kurdistan coalition, to settle down the matter they had to run for the 
election, once election is the headline so the parties needs as much as people to follow them. 
Then the issues started and the Kurdish parties evolved in an abnormal way. 
Q.  Each of the parties select a specific color?  
A. yes, in my opinion if we study theselection of these colors by the parties in the 
psychological and social aspect it means something. 
Q. Distribution of the people over these colors, how did it affect the community especially 
when the war between yellow and green and the other colors occurred? 
A. It will lead to the distraction of the family bonds and social bonds, for instance it will create 
issue between the members of the same family if there is be different opinion, or the 
relatives, so in general people will separate from each other. Even for the security forces 
green and yellow, some people get fanatic about is and say my blood is yellow or green which 
lead to killing and unrest between the people. The accountability is, mostly on the parties not 
he people. 
Q.  This is because each of the parties had their own economy and armed groups? 
A. the parties only cared about how many followers they have, we did not have a good mind 
of thinking to use the situation to the best of the nation after the revolution to resolve the 
issues with the central government and the neighbors. The issues deepen up to the extend 
each of the parties were only thinking about the empowerment of their own party, then the 
co existence was something impossible.  
When you have national army and prepared in the context of the country they will not fight 
for the sake of any particular party, and to defend a party that damage the interest of the 
nation, even the small parties were in struggle to make their own armed groups, because they 
straight forward come from the partisan fights and the already had their own armed groups. 
They could not get into agreement within dialogue and they did not show any concession to 
each other and they did not consider the bad situation that the nation was going through. 
People were starving, but the Kurdish parties were busy with their own interest, they were 
rich because each of them was holding custom point within their jurisdiction and they were 
collecting tax. 
Q. who was the most powerful party in the region after the revolution? 
A. In the green zone PUK was in power, they were struggling during the Baath party against 
them and Baath party could not overthrow them so they used chemical weapon. 
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Q.  How is the aspect of democracy in green zone where they hold the armed groups? 
A. The revolution was a focal point in the history of Kurdish nation but unfortunately these 
parties could not take benefit if it. To sit down and put a new strategy, Because they came 
from the mountain as partisans now it is different they need to run the cities by official 
administrations, it was true that we did not have experience but we could sit and put down a 
plan and to have everybody know about the boundaries that cannot be crossed, and even the 
election worsen the situation. 
In the elections you need people, counterfeit in the elections because we did not invent 
election like the process that going on in Europe. 
Q. Each of the groups had their own armed groups, is it possible to have democracy in place 
in such situation? 
A. It is impossible in the existence of armed groups to have a democratic election. And the 
constitution was to serve the interest of one party even Baghdad was intervening in it. For 
instance I could not believe KDP win the election because since 1975 KDP was vanished from 
this country. How they got all these votes when they were not exist on the most difficult time 
of the nation were PUK was struggling, because we notice the existence of PUK in Soran region 
so this changed the balance of power and the issued deepened. 
Q.  After 2003 there were some elections took place how was aspect of democracy at that 
time? 
A. When there is election there is opposition but we did not have such thing from the start of 
the revolution there were opposition against KDP and PUK we have to keep in mind that there 
were some opposition omong the educated people and free thinker .there were a group who 
published free magazines like Bakhtyar Ali, Mariwan Wrya Qania, Barzan Faraj, at the same 
time they were holding seminars and they expected the civil war, I was following their work. 
The prediction that that PUK and KDP is obtaining leading to civil war got true. The civil war 
divided all the people into two parties and it affected democracy after the war  
It was big mistake for both parties especially PUK because when in war military people arise 
and rule so PUK became a party ruled by military people, PUK was not like this they used to 
be a educated party. 
Q. The war was only between PUK and KDP or the Islamic groups as well? 
A. Yes, the Islamic groups involved in the war Bzwtnawa and they did not have that much 
experience but they were very enthusiastic toward their cause, they made big mistake 
because the war led them to distinction. 
Q.  How many got killed roughly in the war? 
A. Thousands, but the people who got killed in the war between PUK and Bzotnawa might be 
tens of people but the number of the missing is quite big there are a lot of families waiting 
for the return of their love ones. 
Q.  Is there risk of another war? 
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A. yes same mentality of the parties they had when they were partisans, there are some 
changes, in general they seem careless, and as an individual I always fear to happen again. 
Q.  Now can you say we have a unified government one unified army and financial source? 
A. No, until now you can see the division of power between green zone and yellow zone, most 
of the time I see the flag of party then the flag of Kurdistan and Iraq, it should be Kurdistan 
flag first of all. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
225 
 
Interview 4 
Anwar Salih: Head of information department of the PUK 1 organization in Sulaymaniyah 
(2015). 
Could you let us know when PUK has built up?  
PUK was reported the first revelation in 1975, and the year after was begun destining 
against the Iraqi administration.  
What were the PUK points?  
The PUK points were attempting to acquire Kurdish perfectly fine country and uniformity.  
Where is the PUK geopolitics work?  
PUK account the entire Kurdistan as its place to battling.  
Where is the most PUK member's?  
Historically, PUK power was in entire of south of Kurdistan before 1991 however after 1991, 
when the PDK returned to Bdinan range and PDK made a pressure on our members in that 
district so PUK power in that region was decreased. PUK characterize Sulaimany as its green 
castle, and the most of its power is l located in Sulaimany and also Garmian was other 
where that PUK has more members, and Karkuk still is a noteworthy site for the PUK. 
Where is the green zone?  
The green zone is Sulaimany area, Garmian, Halabja, Pshdar, Qaladze, Rania, and Sulimany 
they all are called green zone.  
After 1991 PUK was administrated that area. Can you give us a chance to know about the 
length of time that PUK was the intense party in the green zone and what was changed in its 
power, and what is the present circumstance of the PUK? 
After 1991, According to those circumstances, PUK has struggled to federalism for Iraq and 
made Kurdish autonomy administration. That plan was emerged in election that was took 
place 1992. PDK and PUK were the powerful parties in this region and they were established 
parliament and government. PUK was found its power in Sulaimany. Every parties, if it is 
styed for a long time in the government, it is faced many negative things which is cannot 
obtain all people’s ambitions so it is facing objection. PUK has done many things in all 
sectors but it was not satisfy all people as a result, the change movement was separate from 
PUK and it is influence PUK power in the region and lost most of seats in parliaments and 
government.        
After 1991, as indicated by those circumstances, PUK has attempted to federalism for Iraq 
and Kurdish self-rule organization. That arrangement was developed in election that was 
occurred 1992. PDK and PUK were the intense politic parties in Kurdistan, and they were 
built up parliament and government. PUK was discovered its power in Sulaimany. Each 
politic party, in the event that it is styed for quite a while in the administration, it is 
confronted numerous negative things which it can't get every one of individuals' aspirations 
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so it is confronting complaint. PUK has done numerous things in all sectors however it was 
not satisfy all people. Consequently, the change movement groups were divided from PUK 
and it has an impact PUK power in the area and lost a large portion of its seats in parliament 
and government. 
The influential period for PUK, was begun after 1991 until the division of change 
development from the PUK. About %48 to%49 of Kurdistan was under the PUK controls; 
however after elections for parliament which was occurred in 30/04/2013 PUK turned into 
the second greatest force in Sulaimany. Despite the fact that PUK is the second politic 
power as indicated by the election, PUK has an intense armed force and fighting against the 
IS in the broad territory. PUK has more than 18000 martyrs.  
How and when did chose the green as image for PUK, and who was chosen?  
After 1991the race was occurred so consequently each politic party must be has its own 
colour as a symbol, wherefore the green colour was chosen for PUK. Moreover, PUK has its 
own logo which is formative from the red rose represent the martyr blood's, branch of olive 
tree as an image for the peace, a branch of wheat as an image life, welfare and straggling. 
Those all are holding by a hand which is represent the people hand, and the logo’s 
background is the green colour which is the symbol of PUK Green is a symbol for reborn, 
modernity, and living in a social and politic life. It was selected according to PUK principle 
and programs. 
The green is reflected on many things, and Sulaimany was covered by green banners in the 
PUK events. 
For the PUK occasions, the green was always utilized for making banners, decorating cars, 
decorating offices, designing for clothes, decorating guns and green also utilized for 
decorating books and the newspapers writing for instance, for the new Kurdistan 
newspaper’s writing green is utilized. In addition, green give us power during the election 
campaign. This means that PUK is distinguished from the other politic parties by its own 
colour which is green.  This is a part of PUK identity and history. The PUK followers are very 
proud when they are using this colour for their clothes and banners and so on. The green 
now is a PUK cod and symbol. If you see green anywhere especially in this region, 
immediately you know this is a PUK colour. 
Have you ever green made problems for a PUK’s followers especially in civil war especially 
between PUK and PDK or PUK and Islamic groups?   
Of course, they treated in an aggressive way. This has done by PDK and Islamic groups. If 
someone has worn green T-shirt or neckless, they were insulted even he was not the PUK 
followers, so they were treated as a PUK member’s. Maybe it was the same for someone 
utilized yellow in green zone. During the civil war people may killed or insulted when they 
utilized green, but now the situation is different.  
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Interview 5 
Haji Mohammad Rostam (shop owner at Nali Street) 14-7-2015 
Q. How long have you been working here? 
A. since 2003 or almost for fifteen years. 
Q. Have you studied in school? 
A. In 1958 I studied for a period, I was living in the countryside, I used to graze animals but 
later when I moved to the city I studied in a night school in Sarkareaz quarter between the 
1980s-90s. I am good at reading but my writing is poor. 
Q. Have you worked in politics? 
A. I worked for the revolution in the 1970s in the cities, during that period Kurdish people 
liked to work in politics towards Kurdish autonomy. I wanted to see Kurdish success. 
Q. There is a fixed banner above your shop; what is that for? 
A. This banner symbolizes Ramadan month, everything has its own sign and this banner 
denotes a Ramadan welcome. Almighty God has stated in the Holy Qur’an that God has 
imposed Ramadan on you as he imposed on previous generations and religions. In another 
verse God says that the Qur’an was been delivered [to Muhammad] in this month. Therefore 
I write such words on banners In Ramadan month of every year and it has become a memorial 
for me to welcome Ramadan. Almighty God has urged us to carry on such duty. Some people 
simply think that only in Ramadan God will be worshipped. This is not fair because praying for 
God is a task that should be accomplished and fasting is the same. 
Q. So do you want to express something for people who pass by and read  this fixed banner? 
A. Well this is for the people I want to show that God says it and we have to obey it as it’s an 
inevitable duty. 
Q. I see you have chosen the Verse haven’t you? 
A. Yes I have, this verse is included in Baqarra (cow) Surah, and I chose it and then took it to 
the calligrapher. I have a Kurdish interpretation Qur’an opposite to the Arabic version. This is 
beneficial because everyone cannot understand Arabic in our country. So I took it to the 
calligrapher and asked him to write the VERSE both in Arabic and Kurdish. 
Q. Is it your first year you have ordered such a banner? 
A. No, I have ordered one every year since 2007. 
Q. The banner is written with two colors - blue and red, does it mean anything or has the 
calligrapher himself chosen them? 
A. Not at all, the red font is for the Kurdish verse and the other is for the Arabic. If they were 
in one color then they would look too similar and it is prettier. 
Q. So it’s just for differentiating the languages? 
228 
 
A. Yes exactly, that is the reason. 
Q. Why have you chosen a white background for the banner cloth? 
A. The script will be seen better on the white background  
Q. Is there a holy color according to Islam? 
A. I never heard about that, colors are a personal preference. 
Q. Is it only for decoration? 
A. Yes as I told you I have not heard what is the holiest color, for example if you write on a 
blue background the banner would not look as clear as on the white one, it doesn’t relate to 
holiness. But in Islam people desire white. For instance they mostly wear white clothes and 
say it’s holy, the religious men also wear white turbans. 
Q. But in most of the mosques and shrines green is used, people wrap green cloth around the 
tombs and on the trees above the reverends’ tombs and they even paint the domes with 
green‼ 
A. I personally have not heard that this green color is used with an intention but I have seen 
the reverends’ tombs where green pieces of cloth are wrapped around and some say that the 
Sheikhs used green. 
Q. Do you compose and order banners only for Ramadan or for other occasions? 
A.  I compose them for memorial [birth date] of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon 
him). 
Q. What about national occasions? Do you order banners ? 
A. No 
Q. Do you do it for the deceased ones? 
A. Yes , this would be written as an acknowledgement for the relatives and neighbours. 
Q. Depending on your memory; since when have people used black banners for the funeral 
ceremony? 
A. To the best of my knowledge since the sixties, and I have no Idea regarding before that 
time. The black cloth is a symbol of the burial ceremony. 
Q. Once you compose the banners, do you add your name? 
A. No I just write the Verses. 
Q. Do you write the same thing every year or do you make changes? 
A. If it’s for Ramadan fasting month I just write that, and what relates to the birth date of the 
prophet (peace be upon him) we write that God states in the holy Qur’an Verse: “I and all the 
angles Saluting the Prophet, Thus Thee Believers Salute him”. We send congratulations to 
all the world’s Muslims and especially Kurdistan ones. 
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Q. Apart from both occasions, are there any others you compose? 
A. We have Mia’raj occasion65 which happens in a night but I don’t compose banners, though 
some people do. 
Q. Will people write banners and hang them on the mosques? 
A.  I have seen them in previous years but this year I have rarely seen them. 
Q. And don’t the mall shops owners collectively compose them? 
A. Once I wrote them for the neighbourhood […] but I noticed that there were people who 
liked them while there were some who disliked them and disbelieved, that’s why I decided 
not to write  them any more. 
Q. So did any people respond that they did not believe in it [Islam]? 
A. People won’t tell you directly, but in their heart some are non believers. Some critisised 
me writing the banners for my own intention. I have made the banners because God says so 
and not for commercial purposes. 
Q. Can the banners be seen for national occasions? For example have the jewelry shop owners 
ordered any banners to protest against Da’ash, and what about here in this mall? 
A. I haven’t seen that but in the central local market people have done so. 
There is a point I want to tell you: nowadays each restaurant hangs a banner in which it says: 
“with the occasion of the holy Ramadan month our restaurant is open”. I believe it’s 
disrespectful to Ramadan. If you want to fix a banner for this occasion then write something 
else. In the sixties a few restaurants were opened only for tourists otherwise if one dared to 
open a restaurant people would have commented that it is a “Russian inn”, that is to say 
Russian culture as they have another religion. 
Q. People are now divided on the colors of green, yellow, red ….etc. Was this phenomena 
present during Saddam’s reign or before? 
A. No, this appeared after the uprising66. 
Q. Does it have social effects? 
A. Yes of course, for example if you were a KDP supporter whilst your brother was for the PUK 
then you disliked each other because each wants his party to win the case. Almighty God says 
in the holy Qu’ran Verse that: “all the parties are satisfied with its own” this has inflicted 
restlessness among people because sometimes people dragged through the street and hit as 
punishment because of a simple speech that insulted someone in the opposite party. 
Q. How was color used during the internal civil war67? 
 
65 Mia’raj is the occasion when Muhammad met God he showed Muhammad part of heaven and part of hell 
66 1991 
67 1994-1998 
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  ٥١٠٢/ ٧/ ٨جبار فارس    خۆشنوس       
 
ا
لە فولکەی کاوەی ئاسنگەر لەگەڵ برادەرێک  ٣٨٩١پ. کەی دەستت کردوە بە کارکردن وەک خۆشنوس؟ ج. لە ساڵ
ئیعلانانى سامان مان دانا. پ. ئەو سەردەمە چ شتێکتان دەنووسی؟ لافیتەی پرسەو ڕیکلام و نوسیتی سەر جامخانەی 
ێ و 
ا
 مەجلیسی تنفی  ی ی دوکان و قطعەکان بوو. پ. لافیتەی سیاسی ئەنوسرا؟ ج. بەڵ
ەک ئەو لافیتانەی بۆ ئینتیخابانى
  اقدا بە تەنها خۆی تشر یعی دەنوسرا. پ. بە چ ڕەنگێک دەنوسرا؟ ج. بە ه
ەموو رەنگیک حزنی بعث دیکتاتۆر بوو لە عیێ
هەبوو هیچ ڕکابەرو منافسێکی نەبوو، تەنها خۆی بوو هەر ڕەنگێکی بویستایە بەکاری دەهێنا. پ. ئەی بە چ زمانێک 
ەنوسرا؟ ج. هەمووی بە عەرەنی ئەنوسرا. پ. ئەی کوردی تیا نەبوو؟ ج. نا هەمووی عەرەنی بوو. پ. لە کوێ ئ
ماشەکە هەڵئەواسرا؟ ج. لەناو شار لە شەقام و فولکەکان هەڵئەواسرا ئەوسا سلێمانی فولکەی زۆر بوو. پ. جۆری قو 
ار دەهات ئێستا کودەری بەکاردێت. پ. ئەوسەردەمە چی بوو کە بۆ لافیتە بەکار دەهات؟ ج. ئەوسا قوماسیر سی  ا بەک
ڕەنگەکان هەرچیەک بوایە کێشەنە بوو؟ ج. تۆ ئەنی حسانی کۆنیى است بکەی لە خەتدا ئەگەر تۆخ بیت قوماشەکە 
 ئەبێت بە کال لەسەری بنوسیت وە بە پێچەوانەوە هەر ڕاستە. 
  بەهێچ شێو 
ەیەک، ئەوشتانە نهێتی بوو دەچوە لای ئەوکەسانەی پ. ئەی نوسیتی پێشمەرگە نەدەهاتەلاتان؟ ج. نەخیێ
متمانەیان پێبوو. پ. لەکەیەکەوە ئیش بۆ یەکێتى دەکەیت؟ ج. من بەر لەوەی خەتانى بکەم کاری سیاسیم کردوە، لە 
 خۆش نوسیشم بۆکردون. پ.سەردمی حزنی بعث لافیتە نوسی  ی زۆر 
ڕیزەکانی کۆمەڵەی ڕەنجدەران ئیشم کردوەو ئیسیر
لافیتەی پرسە و ڕیکلام کەم دەنوسرا بەتایبەت هی پرسە چونکە شار بچوک بوو ئەگەر شتیک وی بدایە هەموو بوو؟ ج. 
 حزنی بعپ لە 
. پ. ئەی لافیتەی حزنی بعث خۆی چۆن بوو؟ ج. لەیادی دامەزراندنی
نیسان وە بۆ  ٧شار دەیزانی
  تموز و ئینتیخابات و مناسەبە حزبیەکان لافیتە دەنوسرا.  ٧١شۆرسیر 
پ. لەسەردەمی بعث دا لافیتەت بۆ شۆڕش نەنوسیوە؟ ج. تەنها یەک جار نوسیومە، ئەویش بۆ چلەی شەهید جمال 
تاهی  ئەندامی سەرکردایەنى یەکێتى بوو، چلەکە لە مزگەونى بالیسان بوو، لەگەڵ برایەکی دا چووین، من لافیتەیەکم بۆ 
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ەر نوسی بوو،  نوسینەکان دروشمەکانی کۆمەڵەی نوسی لەسەر قوماسیر زەرد بە بۆییەی ڕەش نوسینەکەم لەس
 ڕەنجدەران بوون. 
پ. ئەگەر بکریت باسی کارکردنی دوای ڕپەڕینمان بۆ بکەی چۆن کارت کردووە؟ ج. لەدوای ڕاپەڕین لە بەسیر ڕاگەیاندنی 
 
ا
  لافیتەیەکم ٠٠١لەوانەیە چەند   ٢٩٩١مەڵبەند دەستم کرد بە ئیش کردن، لەسەرەتای هەڵیی ر اردنی ساڵ
بە زمانی
ا؟ پ. ج. لەدوای کۆنگرەی یەک، کوردی و عەرەنی و ئینگلی  ی ی نوسیبێت. ڕەنگە سەوزەکەی یەکێتى کەی دیاری کر 
 سەوز 
ی
ئەوکاتە بوو پەیرەو پڕۆگرامی یەکێتى گۆڕا بۆ سۆسیال دیموکرات، وە هەموو حزبە  سۆسیال دیموکراتەکان ڕەنکی
کرا. پ. لەو کۆنگرەیەدا   ٢٩٩١/ ٥/ ٩١ڵیی ر اردنی پەرلەمانی کوردستان لە کرا، هە  ٢٩٩١/ ١/ ٧٢بەکاردەهێیی ی . کۆنگرەکە لە 
دەنگ بەو ڕەنگە سەوزە درا؟ ج. پێش هەڵیی ر اردن هەموو حزبەکان کەلە بەرەی کوردستانی دابوون، ئییى بڕیاریان دا کە 
م لە کۆنگرەی 
ا
کەش باکگراوندەکەی هێشتا ڕەنگ دیاری نەکرا بوو تەنانەت لۆگۆ  ١/ ٧٢ڕەنگ بۆخۆیان دیاری بکەن، بەڵ
 زەرد بوو. 
پ. پێش دیاری کردنی ڕەنگە سەوزەکە لافیتەکانتان بە چ رەنگێک دروست دەکرد؟ ج. بۆ پرسە هەر ڕەش بەکار  
 تر هەموو ڕەنگێک بەکار دەهات، هێشتا ڕەنگ نەببو بە سیمبولی هیچ حزبێک، کە هەڵیی ر اردن 
م بۆ شتەکانی
ا
دەهات، بەڵ
  یەکێتى . کرا ئەوڕەنگە بوو بە سیمبولی
هێیی ی ؟ بەچ ڕنگێک نوسینەکان دەنوسن؟ ج. قوماسیر سەوز پ. ئییى لەوە بەدواوە ئێوە قوماسیر سەوز  بەکاردە 
 و بە بۆیەنی ستی لەسەری دەنوسی  ی . پ. چ بۆنەیەک زۆرتی  ی لافیتەتان بۆ دەنوسی؟ ج. پێش ئەوەی بەکاردە 
هێنی  ی
   
می پرسیارەکەت بدەمەوە دەمەوێ باسی شتێک بۆ بگیێ
ا
 خۆی ئەوەی دەمانچەی نی ێ بوایە پەڕۆیەکی وەڵ
مەوە، وەختى
دی پێوە دەپێچا، لەحانونى عەسکەری هەبوو ئەفرۆسرر ا بۆ پاکردنەوە بەکاردەهات، دواڕاپەڕین یەکێتیەکان پەڕۆکەیان زەر 
 گۆڕی بە سەوز، چەندەها جار خەڵک دەهاتە لام داوای پارچەیەک قوماسیر سوزی دەکرد بیپێچێت لە سیلاحەکەیەوە. 
 داوە بە ڕاگەیاندن وە لافیتەی بۆ هەموو بۆنە حزنی و نەتواییەتیەکان دەنوسی، بۆ 
ی
بۆ جوانی پرسیارەکەت یەکێتى گرنکی
سالەی ی.ن.ک لە یۆبیلی  ٥٢هەڵیی ر ادنەکان بۆ یادی دامەزراندنی یەکێتى لافیتەی زۆرمان دەنوسی بەتایبەت لە یادی 
 نی ێ درا. 
 تایبەنى
ی
 زێڕین دا گرنکی
ێ بەس ئێستا ژورەکان گۆڕاوە. پ.  گەورەترین  حەجمی پ. ئێوە هە 
ا
ر لەناو ئەم مەڵبەندەیا ئیشەکانتان دەکرد؟ ج. بەڵ
م بۆنەی تریش ه
ا
ەبوو بۆ نمونە دژی مادەی لافیتە یان ژمارە بۆ کام بۆنەیە دەنوسرا/ ج. هەر بۆ یادی یەکێتى بوو، بەڵ
  ٤٢
ا
  اق کە بۆ کەرکوک  ٠١٠٢ی ساڵ
لافیتەمان نوسی و درایە دەست  ٠٠٥٢دەرچوو، نزیکەی  بڕیارێکی حکومەنى عیێ
 ڕەش لەسەری 
ی
 ستی و بە ڕەنکی
خەڵک و خۆپیشاندانی پێوە کرا. پ. بەچ ڕەنگێک لافیتەکان دروست کران؟ بە قوماسیر
 ئەو مادەیە. پ. بی  ەوەریت چیە لەو بۆنەیەدا؟ ژمارە
ی نوسیمان، لەبەر ئەوەی پەیمانی هەموو حزبەکان بوو بۆ دژایەنى
کەس ئیشمان دەکرد تا بەرە بەیان کە ڕۆژ بوەوەو تەواو   ٦١لافیتەکان زۆر بوون زەغتێکی گەورەمان لەسەر بوو خۆم و 
م بەداخەوە لە دوانیوەڕۆ دا تەقینەوەیەک لە ناو خۆپیشاندانەکەدا  ٠١بوین سەعات 
ا
تەسلیمان کرد دڵم خۆش بوو، بەڵ
ی تەلەفزیونەوە وێنەی تەقین
ەوەکەم بیتی ، لافیتەکانی خۆمم دەبیتی بەدەست خەڵکەوە خۆێتی پێوە ڕوی دا، من لە ڕنێ
 بوو خەڵكێکی زۆر شەهیدو بریندار بوون ئەوە زۆر یادگارییەکی ناخۆشە بۆ من. 
م بە ٦پ. گەورەترین لافیتە کە نوسیبێتت؟ لافیتەیەک بوو بۆ هەڵیی ر اردنی شارەونیەکان، یەکێتیش بەشداربوو، لافیتەکە 
ووم دەنگ بدە بە لیستى یەکێتى . هیچ حزبێک نیە لە سلێمانی بە قەدەر ئێمە لافیتەی نوسیبێت. پ. م بوو، نوسی ب٧٢
ی هەموو ساڵێک ڕەشەبا  ٦/ ١قەت لافیتەکانتان دڕێیی اوە یان لێکراوەتەوە؟ ج. ئێمە معاناتمان هەبوو بەتایبەت لە 
دەبیت کەسێک دابنێی  ی بە س لافیتەکان  ئەبوو لافیتەکانی ئەدڕاندین، کاک عومەری سەید علی ئەو کاتە دەیووت
هەڵبواسێتەوە. پ. بی  ەوەریت چیە لەسەردەمی شەڕی ناوخۆ لە نێوان سەوز و زەردا؟ ج. ئەوسەردەمەمە شەڕە پەرۆیان 
 ڕوداوە سیاسیەکاندا ئاماژە ئەدرا بە شەڕی ناوخۆ. وە ئەو سەردەمە هێشتا حزنی بعث مابوو زۆربەی 
نی ێ دەوت، لە کانى
ایەوە بە حزنی بعث و بە شەڕی ناوخۆوە. وە لەبۆنەکاندا بۆ نمونە یادی یەکێتى ، یادی ڕاپەڕین و شتەکان دە
بەسیى
 کرێکارانیش، دروشمەکانمان ئەبەستەوە بە ئازادی و سەربەخۆنی و ئاشتى و پێکەوە ژیانی 
نەورۆز تەنانەت جەژنی
 میللەتەکەمان. 
یدەکان لە پرسەکانیان و لە چلەکانیاندا لافیتەمان دەنوسی. پ. پ. ئەی بۆ شەهیدەکان لافیتەتان دەنوسی؟ ج. بۆ شەه
مناسەبەی چلەی شەهیدی تیا بوو،  ٣ایت قوربانیەکان زۆر بوون؟ ج. ڕۆژانە شەڕ هەبوو حەفتە هەوبوو وەک بی  ت ماب
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سەر مناسەبەی چلەی شەهیدەکانمان نەبیت، ئەمە جگە لەمناسەبەی شەهیدەکانی سەردەمی شاخ، لە ٠١مانگ نەبوو 
لافیتەکان لە کوێ هەڵدەواسرا؟ ج. لەبەردەم قوماسیر رەش ئەمان نوسی هەر لەم مەڵبەندە دەنووسرا . پ. ئەی 
 هۆڵەكان، لەبەر دەرکی سەرا، لە مزگەوت و لەسەر قەبرانیش. 
 پ. جیاوازی هەبوو لە نێوان کەسەکان بۆ یەکێک زۆرتر بنوسرێت یان کەمیى ؟ ج. وەک مەڵبەند جیاوازی نەدەکرا، 
مەگەر کەس و کاریان زیاتریان نوسیبێت، بۆ نمونە بۆ کۆچی دوانی ئییی اهیم ئەحمد مەلبەند وەک ئەرکی خۆی لافیتەی 
تیان و دامو دەزگاکانی حکومەتیش وەک ئەرکی خۆیان لافیتەی زۆریان بۆ نوسی بوو. پ. ئەی لەکانى 
ا
م هاوڵ
ا
بۆ نوسی بەڵ
؟ ج. بە دڵنیاییەوە تەنانەت قسە لەسەر ئەوەش دەکرا وتیان با شەڕنی ناوخۆدا لافیتەی حزبەکانی تر دەبییی ا 
لە سلێمانی
ئێمە بە سەوز نەنوسی  ی و ئێوەش بە زەرد نەنوسن بەس من لەگەڵ ئەوە نەبووم ئەموت  بە سەوز دەنوسی  ی 
ێ هەموو نوس
ا
ینەکان باشتەکانمان بناسرێتەوە. پ. ئەی بۆ لافیتەی مردوەکان ناوی مردوەکە بەسەوز دەنوسن؟ ج. بەڵ
بەستی و ناوی کەسەکە بە سەوز دەنوسریت. بۆ یادی هەڵەبجە هەموی بە سەوز دەنوسی  ی بەس هەڵەبجەکە بە سور 
 و دلۆنی خوێتی بۆ دروست دەکەین. 
 دەنوسی  ی
پ. ئەو دروشمانەی دەینوسن بە پتێ  زەمەن و بارودۆخەکان گۆڕانکاری بەسەرداهاتووە؟ ج. بە دڵنیاییەوە گۆڕانکاری 
شمەکاندا دێت بە پتێ  ئە هەلو مەرجەی دێتە پێشەوە، بۆ نمونە ئەمساڵ مەسەلەی شەری داعش و قەیران بەسەر درو 
لەگەڵ بەغداد هەیە دروشمەکان بەوانەوە دەبەسریتەوە. پ. چ  بی  ەوەرییەکت هەیە لەزەمەنی ئیش کردنتدا؟ ج. 
 
ا
 ستیوارد هەبوو لە  ٤٩٩١ بۆ  ٣٩٩١بی  ەوەرییەکم هەیە کە دواتر سوپاس نامەشم لەسەر وەرگرت، ساڵ
بوو، مسیى
  خواز بوو، مسیى 
منضمەی کی  ی ئوسیى الی ئیسیر ئەکرد، ئەو ڕێکخراوە نەونى دابەش ئەکرد لە سلێمانی ، منضمەیەکی خیێ
نى خۆی، شەو بەرپرسێک 
ا
  نەوە بۆ وڵ
ستیوارد لە چەمچەماڵ کوشتیان ئێوارەبوو، بۆ ئەوەی تەرمەکەی بنیێ
هێنابوو، هاتن سیر ڕەشەوە هاتن بۆ ماڵەوە، کارەبا نەبوو، لەیەک ژوردابووم  تازە ژنم لەمەڵبەندەوە بە تۆپێک قوما
 ستیوارد بۆ ئەوەی بیبەن لەگەڵ تەرمەکەدا. دوو لافیتەم لەبەر چرا بۆ نوسی  ی 
داوایان لێکردم کە لافیتە بنوسم بۆ مسیى
 ڕەش و بە بۆیەی ستی بە نوسیتی ئینگلی  ی ی و کوردی، هیچ ح
  زبێک نەی نوسی بوو جگە لە یەکێتى . لەسەر قوماسیر
پ. پەیوەندیتان هەبووە لەگەڵ خۆشنوسەکانی ناو شار؟ ج. ئێمە ئیش و کاری ناو مەڵبەندمان دەکرد هەندێ جار 
م کۆمیتەکانی گەرەکەکانی شار زۆر بوون، ئەوان ئیشەکانیان ئەبرد بۆ 
ا
یارمەنى کۆمیتەکانی ناو شارمان ئەدا، بەڵ
یان ئێمە جار هەبوو ئیشمان زۆر بوو ئەمان دا بە ئەوان بینوسن چونکە خۆمان فریا خۆشنوسەکانی ناو شار 
نەدەکەوتی  ی . پ. ئەو ڕەنگانەی وەک پاشماوە دەمانەوە لەسەر ڕوبەری پشتەوەی لافیتەکان چی بوون؟ ج. ڕەنگە 
 دیار بوو لەگەڵ ڕەش و ستی ، ڕەنگە تۆخەکان دیار نەدەما چونکە ئێمە لەس
ەر ڕەش بەستی دەنوسی  ی سەوزەکە بەزەقى
لەسەر سەوز بەستی و جار جار سوریش بەکار دەهێنی  ی . پ. سور بۆچی بەکار دێت؟ ج. بۆ جوانکاری و بۆ ئاوت لاین. 
 سور ڕەمزی 
ی
پ. ئەی ئەو ڕەنگە سورە پەیوەندی نیە بە کارەساتەکانەوە؟ ج. با چۆن پەیوەندی هەیە ڕەنکی
 سور دە
ی
 کانى خۆی ئێمە کۆمەڵەی شەهیدەکانمانە. پ. ئەی باسی ڕەنکی
ا
کریت کە لە شاخ بەکار هاتووە؟ ج. بەڵ
  ەیەکی سور هێمامان بوو چوار هێڵ بەدەورییەوە بوو، ئەوە ڕەمزی زۆرێک لە حزبە 
ڕەنجدەران بوین ئەستیێ
کۆمەنیستەکان بوو، لە دوای کۆنگرەی یەک ئەو ڕەنگە وجودی نەما، هەمووان بڕوایان وابوو کە ئێمە هەڵگری بی  و 
  اوەڕی سۆسیال دیموکراتی  ی . ب
ێ بۆ نموونە بۆ هاتتی مەسئولێکی 
ا
 تر نوسیوە بۆ نموونە بە عەرەنی یان ئینگلی  ی ی؟ ج. بەڵ
پ. ئێوە لافیتەتەتان بە زمانەکانی
عەرەب بۆ ئەم شارە بە عەرەنی نوسیومانە، یان بۆ نمونە کاتێک جێگارنەر و پۆڵ بریمەر هاتن بۆ سلێمانی لافیتەی 
  لافیتەو درا بە خەتاتێک.  ٠٢لافیتەکان سەوز بوون،لەبەر ئەوەی لافیتەکان زۆر بوون، هەر زۆرمان نوسی، 
 
  ٤٤٩١محسی  ی پی  ۆ 
نی 
ا
ی سەرەتای بووم. ٥لە مەکتەنی غازی بووم من لە پۆل دابووم  سەید محسن هاتبوو بۆ مەکتەبەکە لە  ٧٥٩١لەساڵ
ۆز مەمنوع بوو زەمانی مەلەکی بوو، جەژنی دارو درەخت ەور سەید محسن هات بوو لافیتەیەکی نووسی بوو ئەو کاتە ن
  ی منا چووم ، من 
هەبوو بە عەرەبیش ئەنوسرا. نوسی بووی یوم الشجرة. چەند لافیتەیەکی نووسی بوو مدیر ناردی بە شیێ
بکەرەوە  نەم دەناسی چووم بینیم. وونى ئەزانی فلچە بگری ووتم نەوەلا حەرفێکی لەبەر چاوم پر کردەوە وونى ئەوها پری 
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منیش لافیتەکەم بۆ پرکردەوە. ئە سەردەمە بەس ئە هەبوو کە من بیناسم. مامۆستا محمد علی هەبوو لە ئەوقاف بوو 
کرکوکی بوو معاونی سرر طة بوو خطاطی ئەکرد خەنى ثلتی ئەنووسی، لە پێش منا بوو. من نووسینەکانیم بینیوە خۆیم 
قطعەی مآموریەی ئەوقاقی  ٥٥٩١-٤٥٩١فامم کردەوە. لە سالی نەبینیوە لەوە ئەچی ێ مردبێت ئەو کاتەی کە من 
ئەوکاتەی نوسیبوو من بی  م نایەت. لە شەستەکاندا لەتیف حەمدی مامۆستای سەناعەبوو لەگەڵ عەلی عومەر 
تازەهاتبوو نو نووسینەوە  لافیتەی سلێمانی ئەمانە ئەیان نووسی. شێخ لەتیفی دانساز زۆر کۆنە لە بیست و سیەکاندا 
شۆرش هەلگی  سا من ئەکاتە لە  ١٦٩١ەتانى کردوە. لەوحات و شتەکانی نووسیوە.  لەسەرەتای شەستەکاندا لە خ
قوتابیاندا بووم. پێشمەرگە لە شاخ بوو ئێمە نهێتی بووین لە ناو شار. لافیتەمان بۆ دانرابوو بینوسینەوە لە لافیتەکاندا 
یەکەم جار من مامۆستا جمال ئەبدوولم ناسی ئەویش لە قوتابیاندا کۆمەلێک دەمووچاوم بیتی طە بابان محامی بوو ،بۆ 
لافیتەکانمان نووسی من جەمال ئەبدول لافیتەکان ستی بوو. کاک نەوشی  وان ناردی بردیان. کاک  ٢٦٩١بوو ئەمە سالی 
ڕۆن بۆ نەوشی  وان مەسولی هەموو قوتابیان بوو. بابەتەکان هی شۆورش بوو شەست شیعار بوو کۆتای شیعارەکە ب
 دواتر بەرابەرایەنى بەرزانی نەما لە شیعاراتەکەندا، ئییى 
ا
پێشەوە بەرابەرایەنى بەرزانی و پارنى دیموکرانى کوردستان، ساڵ
بەکاک طە م ووت گۆرانکاری رودەدات پار ناوی بەرزانی ئەهات بەرابەررایەنى بەرزانی ئیستا ووشەی بەرزانی نەماوە. 
ی ئەوەبە هەفتەیەک شیعارەکانی ئیمەیان برد هەڵیان واسی لەبەردەرکی سەرا، مام دوا  ٣٦سەرەتای  ٢٦٩١نهایەنى 
جەلال هات ، کۆشکی نوری عەلی هەبوو. سەیدەلیەەی نووری عەلی دوای بوو بە ئوتیل بچوک بوو بەرزترین باڵەخانەی 
ن ئەتوانێت قسەبکات، سلێمانی بوو، مام جەلال چوە ئەوی خوتبەی یا. لەگەل حکومەتدا ڕێک کەوتبوو ئەگینا چۆ 
وونى ئیمە لەگەل احمد حسن بەکەر رێکەوتوین لەسەرلامەرکەزی بەمەرچی ناوەرۆکەکەی ئۆتۆنومی بیت یکەم جارم 
بوو ووشەی ئۆتۆنومی بەرگوێم بکەویت نەم ئەزانی ئۆتۆنۆمی یەعتی چی . لەحیواردابوون. لافیتەکانمان لەوێ 
 دەرکەوت. ئەوەنەی هەلواسرابوون. بەنی ێ ناوی بەرزانی ، قسە تەو 
او بوو بە چەپلەریزان. ئییى قسەکانی من بوادرەکانی
پێنەچوو پێشمەرگە بەرو شار هاتن مام جەلال لە بەکرەجۆ بارەگای دانا. ئییى من ئیستیقالەم کرد لە قوتابیان. من 
ەم. ئیمە دووکانمان نەبوو عەریزەیەکم دانی لەبەر ئەوەی پارنى بوو بە دوو کەرتەوە من ئامادەنیم تەئیدی هیچ لایەک بک
  .  ٢بۆ قوتابیان شتمان ئەنووسی مامۆستا جەمال لە 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
234 
 
 The Martyr Walks Alone: by Qubad Jalizadah 
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Rostam Hakeem 
Performance proposal to: Red Jail gallery, Sulaymaniyah 
 
Sumerian cylinder seal. 
The inspiration for this project comes from Sumerian cylinder seals, invented in the 4th 
Millennium BCE in contemporary Iran, southern Mesopotamia. They are linked to the 
invention of cuneiform writing, although most subjects carved in relief were from a 
mythological source. The cylinders were typically used as seals for signing commercial and 
trade documents and most of cylinders subjects.  
I intend to appropriate this Sumerian form to create new method of painting, using an oil 
barrel to represent the cylinder seal. 
I am from a country which is rich with oil, but it could be argued that same oil has become a 
disaster for the Kurdish nation. Although Iraq’s oil output capacity is nearing 5 million 
barrels per day, people continue to suffer from lack of heating oil during the cold winter. 
When the government distribute oil in the cities, people run to get it, and if successful push 
their barrels home with their feet. The noise of all the barrels moving in this way is 
deafening.  
The performance will involve me writing my memories onto the oil barrel in white paint, 
and then pushing it with my feet across the canvas surface, in order to print off the writing 
(imperfectly) and, by continuing the process build up layers of writing. It might be that oil 
(black oil paint) leaks from the barrel as well. This project is therefore both a performance 
and painting (which will be documented). After the performance, I intend to display the 
barrel on the wall beside the resulting painting, in the manner of Middle East museum 
displays. 
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